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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an ldaho limited liabil ity company,

)

)

P la intiff/Counterdefendant/Appel Iant,

)
)

Case No. CY-20 I 0-5958

)
vs.

)

MICHAEL STORMS, an ind ividual, and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, fN C. ,an Idaho
corporation; collectively doing business as
BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT AND
BREWHOUSE,
Defendan t/Cou nterclaimants/Respondents.

Docket No.

43649

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

_ _ _________________)
**************
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

**************
Appeal from the District Court of the
Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Bonnevi lle

HONORABLE DARREN B. SIMPSON, District Judge.

* ** ******* * ** *
B.J. Driscoll
PO Box 5073 1
Idaho Falls ID 83405

Dean C. Brandstetter
PO Box 51600
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Respondent
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The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, etal.

The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms , Kathy Burggraf, Brownstone Companies, Inc.
Date

Code

User

9/29/20 10

SMIS

SBARRERA

Summons Issued

Joel E. Tingey

NCOC

SBARRERA

New Case Filed-Other Claims

Joel E. Tingey

NOAP

SBARRERA

Plaintiff: The Watkins Company Notice Of
Appearance B.J . Driscoll

Joel E. Tingey

COMP

SBARRERA

Complaint Filed

Joel E. Tingey

SBARRERA

Filing : A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Joel E. Tingey
listed in categories B-H , or the other A listings
below Paid by: Driscoll , B.J . (attorney for The
Watkins Company) Receipt number: 0045750
Dated : 9/29/2010 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For:
The Watkins Company (plaintiff)

NOAP

SOUTHWIC

Notice Of Appearance -- Defs Michael Storms
and Brownstone Companies, Inc.

Joel E. Tingey

NOAP

SOUTHWIC

Defendant: Storms, Michael Scott Notice Of
Appearance Dean C. Brandstetter

Joel E. Tingey

NOAP

SOUTHWIC

Defendant: Brownstone Companies, Inc. Notice
Of Appearance Dean C. Brandstetter

Joel E. Tingey

SOUTHWIC

Acceptance of Service

Joel E. Ti ngey

MOTN

SOUTHWIC

Motion to Disqualify Without Cause

Joel E. Tingey

ORDR

SOUTHWIC

Order for Disqualification

Joel E. Tingey

HUNTSMAN

Order of Assignment to Honorable Darren B.
Simpson

Darren B. Simpson

SOLIS

Motion For Temporary Restraining Order And
Application For Prejudgment Writ Of Attachment

Darren B. Simpson

SOLIS

Brief In Support Of Motion For Temporary
Restrain ing Order And Application For
Prejudgment Writ Of Attachment

Darren B. Simpson

AFFD

SOLIS

Affidavit Of Dane Watkins

Darren B. Simpson

AFFD

SOLIS

Affidavit Of Dane Watkins

Darren B. Simpson

10/5/20 10

NOTC

SOLIS

Notice Of Filing Bond

Darren B. Simpson

10/7/20 10

MINE

QUINTANA

Minute Entry

Darren B. Simpson

ORDR

QUINTANA

Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Darren B. Simpson
Order and Order to Show Cause

NOTH

QUINTANA

Notice Of Hearing Order to Show Cause

Darren B. Simpson

MOTN

SBARRERA

Motion For Prejudgment Writ Of Attachment And
Preliminary Injunction

Darren B. Simpson

AFFD

SBARRERA

Affidavit Of B.J. Driscoll

Darren B. Simpson

SBARRERA

Brief In Support Of Motion For Prejudgment Writ
Of Attachment And Preliminary Inj unction

Darren B. Simpson

SBARRERA

Notice Of Heari ng (10/14/201 0 1:30PM)

Darren B. Simpson

10/1/2010

MOTN

10/1 3/2010

NOTH

Judge
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The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, Kathy Burggraf, Brownstone Companies, Inc.
Date

Code

User

10/14/2010

MINE

LMESSICK

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Hearing
Hearing date: 10/14/2010
Time: 2:33 pm
Courtroom :
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick
Tape Number:

Darren B. Simpson

10/ 18/2010

MEMO

KBAIRD

Memorandum of defentant's storms and
brownstone companies, inc

Darren B. Simpson

10/20/2010

BRIF

DOOLITTL

Reply Brief Filed in Support of Motion for
Prejudgment Writ of Attachment and Preliminary
Injunction

Darren B. Simpson

11/3/2010

MINE

SOUTHWIC

Minute Entry

Darren B. Simpson

11/4/2010

DEOP

SOUTHWIC

Decision Denying Pl's Motion for Prejudgment
Writ of Attachment and Granting in Part Pl's
Request for a Preliminary Injunction

Darren B. Simpson

11/9/20 10

MOTN

SBARRERA

Motion For Reconsideration And Request For
Hearing On Preliminary Injunction Restraining
Order

Darren 8 . Simpson

MOTN

LYKE

Motion for Reconsideration

Darren B. Simpson

BRIF

LYKE

Brief Filed in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration

Darren B. Simpson

NOTH

LYKE

Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion for Reconsideration Darren B. Simpson
(12/03/10@10:30AM)

ORDR

SOUTHWIC

Order Setting Aside Decision Granting in Part Pl's Darren B. Simpson
Request for Preliminary Injunction

11/10/2010

DEOP

SOUTHWIC

Decision Denying Pl's Motion for Prejudgment
Writ of Attachment and Granting in Part Pl's
Requesst for a Preliminary Injunction

Darren B. Simpson

11/17/2010

DCHH

SOUTHWIC

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Sandra Beebe
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100

Darren B. Simpson

11/26/2010

MINE

DOOLITTL

Minute Entry

Darren B. Simpson

MINE

DOOLITTL

Minute Entry

Darren B. Simpson

ORDR

DOOLITTL

Order Granting Prelinminary Injunction In Part

Darren B. Simpson

ORDR

DOOLITTL

Order Denying Plaintiffs Request for a Rule 54(8) Darren B. Simpson
Certificate

12/1/2010

ANSW

LYKE

Answer (Dean C. Brandstetter for Michael Storms Darren B. Simpson
and Brownstone Compan ies, Inc)

12/13/2010

MINE

QUINTANA

Minute Entry

Darren B. Simpson

8/31/2 011

MOTN

SBARRERA

Motion To Dismiss

Darren B. Simpson

NOTH

SBARRERA

Notice Of Hearing RE : Defendant's Motion To
Dismiss (1 0/05/20 11 2:00PM)

Darren B. Simpson

Judge
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Date

Code

User

9/6/2011

ORDR

QUINTANA

Order Vacating and Rescheduling Hearing
September 30, 2011 at 2:00 p.m.

Darren B. Simpson

9/7/2011

HRSC

QUINTANA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/30/2011 02:00
PM) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

Darren B. Simpson

9/22/2011

NOTC

DOOLITIL

Notice Vacaing Hearing and Withdrawing Motion
to Dismiss

Darren B. Simpson

HRVC

QUINTANA

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
09/30/2011 02 :00 PM : Hearing Vacated
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

Darren B. Simpson

9/28/20 11

NOTC

QUINTANA

Notice of Proposed Dismissal for Inactivity

Darren B. Simpson

10/26/2011

MOTN

LYKE

Motion for Retention

Darren B. Simpson

AFFD

LYKE

Affidavit in Support of Motion for Retention

Darren B. Simpson

10/28/2011

AFFD

LYKE

Affidavit of BJ Driscoll

Darren B. Simpson

12/8/201 1

AMCO

TBROWN

Amended Complaint Filed

Darren B. Simpson

12/18/2011

ORDR

LMESSICK

Order For Retention

Darren B. Simpson

12/22/2011

ORDR

LMESSICK

Order for Amended Complaint

Darren B. Simpson

12/27/2011

NTTD

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Intent To Take Default

Darren B. Simpson

1/3/2012

ANSW

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Michael Storms and Brownstone
Companies, Inc. Answer

Darren B. Simpson

5/2/2012

NORT

SBARRERA

Note Of Issue/request For Tria l

Darren B. Simpson

5/8/20 12

RRTS

HUMPHREY

Response To Request For Trial Setting

Darren B. Simpson

7/9/2012

NOTH

LMESSICK

Notice Of Hearing

Darren B. Simpson

HRSC

LMESSICK

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
07/23/2012 10:00 AM) TELEPHONIC

Darren B. Simpson

8/1/2012

NOTH

LMESSICK

Amended Notice of Hearing

Darren B. Simpson

8/7/2012

DCHH

LMESSICK

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled
on 08/07/2012 11:30 AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Dan Williams
Number of Transcript Pages for th is hearing
estimated : TELEPHONIC 50 pages

Darren B. Simpson

8/8/2012

MEDI

LMESSICK

Order Referring Case to Mediation

Darren B. Simpson

MINE

LMESSICK

Minute Entry: Telephonic Status and Scheduling
Conference

Darren B. Simpson

ORPT

LMESSICK

Court Trial Scheduling Order

Darren B. Simpson

HRSC

LMESSICK

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
02/06/2013 01 :30 PM)

Darren B. Simpson

HRSC

LM ESSICK

Hearing Scheduled (Tria l 03/05/2013 09:00 AM ) Darren B. Simpson

HRSC

LM ESSICK

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/12/20 12 01 :30
PM) Summary Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Witness Disclosures

Darren B. Simpson

8/14/2012

10/25/2012
11/8/2012

Judge
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Date

Code

User

Judge

11/9/2012

NTOS

BOULWARE

Notice Of Service - Defendant' Michael Storms'
Interrogatories and Requests for Production to
Plaintiff

Darren B. Simpson

NTOS

BOULWARE

Notice Of Service - Defendant Brownstone
Compan ies lnc.'s Interrogatories to Plaintiff

Darren B. Simpson

11/19/2012

NTOS

DOOLITTL

{Plaintiff's 1st Set of
Notice Of Service
Interrogatories to Defendants Brownstone
Companies, Inc. and Michael Storms and
Plaintiff's 1st Set of Requests for Production of
Documents to Defendants Brownstone
Companies, Inc. and Michael Storms}

Darren B. Simpson

12/10/201 2

HRVC

LMESSICK

Hearing result for Motion schedu led on
12/12/2012 01 :30 PM : Hearing Vacated
Summary Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

12/11/2012

NOTC

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Notice of Compliance RE : Witness
List

Darren B. Simpson

12/12/2012

MOTN

DOOLITTL

Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Plaintiff's Affidavit of Dane Watkins

Darren B. Simpson

BR IF

DOOLITTL

Plaintiff's Brief Filed in Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

NOTH

DOOLITTL

Plaintiff's Notice Of Hearing 1-9-13@ 1:30 p.m . Darren B. Simpson
{Motion for Partial Summary Judgment}

12/18/2012

MOTN

CEARLY

Plaintiff- Motion To Compel And To Stay Motion
For Summary Judgment

12/19/2012

AFFD

CEARLY

Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Compel And To Darren B. Simpson
Stay Summary Judgment Proceedings

12/20/2012

NOTH

SOLIS

Notice Of Hearing 01 /30/2013 @1 :30 PM RE:
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

12/21/2012

NTOS

SOLIS

Notice Of Service - Responses To Defendant
Michael Storms's Interrogatories And Requests
For Production To Plaintiff and Responses To
Defendant Brownstone Companies, Inc's
Interrogatories To Plaintiff

Darren B. Simpson

1/3/2013

MOTN

HUMPHREY

Defendant's Motion For Order Shortening Time
For Hearing

Darren B. Simpson

MOTN

HUMPHREY

Defendant's Motion For Partial Summary
Judgmen t

Darren B. Simpson

NOTH

HUMPHREY

Notice Of Hearing - 01/30/2013 @ 1:30PM RE :
Defendants' Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

1/9/2013

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service {Defendant Michael Storm s Darren B. Simpson
and Brownstone Companies, Inc. Answers to
Plaintiff's 1st Set of Interrogatories and Requests
for Production of Documents}

1/16/201 3

MOT N

DOOLITTL

Plaintiff's Motion to Compel

BRIF

DOOLITTL

Plaintiff's Brief Filed in Opposition to Defendatns' Darren B. Simpson
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

Darren B. Simpson
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Date

Code

User

1/1 6/2013

NOTH

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Notice Of Hearing
p.m.
{Motion to Compel}

1/17/2013

MOTN

CEARLY

Motio n For Order Shortening T ime For
Responding To Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

AFFD

CEARLY

Affidavit In Support Of Motion For Order
Shorten ing Time To Respond

Darren B. Simpson

MOTN

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Motion to Compel and to Stay Motion Darren B. Simpson
for Summary Judgment

MEMO

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Motion to
Compel and to Stay Summary Judgment
Proceedings

Darren B. Simpson

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

NOTH

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Notice Of Hearing 1-30-13 @ 1:30 Darren B. Simpson
p.m.
{Defendants' Motion to Compel and to
Stay Motion for Summary Judgment}

NTOS

CARTER

Notice Of Service - Supplemental Responses To
Defendant Michael Storm's Interrogatories And
Requests For Production To Plaintiff

Darren B. Simpson

MINE

LMESSICK

Minute Entry: Telephonic Status Conference

Darren B. Simpson

MIN E

LMESSICK

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 1/30/2013
Time: 1:34 pm
Courtroom :
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick
Tape Number:
Party: Brownstone Companies, Inc., Attorney:
Dean Brandstetter
Party: Michael Storms, Attorney : Dean
Brandstetter
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney : B.J.
Driscoll

Darren B. Simpson

NTOS

CARTER

Notice Of Service - Defendant's Supplemental
Answers To Discovery

Darren B. Simpson

MOTN

CARTER

Plaintiff - Motion To Amend Complaint

Darren B. Simpson

HRVC

LMESSICK

Hearing resu lt for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 02/06/2013 01 :30 PM : Hearing Vacated

Darren B. Simpson

HRVC

LMESSICK

Hearing result for Trial scheduled on 03/05/2013 Darren B. Simpson
09:00 AM : Hearing Vacated

HRSC

LMESSICK

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/19/2013 10:00
AM) Summary Judgment

1/25/2013

1/30/2013

2/1/20 13

Judge
1-30-13 @ 1:30

Darren B. Simpson

Darren B. Simpson
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Date

Code

User

2/4/2013

AFFD

HUMPHREY

Amended Affidavit In Opposition To Plaintiffs
Motion For Summary Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

2/5/2013

NOTH

CEARLY

Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion To Amend
Complaint 2-19-13 @ 10:00 AM

Darren B. Simpson

2/11/2013

NTOS

OOOLITTL

Notice Of Service {Plaintiffs 2nd
Darren B. Simpson
Suppolemental Responses to Defendant Michael
Storm's Interrogatories and Requests for
Production to Plaintiff}

2/12/2013

BR IF

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Reply Brief Filed in Support of Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

2/13/201 3

AF FD

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Affidavit of Dane Watkins

Darren B. Simpson

2/19/201 3

OCHH

LMESS ICK

Darren B. Simpson
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
02/19/2013 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: Daniel Williams
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated : Summary Judgment
Motion to Amend Complaint 50 pages

MINE

LMESSICK

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 2/19/2013
Time : 10:15 am
Courtroom :
Court reporter: Daniel Williams
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick
Tape Number: 4
Party: Brownstone Companies, Inc., Attorney:
Dean Brandstetter
Party : Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean
Brandstetter
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J.
Driscoll

Darren 8. Simpson

2/21/20 13

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service
{3rd Supplemental
Responses to Defendant Michael Storms's
lnterogatories and Requests for Production to
Plaintiff}

Darren B. Simpson

2/27/20 13

MIN E

LM ESSICK

Minute Entry: Telephonic Status Conference

Darren B. Simpson

HRSC

LMESSICK

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
03/13/2013 01 :30 PM)

Darren B. Simpson

3/14/20 13

HRVC

LMESSICK

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled
on 03/13/2013 01 :30 PM : Hearing Vacated

Darren B. Simpson

3/19/2013

ORDR

LMESSICK

Order Staying Decision on Plaintiffs MOtionf or
Partial Summary Judgment, Plaitniffs Motion to
Amend Complaint and Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

3/25/2013

NOTC

HUMPHREY

Defendant's Notice Of Settlement Failure

Darren B. Simpson

5/13/2013

ORDR

LMESSICK

Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and Granting in Part,
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

Judge
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Date

Code

User

6/4/2013

MOTN

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Motion to Withdraw

Darren B. Simpson

NOTH

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Notice Of Hearing 6-19-13@ 1:30
p.m.
{Motion to Withdraw}

Darren B. Simpson

6/5/2013

NOTH

LMESSICK

Notice Of Hearing: Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson

6/13/2013

MINE

LMESSICK

Minute Entry: Telephonic Status Conference

Darren B. Simpson

6/19/201 3

NOTC

HUM PH REY

Plaintiffs Notice Of Withdrawal Of Motion To
Withdraw

Darren B. Simpson

6/20/2013

MOTN

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint

Darren B. Simpson

NOTH

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Notice Of Hearing 7-24-13@ 1:30
p.m.
{Motion to Amend Complaint}

Darren B. Simpson

MOTN

SOLIS

Plaintiff - Motion For Sanctions And Motion For
Attorney's Fees

Darren B. Simpson

NOTH

SOLIS

Notice Of Hearing 07/24/2013 @1 :30PM
RE:Motion For Sanctions And Motion For
Attorney's Fees

Darren B. Simpson

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Schedu led (Motion 07/24/2013 01 :30
PM) for sanctions/atty fees

Darren B. Simpson

MINE

GWALTERS

Minute Entry
Hearing type : Motion
Hearing date: 7/24/20 13
Time: 2:02 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Dan Williams
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters
Tape Number:
Doug Bowen
Dean Brandstetter

Darren B. Simpson

DCH H

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Motion schedu led on
Darren B. Simpson
07/24/2013 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Dan Williams
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 50 for sanctions/atty fees

AFFD

GWALTERS

Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Sanctions and Darren B. Simpson
for Attorney Fees obo Def.

8/16/2013

ORDR

LM ESSICK

Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Amend and
Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions

Darren B. Simpson

8/21/2013

NOTC

CARTER

Notice Of Available Trial Dates

Darren B. Simpson

9/6/2013

COMP

CEARLY

Second Amended Complaint Filed

Darren B. Simpson

9/9/2013

NOTC

CEARLY

Plaintiff- Notice Of Available Trial Dates

Darren B. Simpson

9/19/2013

HRSC

LMESSICK

Heari ng Schedu led (Pretrial Conference
01 /29/2014 01 :30 PM)

Darren B. Simpson

HRSC

LMESSICK

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/03/20 14 09:00 Darren B. Simpson
AM)

NOTC

LMESSICK

Notice of Hearing: Pretrial Conference Jury Trial

Darren B. Simpson

NOTC

HUMPHREY

Defendant's Amended Notice Of Available Trial
Dates

Darren B. Simpson

7/10/2013

7/24/2013

9/20/2013

Judge
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Date
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User

9/23/20 13

NTOS

HUMPHREY

Notice Of Service - Defendant's Third
Supplemental Answer To Discovery

Darren B. Simpson

9/24/20 13

NOTC

HUMPHREY

Defendant's Notice Of Unavailable Trial Dates

Darren B. Simpson

10/2/2013

ORPT

LMESSICK

Amended Notice of Hearing: Pretrial COnference Darren B. Simpson
Court Trial

10/2 1/2013

NTTD

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Notice Of Intent To Take Defau lt

Darren B. Simpson

10/23/2013

ANSW

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Answer to 2nd Amended Complaint
and Counterclaim

Darren B. Simpson

11/4/20 13

HRSC

LMESSICK

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/20/2013 01 :30
PM) (PL) Motion to Strike

Darren B. Simpson

CEARLY

Motion For Leave To Withdraw As Attorney Of
Record

Darren B. Simpson

CEARLY

Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion For Leave To
Withdraw As Attorney Of Record 11 -20-13
1:30 PM

NOTH

Judge

Darren B. Simpson
@

11/13/2013

RESP

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Response to Motion to Strike
Counterclaim of Defendants

Darren B. Simpson

11/15/2013

BRIF

CARTER

Reply Brief In Support Of Objection And Motion
To Strike Counterclaim

Darren B. Simpson

11/18/2013

NTOS

CEARLY

Notice Of Service Defendant's Fourth
Supplemental Answers To Discovery

Darren B. Simpson

11/20/2013

MINE

GWALTERS

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 11/20/2013
Time: 1:39 pm
Courtroom :
Court reporter: Dan Williams
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters
Tape Number:
Dean Brandstetter
BJ Driscoll

Darren B. Simpson

DCHH

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Darren B. Simpson
11/20/2013 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: Dan Williams
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated : under 50 (PL) Motion to Strike

MOTN

DOOLITIL

Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

BRIF

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Brief Filed in Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

NOTH

DOOLITIL

Plaintiff's Notice Of Hearing
1-8-14@ 1:30
p.m .
{Motion for Partial Summary Judgment}

Darren B. Simpson

1/7/2014

NTTD

CEARLY

Notice Of Intent To Take Default

Darren 8 . Simpson

1/8/2014

HRSC

LMESSICK

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/08/2014 01 :30
PM) Summary Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

11/27/2013
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Judge

Date

Code

User

1/8/2014

DCHH

LMESSICK

Darren B. Simpson
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
01/08/2014 01 : 30 PM : District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Dan Williams
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated : Summary Judgment 50 pages

MINE

LMESSICK

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 1/8/2014
Time: 1:37 pm
Courtroom :
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick
Tape Number:
Party: Brownstone Compan ies , Inc. , Attorney:
Dean Brandstetter
Party: Michael Storms , Attorney: Dean
Brandstetter
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J .
Driscoll

Darren B. Simpson

DOOLITTL

Plaintiff's Reply to Counterclaim

Darren B. Simpson

1/10/2014
1/29/2014

NOTC

LM ESSICK

Notice Vacating and Rescheduling Pretrial
Conference

Darren B. Simpson

2/5/2014

DCHH

LM ESSICK

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 02/05/20 14 11 :00 AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Dan Williams
Number of Transcript Pages for th is hearing
estimated : 50 pages

Darren B. Simpson

MINE

LMESSICK

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference
Hearing date: 2/5/2014
Time: 11 :09 am
Courtroom :
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick
Tape Number:
Party: Brownstone Compan ies, Inc. , Attorney:
Dean Brandstetter
Party: Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean
Brandstetter
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J.
Driscoll

Darren B. Simpson

2/12/2 014

ORDR

LMESSICK

Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

2/28/2014

NOTC

CEARLY

Notice Of Filing Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits

Darren B. Simpson

MOTN

CEARLY

Defendant - Motion For Enlargement Of Time To Darren B. Simpson
File Exhibits

NOTC

QUINTANA

Notice of Compliance Re: Witness List
(Defendant)

Darren B. Simpson
10
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Date
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2/28/2014

NOTC

QUINTANA

Notice of Compliance Pre-Trial Order
(Defendant)

Darren B. Simpson

3/3/2014

NOTC

CEARLY

Notice Of Compliance RE : Exh ibits

Darre n B. Simpson

3/4/2014

MEMO

CEARLY

Plaintiffs' Pretrial Memorandum

Darren B. Simpson

3/ 18/2014

TLST

LMESSICK

Hearing result for Trial scheduled on 03/18/2014 Darren B. Simpson
09:00 AM : Trial Started

MINE

LM ESSICK

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Trial - Day 1
Hearing date: 3/18/2014
Time: 9:12 am
Courtroom :
Court reporter: Daniel W illiams
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick
Tape Num ber:
Party: Brownstone Companies, Inc., Attorney:
Dean Brandstetter
Party: Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean
Brandstetter
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J.
Driscoll

Darren B. Simpson

3/19/2014

MINE

LMESSICK

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Trial - Day 2
Hearing date: 3/ 19/20 14
Time: 9:04 am
Courtroom :
Court reporter: Daniel Williams
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick
Tape Number:
Party: Brownstone Companies , Inc., Attorney:
Dean Brandstetter
Party : Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean
Brandstetter
Party : The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J .
Driscoll

Da rren B. Simpson

3/20/2014

MIN E

LMESSICK

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Trial - Day 3
Hearing date: 3/20/2014
Time: 9:10 am
Courtroom :
Court reporter: Daniel Will iams
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick
Tape Number: 5
Party: Brownstone Compan ies, Inc., Attorney:
Dean Brandstetter
Party: Michael Storms , Attorney: Dean
Brandstetter
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J.
Driscoll

Darren B. Simpson

Judge
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Date

Code

User

3/21/2014

MINE

LYKE

Minute En try
Hearing type :
Hea ring date: 3/21/2014
Time: 8:51 am
Courtroom :
Court reporter: Daniel W illiams
Minutes Clerk: Amanda Lyke
Tape Number:

4/1/2014

HRSC

LMESSICK

Hearing Scheduled (Trial 04/25/20 14 09 :00 AM) Darren 8 . Simpson

HRSC

LMESSICK

Hearing Scheduled (Trial 05/02/2014 09:00 AM) Darren 8 . Simpson

4/1 1/20 14

OR DR

LMESSICK

Order Denying Defendant Michael Storms' and
Darren 8 . Simpson
Defendant Brownstone Companies, lnc.'s Motion
to Dismiss

4/15/201 4

STIP

CEARLY

Stipulation

Darren B. Simpson

4/21/2014

OR DR

LMESSICK

Order Approving Stipulation

Darren 8 . Simpson

4/25/2014

DCHH

LM ESSICK

Hearing res ult for Trial scheduled on 04/25/2014 Darren B. Simpson
09 :00 AM : District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Dan Williams
Number of Tra nscri pt Pages for this hearing
estimated : 50 pages

MINE

LMESS ICK

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Trial - Day 5
Hearing date: 4/25/2014
Time: 9:1 3 am
Courtroo m:
Court reporter: Daniel Williams
Minutes Clerk : Lettie Messick
Tape Number:
Party: Brownstone Companies, Inc., Attorney:
Dean Brandstetter
Party: Michael Storms , Attorney: Dean
Brandstetter
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney : B.J.
Driscoll

4/28/2014

HRSC

LMESSICK

5/6/2014

MINE

LMESSICK

Judge
Darren B. Simpson

Darren B. Simpson

; Hearing Scheduled (Trial 05/15/2014 09:00 AM) Darren B. Simpson
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Trial - Day 6
Hearing date: 5/6/2014
Time: 9:07 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Daniel W illiams
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick
Tape Number:
Party: Brownstone Companies, Inc., Attorney:
Dean Brandstetter
Party: Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean
Brandstetter
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J.
Driscoll

Darren B. Simpson
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Date

Code

User

5/6/2014

DCHH

LMESSICK

LMESSICK

5/30/2014

Judge
Hearing result for Trial scheduled on 05/06/2014 Darren B. Simpson
09 :00 AM : District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Daniel Williams
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated : 200 pages
Notice of Hearing

Darren B. Simpson

6/10/2014

MOTN

CEARLY

Plaintiff - Motion To Continue Trial Date

Darren B. Simpson

6/1 8/2014

NOTC

BIRCH

Defendants' Notice Of Available Trial Dates

Darren B. Simpson

6/19/2014

ORDR

LMESSICK

Order Vacating and Resetting Trial Date

Darren B. Simpson

7/29/2014

MINE

PADILLA

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Trial-Day 7
Hearing date: 7/29/2014
Time: 7:47 am
Courtroom :
Court reporter: Daniel Williams
Minutes Clerk: Maria Padilla
Tape Number:
Party: Brownstone Companies, Inc., Attorney:
Dean Brandstetter
Party: Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean
Brandstetter
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J .
Driscoll

Darren B. Simpson

DCHH

LMESSICK

Hearing result for Trial scheduled on 07/29/2014 Darren B. Simpson
09:00 AM : District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Number of Transcript Pages for
this hearing estimated:

MOTN

CEARLY

Defendants - Motion For Extension Of Time to
File Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions
Of Law

Darren B. Simpson

ORDR

LMESSICK

Order Extending Time to File Proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Darren B. Simpson

ORDR

LMESSICK

Order Extending Time for Plaintiff to File Closing
Argument and Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law

Darren B. Simpson

BIRCH

Plaintiff's Proposed Findings Of Fact And
Conclusions Of Law

Darren B. Simpson

BIRCH

Plaintiffs Closing Argument

Darren B. Simpson

BIRCH

Defendants Storms And Brownstone Compan ies, Darren B. Simpson
Inc., Proposed Findings Of Fact. Conclusions Of
Law And Argument

LMESS ICK

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Darren B. Simpson

JDMT

LMESS ICK

Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

CDIS

LMESSICK

Civil Disposition entered for: Brownstone
Companies, Inc., Defendant; Burggraf, Kathy,
Defendant; Storms, Michael Scott, Defendant;
The Watkins Company, Plaintiff. Filing date:
11/21/2014

Darren B. Simpson

9/11/2014

9/19/2014

11/2 0/2014
11/2 1/2014
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Date

Code

User

11/2 1/20 14

STATUS

LMESSICK

Case Status Changed: Closed

Darren B. Simpson

12/3/2014

HRSC

LMESSICK

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 01 /07/2015 10:00
AM) Objection to Memorandum of Costs

Darren B. Simpson

STATUS

LMESSICK

Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk
action

Darren B. Simpson

MOTN

BIRCH

Defendants' Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs Darren B. Simpson

MEMO

BIRCH

Memorandum Of Attorney's Fees And Costs

Darren B. Simpson

AFFD

BIRCH

Affidavit In Support Of Memorandum Of
Attorney's Fees And Costs

Darren B. Simpson

NOTH

BIRCH

Plaintiffs Notice Of Hearing - January 7, 2015 W
10AM

Darren B. Simpson

MOTN

HUMPHREY

Plaintiffs Motion To Alter Or Amend The
Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

BRIF

HUMPHREY

Brief Filed In Support Of Motion To Alter Or
Amend The Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

CARTER

***PLACE ALL FILINGS IN FILE 4***

Darren B. Simpson

MOTN

BIRCH

Plaintiffs Motion To Disallow Costs And
Attorney's Fees

Darren B. Simpson

NOTH

BIRCH

Plaintiffs Notice Of Hearing - January 7, 2015@
10AM

Darren B. Simpson

12/23/2014

BRIF

BIRCH

Plaintiffs Brief In Support Of Motion To Disallow
Costs An d Attorney's Fees

Darren B. Simpson

12/30/2014

NOTH

CARTER

Amended Notice Of Hearing - RE: Motion To Alter Darren B. Simpson
Or Amend The Judgment 02/1 1/20 15
1:30PM

2/11/2015

DCHH

LMESSICK

Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on
Darren B. Simpson
02/11/2015 01 :30 PM : District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Daniel Williams
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Objection to Memorandum of Costs
50 pages

MINE

LMESSICK

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Hearing
Hearing date: 2/11/2015
Time: 1:40 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Daniel Williams
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick
Tape Number:

ORDR

LMESSICK

Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend Darren B. Simpson
Judgment

BIRCH

Mutual Satisfaction Of Judgments

Darren B. Simpson

MOTN

BIRCH

Defendants' Motion For Substitution Of Party

Darren B. Simpson

NOTH

BIRCH

Defendants' Notice Of Hearing - Augu st 26, 2015 Darren B. Simpson
@ 1:30 PM

12/17/2014

4/9/2015
6/1/2015
8/6/2015

Judge

Darren B. Simpson
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Date

Code
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8/7/2015

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/26/2015 01 :30
PM) Def. Motion for Substitution

Darren B. Simpson

8/19/2015

BRIF

BIRCH

Plaintiffs Brief In Opposition To Motion For
Substitution Of Party

Darren B. Simpson

8/26/2015

MINE

CARTER

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 8/26/2015
Time: 1 :33 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Daniel Williams
Minutes Clerk: Cassie Carter
Tape Number:
Party: Brownstone Companies, Inc., Attorney:
Dean Brandstetter
Party: Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean
Brandstetter
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J.
Driscoll

Darren B. Simpson

8/27/2015

DCHH

CARTER

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Darren B. Simpson
08/26/20 15 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated : Def. Motion for Substitution

9/ 15/2015

ORDR

CARTER

Order Substituting The Estate of Michael Storms
and Granting Attorney Fees and Costs

Darren B. Simpson

JDMT

CARTER

First Amended Judgment

Darren B. Simpson

STATUS

CARTER

Case Status Changed : Closed

Darren B. Simpson

BASIN GER

Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid
by: Cox Ohman Brandstetter Receipt number:
0040859 Dated : 9/22/2015 Amount: $1 .50
{Check)

Darren B. Simpson

BASINGER

Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Darren B. Simpson
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by:
Cox Ohman Brandstetter Receipt number:
0040859 Dated : 9/22/2015 Amount: $1 .00
(Check)

HUMPHREY

Appealed To The Supreme Court

HUMPHREY

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Darren B. Simpson
Supreme Court Paid by: Smith, Driscoll &
Associates Receipt number: 0041772 Dated:
9/29/2015 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: The
Watkins Company (plaintiff)

NOTC

HUMPHREY

Plaintiffs Notice Of Appeal

Darren B. Simpson

BNDC

PADILLA

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 43969 Dated
10/14/2015 for 200.00)

Darren B. Simpson

STATUS

PADILLA

Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk
action

Darren B. Simpson

9/22/2015

9/29/2015

10/14/2015

APSC

Judge

Darren B. Simpson
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Judge

Date

Code
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10/14/2015

CERTAP

PADILLA

Clerk's Certificate of Appeal

Darren B. Simpson

APSC

PADILLA

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Darren B. Simpson

MOTN

JNICHOLS

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Appellant's Motion For Darren B. Simpson
Stay Of Execution And Notification Of
Supersedeas Bond

11/25/2015
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

THEW ATKINS COMP ANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-

[

Q-5qoo

COMPLAINT
Category: A.1
Fee: $88.00

V.

MICHAEL STORMS, an individual,
KATHY BURGGRAF, an individual, and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation; collectively doing
business as BROWNSTONE
RESTAURANT AND BREWHOUSE,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the plaintiff, THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC ("Plaintiff'), and
as and for a cause of action against the defendants, states, alleges, and avers as follows:

PARTIES, JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND BACKGROUND
1.

Plaintiff is an Idaho limited liability company with its principal place of

business in Bonneville County, Idaho.

COMPLAINT - Page 1
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2.

The defendant, Michael St01ms ("Stonns"), is and at all times relevant

hereto was an individual residing in Bonneville County, Idaho.
3.

The defendant, Kathy Burggraf (hereafter, "Burggraf'), was at all times

relevant hereto an individual residing in Bonneville County, Idaho.
4.

The defendant, Brownstone Companies, Inc., is an Idaho corporation with its

principal place of business in Bonneville County, Idaho.
5.

On or about May 30, 1997, St01ms, Burggraf, and Brownstone Companies,

Inc. filed a certificate of assumed business name with the Idaho Secretary of State to
conduct business under the name, "Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse." As of the
filing of this complaint, the certificate has never been amended or revoked.
6.

Unless otherwise indicated, Storn1s, Burggraf, and Brownstone Companies,

Inc. are collectively refened to herein as "Defendants."
7.

At all times mentioned herein, Defendants were the partners, agents,

employees, and servants of each other and at all times mentioned herein acted within the
business, course, and scope of their partnership, agency, employment, service, and
master-servant relationship.
8.

Venue is proper in Bonneville County, Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code

Section 5-401 , or in the alternative, Section 5-404.
9.

On July 31 , 1996, Storms and Burggraf executed a "Commercial Lease

and Deposit Receipt" (" Original Lease") with Watkins for the lease of real prope1iy
located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho ("Premises").
10.

In November 2008, Watkins filed Bonneville County Case No. 08-7258

against Storms and Burggraf for breach of the Original Lease, and other claims.

COMPLAINT - Page 2
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11.

On April 21, 2010, following trial by the court, Watkins received a money

judgment against Storms and Burggraf for past rent, and a judgment terminating the
Original Lease and authorizing Watkins to evict Storms and Burggraf from the Premises.
12.

Following entry of the April 21, 2010 judgment, the Defendants retained

possession of the Premises and paid rent on a month-to-month basis.
13.

On August 15 and 16, 2010, Watkins served Defendants with a letter and a

copy of the Original Lease (the letter and Original Lease hereafter referred to as
"Notice") notifying Defendants of the changes to the terms of the patiies' month-tomonth lease that would take effect at the end of the month of August 2010.

14.

The Notice incorporated the terms of the Original Lease, plus explained

that (1) Defendants would thereafter be responsible for all roof repairs, (2) the rent would
be due the first day of the month, (3) Defendants would pay the annual food and drink
credit of $3,000 on November 1st each year and the credits would be good for 12 months,
(4) Defendants would have no right to use Space # 16 or the upstairs storage or the
sidewalk area, and (5) the lease would expire on October 31, 2027, which was the
expiration date of the Original Lease.
15 .

Defendants continued in possession of the Premises on and after

September 1, 20 10.
16.

By providing written notice to Defendants of the change in lease terms set

forth in the Notice at least 15 days before the expiration of the month, and by Defendants
continuing to hold the Premises after September 1, 2010, the Notice and continued
possession operated and effectually created ai1d established as a part of the lease, the
terms, rent and conditions specified in the Notice ("New Lease").
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17.

Plaintiff has satisfied all the conditions, covenants, and promises required

on its part under the New Lease as outlined herein.

COUNT ONE
(Breach of Contract)
18.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Complaint as if

set forth in ful l.
19.

Under the terms of the New Lease set forth in the Notice, rent is due the first

day of each month.
20.

Paragraph 2 of the New Lease provides, "In the event rent is not paid within

2 days after the due date, Tenant agrees to pay a late charge of $100 plus interest at 1% per
month on the delinquent amount."
2 1.

The rent for September 2010 came due on September 1, 2010.

22.

On September 16, 2010, Defendants delivered the rent payment for

September 20 10 to Watkins.
23.

Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to timely deliver the

September 2010 rent payment to Watkins.
24.

Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to pay the late fee

required by the New Lease.
25 .

Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to pay the interest on

their delinquent payment as required by the New Lease.
26.

Paragraph 16 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part, "Lessee shall

not vacate or abandon the premises at any time during the term hereof ... "
27 .

By letter dated September 15 , 20 10, Brownstone Companies, Inc. gave

notice of its intention to vacate the Premises on October 17, 2010.

COMPLAINT - Page 4
F: \CLIENTS\BJD\8315 - Watk ins v. Stonns.IT\Pleadings\001 Complaint.doc
20

28.

Defendants have breached the New Lease by notifying Watkins of the

intention to vacate the Premises prior to the expiration of the te1m of the New Lease.
29.

Paragraph 18 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part as follows:

Any and all improvements made to the premises during the term
hereof shall belong to Lessor, except trade fixtures of the Lessee. Lessee
may, upon termination hereof remove all his trade fixtures, but shall
repair or pay for all repairs necessary for damages to the premises
occasioned by removal.
30.

Idaho Code Section 55-308 prevents the Defendants from removing any

other fixtures if such removal would cause injury to the Premises.
31.

Paragraph 22 of the New Lease provides among other things that upon

Defendants' breach of the New Lease, Watkins is entitled to recover the amount of all
future rent due under the New Lease through the end of the lease term subject to the
amount of the lost future rents that the Defendants prove could be reasonably avoided.
32 .

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach of the New Lease

as herein alleged, Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of $976,975.85, or such other
amount as may be proven at trial.
COUNT TWO
(Injunctive Relief)
33.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Complaint as if

set forth in full.
34.

Paragraph 18 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part as follows:

Any and all improvements made to the premises during the term
hereof shall belong to Lessor, except trade fixtures of the Lessee. Lessee
may, upon termination hereof remove all his trade fixtures, but shall
repair or pay for all repairs necessary for damages to the premises
occasioned by removal.
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35.

Idaho Code Section 55-308 prevents the Defendants from removing any

other fixtures if such removal would cause injury to the Premises.
36. ·

Watkins seeks a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and

permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendants from removing any item from the
Premises if the removal of that item would cause injury to the Premises.

COUNT THREE
(Accounting)
37.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Complaint as if

set fo1ih in frill.
38.

Addendum "A" to the New Lease provides in pertinent part as follows :

Lessor will be entitled to 5% ofthe gross sales ofthe entire operation
(on premises) for the previous month or the base rent indicated above,
whichever is greater. By the 1O'h ofeach month, Lessee will provide Lessor
the monthly sales figures for the previous month - if a percentage rent is
due, Lessee will pay the Lessor the difference owed by the J S'h ofthat month.
This addendum will act as a power ofattorney for Lessor to check sales
figures with Idaho State Sales Tax Commission in Idaho Falls. In no event
will the monthly rent be less than the base rent.
39.

Defendants have breached th New Lease by failing to provide Watkins with

" the monthly sales figures" showing the "gross sales of the entire operation (on premises)"
covered by the New Lease in order for Watkins to detennine the alternative rent owed under
the tem1s of the New Lease.
40.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach of the New Lease

as herein alleged, Watkins seeks an order requiring Defendants to specifically perform
their duty under Addendum ' A" to the New Lease by providing Watkins with the gross
monthly sales figures of the entire restamant and microbrewery operation on the premises
from September 1, 2010 to the present, and for an accounting of the same.
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COUNTFOUR
(Eviction)
41.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Complaint as if

set fo1th in fi.tll.
42.

As a result of Defendants breaches of the New Lease outlined herein,

Watkins seeks an order authorizing eviction of the Defendants from the Premises.

COUNT FIVE
(Attorney's Fees)
43.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Complaint as if

set forth in full.
44.

Watkins has been required to seek the legal services of the firm of Smith,

Driscoll & Associates, PLLC to prosecute this action and has incurred attorney's fees and
costs because of Defendants ' wrongful conduct as alleged herein, entitling Watkins to
recover an award ofreasonable attorney ' s fees and costs as herein alleged pursuant to the
New Lease, Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-121 , and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows :
1.

For judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, in th amount of

$976,975.85, or such other amount as may be proven at trial;
2.

For injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendants from removing any items

of tangible personal property from the Premises if removal would cause injury to the
Prerruses
3.

For a judgment and order requiring Defendants to specifically perform

their duties under the New Lease to provid Watkins with the gross monthly sales figures
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.

(

..

of the entire operation on the Premises from September 1, 2010 to the present and for an
accounting of the same;
4.

For a judgment and order authorizing eviction of the Defendants from the

Premises and delivering possession of the Premises to Watkins;
5.

For judgment awarding Watkins prejudgment interest;

6.

For judgment awarding Watkins its reasonable attorney' s fees incurred

herein as provided by the New Lease, Idaho Code Section 12-120 and 12-121 , and Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 in the amount of two thousand five hundred dollars
($2,500.00) if this matter is uncontested, and otherwise in such amounts as the court may
determine;
7.

For judgment awarding Watkins its costs of suit incurred herein as

provided by the Lease and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54; and
8.

For such other and further relief as appears just and equitable in the

premises.
DATED this #

day of September, 2010.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES PLLC

By ~ ~
: J. Driscoll
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ.
COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETTER, CHARTERED
510 "D" STREET
P.O. BOX 51600
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-1600
(208) 522-8606
Fax: (208) 522-8618
Idaho State Bar No.: 2960
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-10-5958

ANSWER

vs.
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, KATHY
BURGGRAF, an individual, and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an
Idaho Corporation; collectively doing
business as BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT
AND BREWHOUSE,
Defendant.
COMES NOW the Defendant, Michael Storms and Brownstone Companies, Inc., by and
through their attorney, Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq., and answers the Complaint of the Plaintiff by
denying each and every allegation contained in said Complaint.
WHEREFORE, haying fully answered the Complaint of the Plaintiff, Defendants pray
that the same be dismissed, that the Plaintiff take nothing by way thereof, and that Defendants
recover their attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending the within matter.

ANSWER-1
S:IOEAN\Clients\Storms. Michael\Second Cause\Answer.wpd

25

DATED this __l_ day of December, 2010.

~ h...:

DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the_\_ day of December, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following persons at the addresses
below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct
postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting as set forth below.
B.J. Driscoll, Esq.
Smith, Driscoll and Associates
414 Shoup
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls ID 83405
Fax: 529-4166

[
] By pre-paid post
[
] By hand delivery
[ ~ By facsimile transmission
[
] By Cotuthouse Box

~g

DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ.

-

ANSWER-2
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CO UtHY
Bryan D. Smith, Esq . - ISB #4411
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

J
r

l

,.-

8 Pll

414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Fa lls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-10-5958

AMENDED COMPLAINT

V.

MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, KATHY
BURGGRAF, an individual, and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an Idaho
corporation; collectively doing business as
BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT AND
BREWHOUSE,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the plaintiff, THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC (" Watkins"), and as and
for a cause of action against the defendants, states, alleges, and avers as follows:

PARTIES, JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND BACKGROUND
1.

Watkins is an Idaho limited liability company with its principal place of

business in Bonneville County, Idaho.
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2.

The defendant, Michael Storms ("Storms"), is and at all times relevant

hereto was an individual residing in Bonneville County, Idaho.
3.

The defendant, Kathy Burggraf (hereafter, "Burggraf"), was at all times

relevant hereto an individual residing in Bonneville County, Idaho.
4.

The defendant, Brownstone Companies, Inc., is an Idaho corporation with

its principal place of business in Bonneville County, Idaho.
5.

On or about May 30, 1997, Storms, Burggraf, and Brownstone Companies,

Inc. filed a certificate of assumed business name with the Idaho Secretary of State to
conduct business under the name, "Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse." As of the
filing ofthis amended complaint, the certificate is current.
6.

Unless otherwise indicated, Storms, Burggraf, and Brownstone Companies,

Inc. are collectively referred to herein as "Defendants."
7.

At all times mentioned herein, Defendants were the partners, agents,

employees, and servants of each other and at all times mentioned herein acted within
the business, course, and scope of their partnership, agency, employment, service, and
master-se rvant relationship.
8.

Venue is proper in Bonneville County, Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code

Section 5-401, or in the alternative, Section 5-404.
9.

Watkins may seek several forms of relief in the alternative or of different

types .
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10.

On July 31, 1996, Storms and Burggraf executed a "Commercial Lease and

Deposit Receipt" ("Original Lease") with Watkins for the lease of real property located at

455 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho ("Premises").
11.

In November 2008, Watkins filed Bonneville County Case No. 08-7258

against Storms and Burggraf for breach of the Original Lease, and other claims.

12.

On April 21, 2010, following trial by the court and a decision holding

Storms and Burggraf had breached the Original Lease, Watkins received a judgment
against them for money damages for past rent, terminating the Original Lease, and
authorizing Watkins to evict Storms and Burggraf from the Premises .
13.

Following entry of the April 21, 2010 judgment, the Defendants retained

possession of the Premises and paid rent on a month-to-month basis.

14.

On August 15 and 16, 2010, Watkins served Defendants with a letter and

a copy of the Original Lease (the letter and Original Lease hereafter referred to as
"Notice") notifying Defendants of the changes to the terms of the parties' month-tomonth lease that would take effect at the end of the month of August 2010.

15.

The Notice incorporated the terms of the Original Lease, plus explained

that (1) Defendants would thereafter be responsible for all roof repairs, (2) the rent
would be due the first day of the month, (3) Defendants would pay the annual food and
drink credit of $3,000 on November 1st each year and the credits would be good for 12
months, (4) Defendants would have no right to use Space #16 or the upstairs storage or
the sidewalk area, and (5) the lease would expire on October 31, 2027, which was the
expiration date of the Original Lease .
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16.

Defendants continued in possession ofthe Premlses on and after

September 1, 2010.
17.

By provlding written notice to Defendants of the change in lease terms

set forth in the Notice at least 15 days before the expiration of the month, and by
Defendants continuing to hold the Premises after September 1, 2010, the Notice and
continued possession operated and effectually created and established as a part of the
lease, the terms, rent and conditions specified ln the Notice {"New Lease").
18.

Watkins has satisfied all the conditions, covenants, and promises

required on its part under the Original Lease and the New Lease as outlined herein.
COUNT ONE
(Breach of Contract)

19.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Amended

Complaint as if set forth in full.
20.

Under the terms of the New Lease set forth in the Notice, rent is due the

first day of each month.
21.

Paragraph 2 ofthe New Lease provides, "In the event rent is not paid within

2 days after the due date, Tenant agrees to pay a late charge of $100 plus interest at 1%
per month on the delinquent amount."
22.

The rent for September 2010 came due on September 1, 2010.

23.

On September 16, 2010, Defendants delivered the rent payment for

September 2010 to Watkins.
24.

Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to timely deliver the

September 2010 rent payment to Watkins.
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25.

Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to pay the late fee

required by the New Lease .
26.

Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to pay the interest on

their delinquent payment as required by the New Lease.
27.

Paragraph 16 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part, "Lessee shall

not vacate or abandon the premises at any time during the term hereof .. ."
28.

By letter dated September 15, 2010, Brownstone Companies, Inc. gave

notice of its intention to vacate the Premises on October 17, 2010.
29.

Defendants have breached the New Lease by notifying Watkins of the

intention to vacate the Premises prior to the expiration of the term of the New Lease.
30.

Paragraph 18 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part as fol lows :

Any and all improvements made to the premises during the term
hereof shall belong to Lessor, except trade fixtures of the Lessee. Lessee
may, upon termination hereof, remove all his trade fixtures, but shall
repair or pay for all repairs necessary for damages to the premises
occasioned by removal.
31.

Idaho Code Section 55-308 prevents the Defendants from removing any

other fixtures if such removal would cause injury to the Premises.
32.

Paragraph 22 of the New Lease provides among other things that upon

Defendants' breach of the New Lease, Watkins is entitled to recover the amount of all
future rent due under the New Lease through the end of the lease term subject to the
amount of the lost future rents that the Defendants prove could be reasonably avoided .
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33.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach of the New Lease

as herein alleged, Watkins has been damaged in the amount of $976,975.85, or such
other amount as may be proven at trial.
COUNT TWO
(Injunctive Relief)

34.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Amended

Complaint as if set forth in full.
35.

Paragraph 18 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part as follows:

Any and all improvements made to the premises during the term
hereof shall belong to Lessor, except trade fixtures of the Lessee. Lessee
may, upon termination hereof, remove all his trade fixtures, but shall
repair or pay for all repairs necessary for damages to the premises
occasioned by removal.
36.

Idaho Code Section 55-308 prevents the Defendants from removing any

other fixtures if such removal would cause injury to the Premises.
37.

Watkins seeks a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and

permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendants from removing any item from the
Premises if the removal of that item would cause injury to the Premises.
COUNT THREE

(Accounting)
38.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Amended

Complaint as if set forth in full.
39.

Addendum "A" to the New Lease provides in pertinent part as follows:

Lessor will be entitled to 5% of the gross sales of the entire operation
(on premises) for the previous month or the base rent indicated above,
whichever is greater. By the 10th of each month, Lessee will provide Lessor
the monthly sales figures for the previous month - if a percentage rent is
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due, Lessee will pay the Lessor the difference owed by the 15th of that
month. This addendum will act as a power of attorney for Lessor to check
soles figures with Idaho State Sales Tax Commission in Idaho Falls. In no
event will the monthly rent be less than the base rent.
40.

Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to provide Watkins

with "the monthly sales figures" showing the "gross sales of the entire operation (on
premises)" covered by the New Lease in order for Watkins to determine the alternative
rent owed under the terms of the New Lease.
41.

As a direct and proximate res ult of Defendants' breach of the New Lease

as herein alleged, Watkins seeks an order requ iring Defendants to specifically perform
their duty under Addendum "A" to the New Lease by providing Watkins with the gross
monthly sales figures of the entire restaurant and microbrewery operation on the
premises from September 1, 2010 to the present, and for an accounting of the same.
COUNT FOUR

(Eviction)
42.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Amended

Complaint as if set forth in full.
43.

As a result of Defendants' breaches of the New Lease outlined herein,

Watkins seeks an order authorizing eviction of the Defendants from the Premises.
COUNT FIVE

(Attorney's Fees)
44.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Amended

Complaint as if set forth in ful l.
45.

Watkins has been required to seek the legal services of the firm of Smith,

Driscoll & Associates, PLLC to prosecute this action and has incurred attorney's fees and
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costs because of Defendants' wrongful conduct as al leged herein, entitling Watkins to
recover an award of reasonab le attorney's fees and costs as herein alleged pursuant to
the Original Lease, the New Lease, Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-121, and Id aho Rule of
Civil Procedure 54.
COUNT SIX

(Breach of Contract/Covenant to Repair)
46.

Plaintiff realleges al l previous allegations contained in the Amended

Comp laint as if set forth in fu ll.
47 .

Under Paragraph 7 and the other terms ofthe Original Lease and the New

Lease set forth in the Notice, Defendants agreed, "at [their] own expense and at al l times,
[to] maintain the premises in good and safe condition, including plate class, electrica l
wiring, plumbing and heating installations and any other system or equipment upon the
premises and shall surrender the same, at termination hereof, in as good condition as
received, norma l wear and tear excepted," and agreed that they "shall be responsib le for
al l repairs requ ired."
48.

Defendants have breached the Original Lease and the New Lease by failing

to maintain the Premises in good and safe condition and to surrender possession of the
Premises in as good condition as received, normal wear and tear excepted .
49.

As a direct and proximate resu lt of Defendants' breach as herein alleged,

Watkins has been damaged in such amount as will be proven at trial.

II
II

AMENDED COMPLAINT- Page 8
F:\CLIENTS\BJD\8315 - Watkins v. Sto r ms.ll\Pl eadings\025 Amended Compla int.doc
34

COUNT SEVEN

(Unjust Enrichment)
50.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Amended

Complaint as if set forth in full.
51.

Defendants received the benefit of remaining in possession of the Premises

for approximately three months, or such other time as may be established at trial, during
which time they paid no rent.
52.

Defendants appreciated the benefit of remaining in possession of the

Premises beyond the date identified in their notice of intention to vacate the Premises by
continuing business operations for a time, then ceasing business operations and then
slowly vacating the Premises at their leisure over the course of several weeks.
53.

Under the circumstances, allowing Defendants to retain these benefits

without payment to Watkins in an amount to be proven at trial would be inequitable and
unjust in light ofthe fact that Defendants paid no rent during this time and Watkins was
unable to rel et the Premises while Defendants retained possession of the Premises for
several weeks after the date identified in their notice of intention to vacate the Premises.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows:

1.

For judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of

$976,975.85, or suc h other amount as may be proven at trial;
2.

For injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendants from removing any items

of tangible personal property from the Premises if removal would cause injury to the
Premises
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.
3.

For a judgment and order requiring Defendants to specifically perform

their duties under the New Lease to provide Watkins with the gross monthly sales
figures of the entire operation on the Premises from September 1, 2010 to the present
and for an accounting of the same;
4.

For a judgment and order authorizing eviction of the Defendants from

the Premises and delivering possession of the Premises to Watkins;

5.

For judgment against Defendants for damages caused by Defendants'

breach of contract and the covenant to repair and maintain the premises;
6.

For judgment against Defendants for the amount by which they have

been unj ustly enriched by possession of the Premises without payment to Watkin s;
7.

For judgment awarding Watkins prejudgment interest;

8.

For judgment awarding Watkins its reasonable attorney's fees incurred

herein as provided by the New Lease, Idaho Code Section 12-120 and 12-121, and Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 in the amount of two thousand five hundred dollars
($2,500.00) if this matter is uncontested, and otherwise in such amounts as the court
may determine;
9.

For judgment awarding Watkins its costs of suit incurred herein as

provided by the Lease and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54; and

10.

For such othe r and further relief as appears just and equitable in the

premises.

II
II
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DATED this

___k_ day of December, 2011.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES PLLC

"

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this D
ay of December, 2011, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED COMPLAINT t o be served, by placing the same
in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand
delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq.
COX, O_
H MAN &
BRANDSTETTER, CHTD
P.O. Box 51600
510 " D" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

[~

S. Mail
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery
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(
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & AsSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166

1 SEP -6 PM i.. 02

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
TH E STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-10-5958
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

v.
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, KATHY
BURGGRAF, an individua l, and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an Idaho
corporation; collectively doing business as
BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT AND
BREWHOUSE,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the plaintiff, THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC ("Watkins"), and as and
for a cause of action against the defendants, states, alleges, and avers as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND BACKGROUND

1.

Watkins is an Idaho limited liabi lity company with its principal place of

business in Bonneville County, Idaho.
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2.

The defendant, Michael Storms ("Storms"), is and at all times relevant

hereto was an individual residing in Bonneville County, Idaho.
3.

The defendant, Kathy Burggraf (hereafter, "Burggraf"), was at all times

relevant hereto an individual residing in Bonneville County, Idaho.
4.

The defendant, Brownstone Companies, Inc., is an Idaho corporation with

its principal place of business in Bonneville County, Idaho.
5.

On or about May 30, 1997, Storms, Burggraf, and Brownstone Companies,

Inc. filed a certificate of assumed business name with the Idaho Secretary of State to
conduct business under the name, "Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse." As ofthe
filing of this second amended complaint, the certificate is current.
6.

Unless otherwise indicated, Storms, Burggraf, and Brownstone Companies,

Inc. are collectively referred to herein as "Defendants."
7.

At all times mentioned herein, Defendants were the partners, agents,

employees, and servants of each other and at all times mentioned herein acted within
the business, course, and scope of their partnership, agency, employment, service, and
master-servant relationship.
8.

Venue is proper in Bonneville County, Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code

Section 5-401, or in the alternative, Section 5-404.
9.

Watkins may seek seve ral forms of relief in the alternative or of different

types.
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10.

On July 31, 1996, Storms and Burggraf executed a "Commercial Lease and

Deposit Receipt" ("Original Lease") with Watkins for the lease of real property located at
455 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho ("Premises").
11.

In November 2008, Watkins filed Bonneville County Case No. 08-7258

against Storms and Burggraf for breach of the Original Lease, and other claims.
12.

On April 21, 2010, following trial by the court and a decision holding

Storms and Burggraf had breached the Original Lease, Watkins received a judgment
against them for money damages for past rent, terminating the Original Lease, and
authorizing Watkins to evict Storms and Burggraf from the Premises.
13.

Fol lowing entry of the April 21, 2010 judgment, the Defendants retained

possession of the Premises and paid rent on a month-to-month basis.
14.

On August 15 and 16, 2010, Watkins served Defendants with a letter and

a copy of the Original Lease (the letter and Original Lease hereafter referred to as
"Notice") notifying Defendants of the changes to the terms of the parties' month-tomonth lease that would take effect at the end of the month of August 2010.
15.

The Notice incorporated the term s of the Original Lease, plus explained

that (1) Defendants would thereafter be responsible for all roof repairs, (2) the rent
would be due the first day of the month, (3} Defendants wou ld pay the annual food and
drink credit of $3,000 on November 1st each year and the credits would be good for 12
months, (4} Defendants would have no right to use Space #16 or the upstairs storage or
the sidewalk area, and (5} the lease would expire on October 31, 2027, which was the
expiration date of the Original Lease.
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16.

Defendants continued in possession of the Premises on and after

September 1, 2010.
17.

By providing written notice to Defendants of the change in lease terms

set forth in the Notice at least 15 days before the expiration of the month, and by
Defendants continuing to hold the Premises after September 1, 2010, the Notice and
continued possession operated and effectually created and established as a part of the
lease, the terms, rent and conditions specified in the Notice ("New Lease").
18.

Watkins has satisfied all the conditions, covenants, and promises

required on its part under the Original Lease and the New Lease as outlined herein.
COUNT ONE
(Breach of Contract)

19.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Second Amended

Complaint as if set forth in full.
20.

Under the terms of the New Lease set forth in the Notice, rent is due the

first day of each month.
21.

Paragraph 2 of the New Lease provides, "In the event rent is not paid within

2 days after the due date, Tenant agrees to pay a late charge of $100 plus interest at 1%
per month on the delinquent amount."
22.

The rent for September 2010 came due on September 1, 2010.

23.

On September 16, 2010, Defendants delivered the rent payment for

September 2010 to Watkins.
24.

Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to timely deliver the

September 2010 rent payment to Watkins.
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25.

Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to pay the late fee

required by the New Lease.
26.

Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to pay the interest on

their delinquent payment as required by the New Lease.
27.

Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to pay rent for each

month they remained in possession of the Premises.
28.

Paragraph 16 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part, "Lessee shall

not vacate or abandon the premises at any time during the term hereof . . ."
29.

By letter dated September 15, 2010, Brownstone Companies, Inc. gave

notice of its intention to vacate the Premises on October 17, 2010.
30.

Defendants have breached the New Lease by notifying Watkins of the

intention to vacate the Premises prior to the expiration of the term of the New Lease.
31.

Paragraph 18 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part as follows:

Any and all improvements made to the premises during the term
hereof shall belong to Lessor, except trade fixtures of the Lessee. Lessee
may, upon termination hereof, remove all his trade fixtures, but shall
repair or pay for all repairs necessary for damages to the premises
occasioned by removal.
32.

Idaho Code Section 55-308 prevents the Defendants from removing any

other fixtures if such removal would cause injury to the Premises.
33.

Paragraph 22 of the New Lease provides among other things that upon

Defendants' breach of the New Lease, Watkins is entitled to recover the amount of all
future rent due under the New Lease through the end of the lease term subject to the
amount of the lost future rents that the Defendants prove could be reasonably avoided .
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34.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach of the New Lease

as herein alleged, Watkins has been damaged in the amount of $976,975.85, or such
other amount as may be proven at trial.
COUNT TWO

(Injunctive Relief)
35.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Second Amended

Complaint as if set forth in full.
36.

Paragraph 18 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part as follows:

Any and all improvements made to the premises during the term
hereof shall belong to Lessor, except trade fixtures of the Lessee. Lessee
may, upon termination hereof, remove all his trade fixtures, but shall
repair or pay for all repairs necessary for damages to the premises
occasioned by removal.
37.

Idaho Code Section 55-308 prevents the Defendants from removing any

other fixtures if such removal would cause injury to the Premises.
38.

Watkins seeks a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and

permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendants from removi ng any item from the
Premises if the removal of that item would cause injury to the Premises.
COUNT THREE

(Accounting)
39.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Second Amended

Complaint as if set forth in full.
40.

Addendum "A" to the New Lease provides in pertinent part as follows:

Lessor will be entitled to 5% of the gross sales of the entire operation
(on premises) for the previous month or the base rent indicated above,
whichever is greater. By the 10th of each month, Lessee will provide Lessor
the monthly sales figures for the previous month - if a percentage rent is
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due, Lessee will pay the Lessor the difference owed by the 15th of that
month. This addendum will act as a power of attorney for Lessor to check
sales figures with Idaho State Sales Tax Commission in Idaho Falls. In no
event will the monthly rent be less than the base rent.
41.

Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to provide Watkins

with "the monthly sales figures" showing the "gross sales of the entire operation (on
premises)" covered by the New Lease in order for Watkins to determine the alternative
rent owed under the terms of the New Lease .
42.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach of the New Lease

as herein alleged, Watkins seeks an order requiring Defendants to specifically perform
their duty under Addendum "A" to the New Lease by providing Watkins with the gross
monthly sales figures of the entire restaurant and microbrewery operation on the
premises from September 1, 2010 to the present, and for an accounting of the same.
COUNT FOUR

(Eviction)
43.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Second Amended

Complaint as if set forth in full.
44.

As a result of Defendants' breaches of the New Lease outlined herein,

Watkins seeks an order authorizing eviction of the Defendants from the Premises.
COUNT FIVE

(Attorney's Fees)
45.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Second Amended

Complaint as if set forth in full.
46.

Watkins has been required to seek th e legal services of the firm of Smith,

Driscoll & Associates, PLLC to prosecute this action and has incurred attorney's fees and
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costs because of Defendants' wrongful conduct as alleged herein, entitling Watkins to
recover an award of reasonable attorney' s fees and costs as herein alleged pursuant to
the Origina l Lease, the New Lease, Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-121, and Idaho Ru le of
Civil Procedure 54.
COUNT SIX

(Breach of Contract/Covenant to Repair)
47.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Second Amended

Complaint as if set forth in full.
48.

Under Paragraph 7 and the other terms of the Origina l lease and the New

Lease set forth in the Notice, Defendants agreed, " at [their] own expense and at all times,
[to] maintain the premises in good and safe condition, including plate class, electrical
wiring, plumbing and heating installations and any other system or equipment upon the
premises and shall surrender the same, at termination hereof, in as good condition as
received, norma l wear and te ar excepted," and agreed that they "shall be responsible fo r
all repairs required."
49.

Def endants' possession of the Premises imposed on them an imp lied

contractua l duty to mainta in the Premises in good and safe condition.
50.

Defendants have breached the Original Lease, New Lease, and implied

contractua l duty by failing to maintain the Premises in good and safe co ndition and to
surrender possession of the Premises in as good condition as received, normal wea r and
tear except ed.
51.

As a direct an d proximate resu lt of Defendants' breach as herein al leged,

Watkins ha s been damaged in such amount as wi ll be prove n at trial.
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COUNT SEVEN

(Unjust Enrichment)
52.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Second Amended

Complaint as if set forth in full.
53.

Defendants received the benefit of remaining in possession of the Premises

for approximately three months, or such other time as may be established at trial, during
which time they paid no rent.
54.

Defendants appreciated the benefit of remaining in possession of the

Premises beyond the date identified in their notice of intention to vacate the Premises by
continuing business operations for a time, then ceasing business operations and then
slowly vacating the Premises at their leisure over the course of several weeks.
55.

Under the circumstances, allowing Defendants to retain these benefits

without payment to Watkins in an amount to be proven at trial would be inequitable and
unjust in light of the fact that Defendants paid no rent during this time and Watkins was
unable to rel et the Premises while Defendants retained possession of the Premises for
several weeks after the date identified in their notice of intention to vacate the Premises.
COUNT EIGHT

(Waste)
56.

Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations cont ained in the Second Amended

Complaint as if set forth in full.
57 .

While Defendants were in possession of the Premises, they were under a

duty to exercise reasonable care in the use and care of the Premises and to commit no
unreasonable injury or waste thereon.
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58 .

Defendants breached this duty by failing to exercise reasonable care in the

use of th e Premises and by committing unreasonable injury and waste thereon.
59.

As a direct and proximate res ult of Defendants' breach as herein alleged,

Watkins has been damaged in such amount as will be proven at trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows:
1.

For judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of

$976,975.85, or such other amount as may be proven at trial;
2.

For injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendants from removing any items

of ta ngible pe rsonal property from the Premises if removal would cause injury to the
Premises
3.

For a judgment and order requiring Defendants to specifically perform

their duties under the New Lease to provide Watkins with the gross monthly sales
figu res of the entire ope ration on the Premises from September 1, 2010 to the present
and for an accounting of the same;
4.

For a judgment and order authoriz in g eviction of the Defendants from

the Premises and delivering possession of the Premises to Watkins;
5.

For judgment against Defendants for damages caused by Defendants'

breach of contract and the covenant to repair and maintain the premises;
6.

For judgment against Defendants for the amount by which t hey have

been unjustly enriched by possession of the Premises without payment to Watkins;
7.

For judgment against Defendants for the damages arising from the

unreasonable inju ry to and waste committed on the Prem ises.
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8.

For judgment awarding Watkins prejudgment interest;

9.

For judgment awarding Watkins its reasonable attorney's fees incurred

herein as provided by the New Lease, Idaho Code Section 12-120 and 12-121, and Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 in the amount of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) if this
matter is uncontested, and otherwise in such amounts as the court may determine;
10.

For judgment awarding Watkins its costs of suit incurred herein as

provided by the Lease and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54; and
11.

For such other and further relief as appears just and equitable in the

premises.
DATED this

___{o__ day of September, 2013.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES PLLC
\

By

~~
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~
day of September, 2013, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT to be served, by placing
the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the
following:
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq.

COX, OHMAN &
BRANDSTETTER,CHTD
P.O. Box 51600
510 "D" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Honorable Darren B. Simpson
District Judge
Bingham County Courthouse
501 N. Maple, #310
Blackfoot, ID 83221

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Fax
[ ] _?,ernight Delivery
[ v( Hand Delivery

[/ JU. S. Mail
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ } Hand Delivery
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CJS ~IC COUiH
M:,GIS l ~ :, f [ n, '15101~

P'.~k ~L VILL l C:'."'d Y. 1"1 ,\ HJ

13 OCT 23 PM t.: 34
DEAN C. BRANDSTETIER, ESQ.
COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETIER, CHARTERED
510 "D" STREET
P.O. BOX 51600
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-1600
(208) 522-8606
Fax: (208) 522-8618
Idaho State Bar No. 2960
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS BROWNSTONE
COMPANIES, INC., AND MICHAEL STORMS
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMP ANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-10-5958

ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND COUNTERCLAIM

vs.
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual,
KATHY BURGGRAF, an individual, and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an
Idaho Corporation; collectively doing
business as BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT
AND BREWHOUSE,
Defendants.
COMES NOW the Defendant, Michael Storms (hereinafter referred to as " Storms") and
Brownstone Companies, Inc. , (hereinafter referred to as "Brownstone") by and through their
attorney, Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq. , and answers the Second Amended Complaint of the
Plaintiff as follows.
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FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Pursuant to the equitable doctrines of waiver, laches and estoppel, Plaintiff is precluded
from asserting claims contrary to those which are waived , and timely made and/or contradictory
to earlier positions. Further that Plaintiff has unclean hands and is therefor not entitled to the
relief requested in the Complaint. Plaintiff is guilty of inequitable conduct and comes to the
Court with unclean hands. As such, Plaintiff should be equitably estopped from recovering on
any equitable theory including estoppel, detrimental reliance, and/or unjust enrichment.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
As a separate further answer and defense, Defendants Storms and Brownstone allege
(without waiving any liability and specifically denying liability) that Plaintiff has failed to
reasonably mitigate damages and that Plaintiff may not recover for damages that could have been
reasonably avoided.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
As a separate further answer and defense, Defendants Stonns and Brownstone allege that
the "New Lease" alleged in Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is barred by reason of the
Statute of Frauds, particularly Idaho Code§ 9-505(1) and/or Idaho Code § 9-505(4).
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff has failed to provide an effective and proper notice of changes to the claimed
tenancy of Brownstone and/or Storms as required by Idaho Code § 55-307.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
No tease from month to month existed between Plaintiff and Brownstone and/or Storms
and as such Idaho Code § 55-3 07 does not apply to effectuate changes in the relationship
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between Plaintiff and Brownstone and/or Storms.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Without admitting that a "New Lease" was ever created and specifically denying the same
in the event a "New Lease" was created, Plaintiff breached the "New Lease" by failing to provide
appropriate parking spaces in compliance with the requirements of the City ofldaho Falls and the
roof of the premises was in a state of disrepair and leaked. As such, the Plaintiff is guilty of
breach of contract thereby relieving the Defendants of any responsibility for the alleged "New
Lease" between Plaintiff and Brownstone and/or St01ms.

ANSWER

1.

Answering paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint,

Storms and Brownstone admit each and every allegation contained therein.
2.

Answe1ing paragraph 5 of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone admit each and eve1y allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense
and/or allegation, Stonns and Brownstone allege that Plaintiff had specific and actual knowledge
that commencing in 2005 Burggraf had no further interest in Brownstone was no longer a
shareholder officer or agent of Brownstone and was not conducting business under the name of
Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse. By way of further affirmative defense Storms and
Brownstone asse1t that Plaintiff at least by April 21 , 2010 had actual knowledge that Brownstone
was the exclusive entity doing business as Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse and that
neither Storms or Burggraf was doing business under such name.
3.

Answering paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint Stonns and

Brownstone asse1t that such paragraph is not an allegation or averment but is a maru1er of
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pleading facts and as such is not required to be admitted or denied but to the extent a response is
required thereto Storms and Brownstone deny each allegation contained therein.
4.

Answering paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Defendant

denies each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense and/or
allegation, Storms and Brownstone allege that Plaintiff had specific and actual knowledge that
commencing in 2005 Burggraf had no further interest in Brownstone, was no longer a
shareholder, officer or agent of Brownstone and was not conducting business under the name of
Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse. By way of further affirmative defense Storms and
Brownstone asse1t that Plaintiff at least by April 2 1, 2010 had actual knowledge that Brownstone
was the exclusive entity doing business as Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse and that
neither Storms or Burggraf was doing business under such name. By way of futther affirmative
defense and/or allegation Storms was the authorized registered agent of Brownstone, was its
president, and sole shareholder but after 2005 did not maintain or establish any partnership,
employment, partnership, agency, service, or master-servant relationship with Brownstone or
Burggraf which fact was well known to Plaintiff. By way of further affirmative defense and/or
allegation Storms and Brownstone allege that on or about June 5, 2006, Storms as landlord
subleased the premi ses located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho to Brownstone.
Thereafter, Brownstone was the sole entity doing business as Brownstone Restaurant and
Brewhouse.
5.

Answering paragraph 8 of Plaintiff' s Second Amended Complaint, Stonns and

Brownstone admit each and every allegation contained therein.
6.

Answering paragraph 9 of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Storms and
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Brownstone assert that such paragraph is not an all egation or averment but is a manner of
pleading facts and as such is not required to be admitted or denied but to the extent a response is
required thereto Stoims and Brownstone deny each allegation contained therein.
7.

Answering paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone admit each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense
and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone allege the interest and rights of Sto.rms and Burggraf
in the Commercial Lease and Deposit Receipt lease were forfeited and terminated and Storms
and Burggraf were evicted from the premise located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho by
order of the Court entered in Bonneville County Case No. CV-08-7258 on or about March 25,
2010.
8.

Answering paragraphs 11 and 12 of Plaintiff s Second Amended Complaint,

Storms and Brownstone admit the allegations contained therein.
9.

Answering paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense
and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone allege the interest and rights of Storms and Burggraf
in the Commercial Lease and Deposit Receipt lease were forfeited and terminated and Storms
and Burggraf were evicted from the premise located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho by
order of the Court entered in Bonneville County Case No. CV-08-7258 on or about March 25,
2010. By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone allege that
Brownstone was the only entity conducting buisness and occupying the premise located at 455
River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho and Brownstone paid rent to Plaintiff with Plaintiff accepting
the rent paid by Brownstone for each of the months of April, May, June, July, August and
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September 2010. By way of additional affirmative defense and allegation Storms and
Brownstone allege that neither Storms or Burggraf paid rent to Plaintiff. By way of further
affirmative defense Storms and Brownstone allege that no month to month tenancy or lease was
created as result of the occupancy of the premise by Brownstone with the apparent and actual
consent of Plaintiff. At no time did Brownstone or Storms come to any form of implied or actual
lease or agreement to occupy the premise with Plaintiff nor did the parties come to any
agreement as to any lease or occupancy terms including but not limited to the amount of any rent.
10.

Answering paragraph 14 of Plaintiff s Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone denies each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense
and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the
affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding
paragraphs. Storms and Brownstone further allege that any notice served on Burggraf was of no
effect, force or consequence on Storms and Brownstone. By way of further affirmative defense
and/or allegation no lease or tenancy from month to month existed between Plaintiff and Storms
and/or Brownstone and/or Burggraf after March 25, 20 IO and before the service (if made or
effected) of the Notice alleged in such paragraph such that such Notice was of no force, effect, or
consequence as to Storms and/or Brownstone. By way of further and alternative affirmative
defense and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone allege that proper notice was not given or
served upon Storms and/or Brownstone. By way of further affirmative defense and/or allegation
Storms and Brownstone allege that Idaho Code § 55-307 does not authorize a Notice to
effectuate or create a tenancy for a term of years. By way of additional and alternative
affirmative defense and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone allege any claim for accelerated
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rent is baned by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel by vi rtue of the court' s
findin gs, conclusions, and judgment entered in Bonneville County Case No. CV-08-7258.
11.

Answering paragraph 15 of Pl aintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone deny that any new lease was entered into, but admits what the Notice attempted to
do and what the notice said. By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and
Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or
allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding paragraphs. By way of additional
and alternative affirmative defense and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone allege that
Brownstone was not a named or contemplated party to the "New Lease", that Burggraf was not in
possession and was not leasing, or occupying the premises located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho
Falls, Idaho and Storms was never provided proper notice of the contemplated terms of the "New
Lease" and such is of no force or effect as to Storms and Brownstone.
12.

Answering paragraph 16 of Plainti ffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone admit that Brownstone remained in possession of the Premise on and after
September 1, 2010 by virtue of the actions of Plaintiff in serving the Defendants with orders
probhibiting the removal of the property of Storms leased to Brownstone. Storms and
Brownstone deny each and every other allegation contained in said paragraph. By way of
affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this
reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to
the preceding paragraphs.
13.

Answering paragraphs 17 and 18 of Plaintiff' s Second Amended Complaint,

Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative
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defense and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each
of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding
paragraphs.
14.

Answering paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone admit and deny such allegations by incorporating their response to paragraphs 1-18
of Plaintiffs Complaint as previously stated.
15.

Answering paragraphs 20, 21, 22, 23 , 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 of Plaintiff's Second

Amended Complaint, Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein.
By way of affi rmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and
incorporate by this reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any
of the answers to the preceding paragraphs.
16.

Answering paragraph 29 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone admit each and every allegation contained therein.
17.

Answering paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Stonns and

Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense
and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the
affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding
paragraphs.
18.

Answering paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone deny that there was any new lease entered between the Plaintiff and/or Storms and
Brownstone as such Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation which purpo1ts to
allege the te1m of the "New Lease' . By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation, Sto1ms
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and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the affirmative defenses
and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding paragraphs.
19.

Answering paragraph 32 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense
and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone allege that I.C. § 55-308 is not quoted correctly.
20.

Answering paragraphs 33 and 34 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint,

Storms and Brownstone deny that there was any new lease entered between the Plaintiff and/or
Storms and Brownstone and as such Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation
which purports to allege the terms of the "New Lease". By way of affirmative defense and/or
allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the
affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding
paragraphs.
2 1.

Answering paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone admit and deny such allegations by incorporating their response to paragraphs 1-34
of Plaintiffs Complaint as previously stated.
22.

Answering paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone deny that there was any new lease entered between the Plaintiff and/or Storms and
Brownstone as such Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation which purports to
allege the terms of the "New Lease" . By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms
and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the affirmative defenses
and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding paragraphs. By way of
additional affirmative defense and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone allege that Brownstone
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and/or Stonns vacated the premises on or about December 30, 2010 after issuance of the court's
Order in this matter on November 24, 20 IO in compliance therewith despite no obligation on the
part of Storms or Brownstone to comply with paragraph 18 of the non-existent "New Lease".
23.

Answering paragraph 37 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense
and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone allege that the Plaintiff has failed to quote the statute
correctly.
24.

Answering paragraph 38 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Stonns and

Brownstone admit that Plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
but deny each and every other allegation contained in such paragraph and further denies that
Plaintiff is entitled to such. By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and
Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or
allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding paragraphs.
25.

Answering paragraph 39 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone admit and deny such allegations by incorporating their response to paragraphs 1-38
of Plaintiffs Complaint as previously stated.
26.

Answering paragraphs 40, 41 and 42 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint,

Storms and Brownstone deny that there was any new lease entered between the Plaintiff and/or
Storms and Brownstone as such Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation which
purports to allege the terms of the "New Lease". By way of affirmative defense and/or
allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the
affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding
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paragraphs. By way of additional affirmative defense and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone
allege that all business activities of Brownstone ceased on or about October 1, 20 l Oas a direct
result of Plaintiff's initiation of the within proceedings and no sales were made after that date.
By way of additional affirmative defense and/or allegation the claimed obligation to pay
rent for the month of September was genuinely disputed by the parties, Brownstone tendered
payment for all rent due for the month of September, 2010 on September 15, 2010, such tender in
full satisfacti on was clear and conspicuous and Plaintiff negotiated and accepted such tender, by
reason of such the parties reached an accord and satisfaction for such month.
27.

Answering paragraph 43 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone admit and deny such allegations by incorporating their response to paragraphs 1-42
of Plaintiff's Complaint as previously stated.
28.

Answering paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense
and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone deny that there was any new lease entered between the
Plaintiff and/or Storms and Brownstone as such Storms and Brownstone deny each and every
allegation which purports to allege the terms of the "New Lease". By way of affirmative defense
and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone real lege and incorporate by this reference each of the
affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding
paragraphs. By way of additional and alternative affirmative defense and/or allegation Storms
and/or Brownstone vacated the premises on or about December 30, 2010 and have not thereafter
claimed a right to possess the premises located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho Fall s, Idaho.
29.

Answering paragraph 45 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and
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Brownstone admit and deny such allegations by incorporating their response to paragraphs 1-44
of Plaintiffs Complaint as previously stated.
30.

Answering paragraph 46 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein. Storms and Brownstone deny that
there was any "New Lease" entered between the Plaintiff and/or Storms and Brownstone as such
Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation which purports to allege the terms of the
"New Lease". By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege
and incorporate by this reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in
any of the answers to the preceding paragraphs. By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation,
Storms and Brownstone allege that Storms and Brownstone are entitled to recover their attorney
fees and costs in defending this action pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12- 120, 12-121 , 12-123 and
Idaho Rule of Procedure 54.
31.

Answering paragraph 47 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone admit and deny such allegations by incorporating their response to paragraphs 1-46
of Plaintiffs Complaint as previously stated.
32.

Answering paragraph 48 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone denies each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense
and/or allegation, Brownstone is not and never was bound by the original lease or the new lease;
Storms is not bound by the provisions of the alleged " new lease". Plaintiff is collaterally
estopped and baITed by res judicata as a result of the proceeding in Bonneville County Case No.
CV-2008-7258. Storms and Brownstone deny that there was any new lease entered between the
Plaintiff and/or Storms and Brownstone as such Storms and Brownstone deny each and every
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allegation which purports to allege the terms of the "New Lease'. By way of affinnative defense
and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the
affinnative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding
paragraphs.
33.

Answering paragraph 49 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein, further Stonns and Brownstone
deny that possession by either created any implied contractual duty and/or that if the law implies
a contractual duty by mere possession that Plaintiff has failed to set fmih the correct duty. By
way of affirmative defense and/or allegation

torms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by

this reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers
to the preceding paragraphs. By way of further affirmative defense Storms and Brownstone assert
that Plaintiff at least by April 21, 2010 had actual knowledge that Brownstone was the exclusive
entity doing business as Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse and that neither Storms or
Burggraf was doing business under such name. By way of further affirmative defense and/or
allegation Storms was the authorized registered agent of Brownstone, was its pr sident and sole
shareholder but after 2005 did not maintain or establish any partnership employment,
paiinership, agency, service, or master-servant relationship with Brownstone or Burggraf which
fact was well known to Plaintiff. By way of further affirmative defense and/or allegation Storms
and Brownstone allege that on or about June 5 2006, Stonns as landlord subleased the premises
located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho to Brownstone. Thereafter, Brownstone was
the sole entity doing business as Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse. By way of additional
affirmative defense, Storms' possession of the property ended as early as June 5 2006 but at
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least by April 21, 20 10. During all times of Storms' possession, Storms at all time complied
with any implied contractual duty. By way of additional affirmative defense, Brownstone
obtained possession of the property as early as June 5, 2006 but at least by April 21, 2010, and
during all times of Brownstone's possession, Brownstone at all times complied with any implied
contractual duty .
34.

Answering paragraph 50 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained in such paragraph and further deny that
there was any new lease entered between the Plaintiff and/or Storms and Brownstone as such
Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation which purports to allege the terms of the
"New Lease". By way of further affirmative defense and/or allegation Brownstone was never a
party to the original lease, and is in no way obligated to comply with the terms thereof. By way
of additional affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reaJlege and
incorporate by this reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any
of the answers to the preceding paragraphs.
35.

Answering paragraph 51 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained in such paragraph. By way of additional
affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this
reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to
the preceding paragraphs.
36.

Answering paragraph 52 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone admit and deny such allegations by incorporating their response to paragraphs 1-5 1
of Plaintiffs Complaint as previously stated.
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37.

Answering paragraphs 53, 54 and 55, Storms and Brownstone deny each and

every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms
and/or Brownstone were prohibited from vacating the premises on or before October 15,20 10 by
the Plaintiffs actions in seeking and obtaining Temporary Injunctive relief from October 1, 2010
until November 24, 2010. When Brownstone was finally able to remove its possessions from the
premises, weather conditions were such that substantially greater time was necessary to
effectuate the removal. Brownstone and/or Storms ceased business operations on October 1,
20 10 and if anything Brownstone and/or Storms were denied the use of the equipment, and
denied the ability to undertake sales and profits from the period October 15, 2010 until January 1,
2011. By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and
incorporate by this reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any
of the answers to the preceding paragraphs. By way of additional affirmative defense and/or
allegation Storms and Brownstone allege that all business activities of Brownstone ceased on or
about October 1, 20 10 as a direct result of Plaintiff s initi ation of the within proceedings and no
sales were made after that date.
38.

Answering paragraph 56 of Plaintiff s Second Amended Complaint, Storms and

Brownstone admit and deny such allegations by incorporating their response to paragraphs 1-55
of Plaintiffs Complaint as previously stated.
39.

Answering paragraph 57, 58, and 59 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint,

Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein, and by way of
affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this
reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to
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the preceding paragraphs. By way of further affirmative defense Storms and Brownstone assert
that Plaintiff at least by April 21, 2010 had actual knowledge that Brownstone was the exclusive
entity doing business as Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse and that neither St01ms or
Burggraf was doing business under such name. By way of further affirmative defense and/or
allegation Storms was the authorized registered agent of Brownstone, was its president, and sole
shareholder but after 2005 did not maintain or establish any partnership, employment, agency,
service, or master-servant relationship with Brownstone or Burggraf which fact was well known
to Plaintiff. By way of further affirmative defense and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone
allege that on or about June 5, 2006, Storms as landlord subleased the premises located at 455
River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho to Brownstone. Thereafter, Brownstone was the sole entity
doing business as Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse. By way of additional affirmative
defense, Storms' possession of the property ended as early as June 5, 2006, but at least by April
21, 2010. During all times of Storms' possession, Storms at all time exercised reasonable care in
the use and possession of the premises and at the end of hi s possession the premises had suffered
no unreasonable injury or waste during his occupancy and in fact Storms substantially improved
the property. By way of additional affirmative defense, Brownstone obtained possession of the
property as early as June 5, 2006 but at least by April 2 1, 20 10. During all times of
Brownstone' s possession, Brownstone at all time exercised reasonable care in the use and
possession of the premises and at the end of its possession the premises had suffered no
unreasonable injury or waste during its occupancy.
WHEREFORE, having fully answered the Second Amended Complaint of the Plaintiff,
Storms and Brownstone pray that the same be dismissed, that the Plaintiff take nothing by way
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thereof, and that Storms and Brownstone recover their attorney' s fees and costs incurred in
defending the within matter and as set forth in the Counterclaim.

COUNTERCLAIM
COMES NOW the Defendant, Michael. Storms (hereinafter referred to as "Storms") and
Brownstone Companies, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as "Brownstone") by and through their
attorney, Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq., and for a Counterclaim against Plaintiff, The Watkins
Company, L.L.C. (hereinafter referred to as " Watkins") alleges as follows:
1.

O n or about April 21, 20 10 the court in Bonneville County Case No. CV-08-7258

entered judgment te1minating a lease agreement between Storms and Kathy Burgraff, and
Watkins.
2.

Between April 1, 20 10 and September 30, 2010, Storms and/or Brownstone

occupied the premises located at 455 River Parkway (hereinafter referred to as the " Premises") in
Idaho Falls, Idaho.
3.

On September 15, 20 10 Storms and/or Brownstone through counsel, notified

Watkins of Brownstone's intent to vacate the premises on October 17, 2010.
4.

On September 29, 20 10, Watkins filed suit against Storms and Brownstone

seeking, in part, a pre-judgment writ of attachment and preliminary injunction. On October 1,
20 10 the comt entered a Order Granting Watkins Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
directed that Watkins post a $ 10,000 bond for the issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order.
Such order prohibited Storms and Brownstone from removing any property from the Premises.
5.

A bond was fi led with the court on or about October 5, 2010 for the purpose of

paying all costs and damages which Storms and Brownstone sustained by reason of the issuance
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of the Temporary Restraining Order.
6.

A hearing was held on Watkins' application for prejudgment writ of attachment

and preliminary injunction on October 14,20 10 and the court entered a Decision Denying
Plaintiffs Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment and Granting in Part Plaintiffs Request
for a Preliminary Injunction on November 4, 2010. Such decision determined that Watkins had
failed to show a reasonable probability that it would prevail on the merits of its case pertaining to
the alleged creation of a new lease and as a result denied the Motion for Prejudgment Writ of
Attachment. The court did grant a Preliminary Injunction restraining Storms and Brownstone
from removing from the Premises:
a.

Brewing equipment and all components

b.

Brick structures and divider walls

c.

Staircase and suspended structures

d.

Kettle, fermentation tanks, framing, piping, ventilation components, air
conditioners, mills, sinks, dishwashers, boilers, ovens, stoves, coolers, freezers,
signs, lighting, and racks.

7.

Such Preliminary Injunction was amended by order of the court dated November

24, 2010 to prohibit the removal of a limited number of items to which the parties had stipulated
and two outdoor poles and directed Watkins to post a bond for the issuance of a Preliminary
Injunction in the amount of $10,500.00. No such Preliminary Injunction Bond was subsequently
filed with the court by Watkins.
8.

Brownstone shut down all operations of the restaurant, bar and brewing facil ity on

October 1, 20 10 in anticipation of vacating the premises pursuant to its notice of September 15,
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201 0 and Brownstone and Storms were prohibited from removing equipment, property, and trade
fixtures from October 1, 2010 through November 24, 2010.
9.

Despite Brownstone's intention to vacate the premises on October 17, 2010 and as

a result of the issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order and the other actions of Watkins,
Brownstone was forced to remain in possession of the premises and continued to pay insurance
on the premises, and/or its contents for the months of October, November and December 2010 to
the damage of Brownstone in an amount to be determined at the time of trial.
10.

Despite the intention to vacate the premises on October 17, 2010 and as a result of

the issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order and the other actions of Watkins, Brownstone
was forced to remain in possession of the premises and continued to pay power and other utilities
for the premises for the months of October, November and December 2010 to the damage of
Brownstone in an amount to be determined at the ti me of trial.
11 .

Storms and Brownstone had rented storage facilities to store the equipment,

property and trade fixtures which were to be moved by October 17, 2010 and had to maintain the
availability of the same for the months of October, November and December 201 0 to the damage
of Storms and Brownstone in an amount to be determined at the time of trial.
12.

As a result of the application fo r Prejudgment Writ of Attachment and the

temporary restraining order the starting date of the move from the premises was delayed from
October 1, 20 10 until November 24, 2010. The delay resulted in significantly greater moving
expenses than it would have cost if Brownstone and Storms would have been allowed to move
and vacate in October. Further, it took 19 more days than the anticipated 17 days to vacate the
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premises to the damage of Storms and Brownstone in an amount to be determined at the time of
trial.
13.

Stom1s and Brownstone incurred attorney fees and costs in an amount to be

determined at the time of trial but in the sum of not less than $15 ,000.00 solely in defending the
application for prejudgment writ of attaclunent and the application for a temporary and
preliminary inj unction pursuant to the provisions ofldaho Code§ 8-803 and Rule 65(c) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and is entitled to recover such sum from Watkins or its surety.
WHEREFORE Defendants pray that judgment be entered against Watkins and in favor of
Stonns and/or Brownstone on their Counterclaim in an amount to be dete1mined at the time of
trial together with additional reasonable attorney fees and costs and such other relief as the court
deems just.

L-1

DATED this ~ '$ day of October, 2013 .

DEA C. BRAND~
.~
Attorney for Defendants Storms and Brownstone

Defendant and Counterclaimant
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
:ss.
)

MICHAEL STORMS being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: That he is one
of the Defendants and Counterclaimants in the above cause; that he has read the foregoing
Answer to Second Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, knows the contents thereof; and that
the same is true and correct as he verily believes.

SUBSCR1BED AND SWORN to before me this "?-3

.'L

of October, 2013.

~£>

NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
Residing at: . . 2 ~ 6?'?
My Commission Expires: ...rfe ;/.t.,,/J

~·
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the

23

,-,4
day of October, 2013, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following persons at the addresses
below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct
postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting as set forth below.
B.J. Driscoll, Esq.
Smith, Driscoll and Associates
414 Shoup
P.O. Box 5073 1
Idaho Falls ID 83405
Fax: 529-4166

[
] By pre-paid post
[
] By hand delivery
[ L-j By facsimile transmission
[
] By Courthouse Box

Hon. Darren B. Simpson
District Judge
Bingham County Courthouse
50 1 N Maple #3 10
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax: 785-8057

[
]
[
]
[ L---]
[
]

By pre-paid post
By hand delivery
By facsi1nile transmission
By Courthouse Box

~-DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ.
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DIS rR ICl CJUr<J
MAG1Sl RMF l11V 1S!0N
flO NH[VIL L~ C,_ :., 1./ I Y. IJ,\H .

B. J. Driscoll, Esq. -158 #7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Ave.
P.0. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166

14 JAN IO PH ~: 28

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,

Case No. CV-10-5958

REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiff,

v.
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, KATHY
BURGGRAF, an individual, and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an Idaho
corporation; collectively doing business as
BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT AND
BREWHOUSE,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the plaintiff, The Watkins Company, LLC ("Watkins"), and in reply
to defendant's Counterclaim, admits, denies, alleges, and avers as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
1.

Defendant's Counterclaim fails to state a cause of action upon which

relief can be granted.
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SECOND DEFENSE
2.

Plaintiff denies each and every allegation of said defendant's

Counterclaim not herein specifically admitted.
THIRD DEFENSE
3.

In answer to paragraph 1 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff admits

the court in said case entered an Amended Judgment on April 21, 2010, but denies the
remaining allegations.
4.

In answer to paragraph 2 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff admits

the same.
5.

In answer to paragraph 3 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff admits

the same.
6.

In answer to paragraph 4 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff admits

the same.
7.

In answer to paragraph 5 of Defendant's Counterclaim , plaintiff admits

that Watkins filed a bond on October 5, 2010, but denies the remaining allegations of
paragraph 5.
8.

In answer to paragraph 6 of Defendant' s Counterclaim, plaintiff admits

t he sam e.
9.

In answer to paragraph 7 of Defendant' s Counterclaim, plaintiff admits

the same.
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10.

In answer to paragraph 8 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff is

without sufficient knowledge of when the defendants ceased their business operations
and therefore denies the same. Plaintiff denies the balance of said paragraph 8.
11.

In answer to paragraph 9 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff denies

the same.
12.

In answer to paragraph 10 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff denies

the same.
13.

In answer to paragraph 11 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff is

without sufficient knowledge of defendants' alleged rental of storage facilities and
therefore denies the same.
14.

In answer to paragraph 12 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff denies

the same.
15.

In answer to paragraph 13 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff denies

the same.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

1.

As a separate and further defense, plaintiff alleges that

Defendants/Counterclaimants failed to mitigate their damages, and that any and all
damages, as alleged by the Defendants/Counterclaimants, which are expressly denied,
resulted from said failure to mitigate damages.
2.

As a separate and further defen se, plaintiff alleges that

Defendants'/Counterclaimants' claims should be reduced or discharged by the doctrine
of setoff.
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3.

As a separate and further defense, plaintiff alleges that

Defendants'/Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
4.

As a separate and further defense, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants/Counterclaimants are estopped from asserting the claims herein, or have
waived said claims.
5.

As a separate and further defense, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants'/Counterclaimants' claims are barred by !aches.
6.

As a separate and further defense, Plaintiff alleges that the Counterclaim

and each and every separate cause of action contained therein is barred in whole or in
part by reason of Defendants' /Counterclaimants' unclean hands.
7.

As a separate and further defense, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants'/Counterclaimants' claims are barred by unjust enrichment.
8.

As a separate and further defense, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants'/Counterclaimants' claims are barred by force majeure.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment as follows:
(1)

That Defendants' Counterclaim be dismissed and that he take nothing

thereby;
(2)

That Plaintiff recover its rea sonable attorney's fee s and costs incurred in

defending defendant's Counterclaim, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3); and
(3)

For such other and further relief as to the Court appears just and

equitable in the premises.
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..

DATED this

I

/tf)

day of January, 2014.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES,

PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~
day of January, 2014, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM to be served, by placing the
same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or
hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq.
COX, OHMAN &
BRANDSTETTER, CHTD
P.O. Box 51600
510 "D" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Honorable Darren B. Simpson
District Judge
Bingham County Courthouse
501 N. Maple, #310
Blackfoot, ID 83221

[ ] )J. S. Mail
[ v( Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

[ ] )J. S. Mail

[0

Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

'\
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:D fN CHAMBERS AT BLACKFOOT,
B:VGHAM COUNTY, IDAHO
•
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D
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01STR1CT JUDGE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual,
KATHY BURGGRAF, an individual, and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an
Idaho Corporation; collectively doing
business as BROWNSTONE
RESTAURANT AND BREWHOUSE,
Defendants.

_______________

I.

CASE NO. CV-2010-5958

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATEMENT OF Tl-IE CASE

Plaintiff The Watkins Company, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company
(hereinafter "Watkins"), filed this breach of contract, breach of covenant to repair, unjust
enrichment, and waste action against Defendants Michael Storms, an individual
(hereinafter "Storms"); Kathy Burggraf, an. individual (hereinafter "Burggraf');
Brownstone Companies, Inc., an Idal10 Corporation (hereinafter the "Brownstone"); and
Storms Burggraf, and Brownstone collectively doing business as the Brownstone
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Restaurant and Brewhouse (hereinafter the "Restamant"). 1

Watkins also requested

injunctive relief, an accounting, eviction, and attorney's fees. 2 Storms and Brownstone
asse1t ed affirmative defenses and counterclaimed for storage rental moving, utility and
insurance expenses, together with attorney fees. 3
A Co urt Trial was held on March 18-21 , April 25, May 6, and July 29 of 2014. 4
Having reviewed the record, the evidence presented at trial, and the relevant authorities
the following find ings of fact and conclusions of law are appropriate.
II.

ISSUES

Watkins presented evidence in supp01t of his theories of breach of the covenant to
repair (Count Six) unj ust enrichment (Count Seven) and waste (Count Eight). 5 Watkins
requests attorn ey fees pursuant to the original lease between the parties, the "New
Lease," Idaho Code§§ 12- 120 and 12-12 1 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54.6
Storms and Brownstone counterclaimed that Watkins pre ented Storms and
Brownstone from vacating the Premises for approximately six (6) weeks, causing Storms
and Brownstone to incur unnecessary storage rental expenses "significantly greater

1 Second Amended Compl aint, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonnev ill e County case no. CV20 I 0-5958 (filed September 6, 2013) (hereinafter the ''Second Amended Complaint").
2 Seco nd Amended Complaint at pp. 6-8.
3 An swe r to Second Amended Com plaint and Co unterclaim, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms,
Bonnevil le Co unty case no. CY-2010-5958 (filed October 23 20 13) (he reinafter the "Answer and
Counterclaim').
4 Minute Entry [for March 18, 2014 Court Trial]
The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville
County case no. CV-201 0-5958 (fri ed March 21, 2014); M inute Entry [for March .19, 2014 Court Trial] ,
The Watkins Company, lLCv. Storms Bonneville Co unty case no. CV-2010-5958 (filed March 21 2014);
Minute Entry [for March 20, 2014 Court Trial], Th e Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms Bonneville County
case no . CV-20 10-5958 (fi led March 2 1, 20 14); Minute ntry [for March 2 1, 2014 Co UJt Trial] , The
Watkins Company. llC v. Storms , Bonnevi ll e County case no. CV-2010-5958 (filed May I, 20 14); Minute
Entry [fo r April 24, 2014 Cou1i Tri al] The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storm Bonneville County case no.
CY -20 I 0-5958 filed May l 20 14). This Couii notes that the Bonneville County Cle rk has not prepared a
minute entry for the July 29 2014 hearing as of the date of thee findings and conclusions.
5 See: Second Amended Complaint, at pp. 8- 10.
6 Second Amended Com plaint, at pp. 7-8 .
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moving expenses " 7 power and utilities for the rental property located at 455 River
Parkway Idaho Falls, Idaho (hereinafter the "Premises"), insurance expenses and
attorney fees. 8 Storms and Brownstone also claim affirmative defenses of unclean hands,
and failure to mitigate damages. 9 Storms and Brownstone request attorney fees and costs
under Idaho Code § 8-803 , and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65( c) for defending against
the temporary restraining order and the reque ted writ of attachment. 10
Based upon the record, the evidence presented at trial, and the relevant
authorities, the following issues require adjudication:
l.

Did the terms of the Lease carry over into Storms' and Brownstone's

tenancy at will?
2.

Did Storms and/or Brownstone breach the covenant to repair in the Lease?

3.

What amount of money, if any, should be awarded to Watkins for cleaning

or repair of the Premises as a result of Storms' and/or Brownstone's breach?
4.
Premises from
5.

Were Storms and Brownstone unjustly enriched by possession of the
ovember 25, 2010 to December 30, 2010 without paying rent?
Have Storms and Brownstone shown themselves entitled to recover

storage rental expenses, additional moving expenses, insurance expenses, utility
expenses, and attorney fees as damages for the temporary restraining order entered
against them?

7

An swer and Counterclaim at p. 19

8 ~ : Answer and Counterclaim, at
9 An wer and Counterclaim at p. 2.
10

,r 12.
pp. 17-20.

Answer and Counterclaim , at p. 20.
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6.

What amount of money if any, should be awarded to Storms and

Brownstone on their claims for expenses and fees incurred as a result of the temporary
restraining order entered against them?

III.
1.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Watkins owns commercial real estate located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho

Falls, Idaho (the Premises). 11 Dane Watkins, Sr. is Watkins' managing partner. 12
2.

On April 18, I 996, Brownstone was incorporated in the State of Idaho. 13

Storms is the president and registered agent for Brownstone. 14 Brownstone's address is
listed on its Certificate of Incorporation as "455 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho
83 402." 15 This is the address of the Premises. 16
3.

On July 31 , 1996, Storms and Bmggraf, as individuals, entered into a

thirty (30) year commercial lease agreement with Watkins (hereinafter referred to as the
"Lease") to lease the Premises for the operation of a microbrewery and restaurant. 17
4.

Paragraph 7 of the Lease reads as follows:

MAINTENANCE, REPAIRS, ALTERATIONS: Lessee acknowledges
that the premises are in good order and repair, unless otherwise indicated
herein. Lessee shall, at his own expense and at all times maintain the
premises in good and safe condition, including plate glass, electrical

11 Defendants' Trial Exhibit P, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonnev ille County case no. CV20 I0-5958 (adm itted March 18, 2014) (herei nafter "Trial Exhibit P"), at p. l. On March 18 20 J 4 tbe
first day of tr ial, the parties sti pulated to the admission of the following tria l ex hibits: Plaintiff's Exhibits 128, and 32-39; Defendants' Exhibits A - U. Defendants' Exhibit T.98A was admitted on March 19, 2014.
Defendants' Exhibit V was admitted for demonstrative purposes on April 24, 20 14. Defendants' Exhibits
AA , AA! , AA2, AA3 V, W, X, Z and ZI were admitted on May 5 2014. Each ofthese ex hibits shall
here in after be refe1Ted to as "Trial Exhibit" followed by the designated exhibit number.
12 Tria l Exhi bit P, at p. I.
13 Exhibit I, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-5958 (admitted
by tipulation October 14 2010) (hereinafter "TRO Exh ibit 1") at p. 1.
14 TRO Ex hib it l at p. 2.
is Id.
16 Exh ibit 14, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-5958 (admitted
by sti pulation October 14 20 I0) (hereinafter "TRO Exhibit 14") at p. 2.
17 Tr ial Ex hibit I, at p. l . ~ 3.
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wmng, plumbing and heating installations and any other system or
equipment upon the premises and shall surrender the same at tem1ination
hereof, in as good condition as received, normal wear and tear excepted.
Lessee shall be responsi ble for all repairs required, See Addendum B
which shall be maintained by Lessor. Lessee shall also maintain in good
condition such portions adjacent to the premises, such as sidewalks
driveways, lawns and shrubbery, which would otherwise be required to be
maintained by Lessor.
No improvement or alteration of the premises shall be made
Prior to the
without the prior written consent o the Lessor.
commencement of any substantial repair improvement or alteration,
Lessee shall give Lessor at least two (2) days written notice in order that
Lessor may post appropriate notices to avoid any liability for liens.
Lessee shall not commit any waste upon the premises, or any
nuisance or act which may disturb the quiet enj oyment of any tenant in the
.
b Ul"ld'mg. 18
5.

Addendum

B to

the

Lease

details

the

particular

maintenance

responsibilities assigned to the tenant and to the Iandlord. 19 The tenant's maintenance
responsi bilities include glass breakage. 20
6.

Addendum B also sets forth the parties' agreement that:

Le ee plans to spend a minimum of $400 000.00 on remodeling of the
premises and installation of the microbrewery system. Lessee will furnish
checks and invoices to see the $400,000.00 has been paid. 2 1
7.

After executin g the Lease with Watkins, Storms and Burggraf gutted the

building22 and renovated it to accommodate a microbrew pub and restaurant. 23 They tore
out the drop ceilings, 24 sandblasted and stained the original beams,25 installed new

18
19
20

21
22

23

24
25

Trial Exh ibit 1, atp. l ,~ 7.
Trial Exh ibit I at p. 4.
Id.
]d.

See: Tr ial
See: Trial
See: Trial
See: Trial

Exhibits T.1 through T.13, T. 15 through T.17.
Exhibits T. 19 through T.26.
E 'hibit T.16.
Exhibit T. 20.
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plumbing, 26 tore out the old and installed new electrical services, removed walls, 27 and
reconfigured the interior of the Premises.
8.

On May 30, 1997 Storms, Burggraf, and Brownstone filed a certificate of

assumed business name with the Idaho Secretary of State to conduct business under the
name "Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse." 28
9.

During the thirteen ( 13) year operation of the Restaurant, employees were

expected to undertake routine cleaning of their stations. Furthermore, an annual cleaning
day took place wherein equjpment was removed and pressure washed and the Pr mises
including the outside brick work, was cleaned by Restaurant employees. The kitchen
hood system was maintained by a commercial service on an annual basi and inspected
by the fire marshal. The Restaurant was never cited by the Health Deprutment or the Fire
Department for any violations.

10.

Burggraf ceased to take pa1i in the day-to-day operations of the Restaurant

in 2002 and sold her interest in the Brownstone in 2005 .29

11.

In 2005, Storms approached Dane Watkins about the Restaurant's roof,

which extended over other businesses in the Eagle Rock commercial complex. Storms
wanted to replace the roof because it was old and its shingles were falling off. Storms
understood that he was responsible to pay for one-half of any repairs to the roof over the
Restaurant.

After speaking to Mr. Watkins, Storms understood that both he and Mr.

Watkins would solicit bids from roofers for the repair of the roof.

26

See: Trial Exhibit T.15.
Trial Ex hibit T.17.
2 Complaint, The Watkins Company, LlC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-20 I0-5958 (fi led
Se ptember 29, 20 I 0) (here inafter the "Complaint"), at p. 2, 1 5. See also: Exh ibit 3, The Watkins
27 - ; :
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12.

In the fall of 2005, not long after speaking with Mr. Watkins about the

roof Storms arrived at the Restaurant to see a roofing contractor working on the area of
the roof to the west of the Restaurant. Mr. Watkins had hired Briggs Roofing to repair
the entire roof including the portion over th

Restaurant.

After meeting with Mr.

Watkins, Storms ultimately agreed to allow Briggs Roofing to repair the roof over the
Restaurant, and paid Mr. Watkins by December of 2005, $6,780.00 for Storms' portion
of the cost. Storms never saw a bid or an invoice from Briggs Roofing.
13.

In April of 2006, Briggs Roofing returned to finish the portion of the

roofing over the Restaurant.

A crew arrived and tore off the lay rs of old shingles

pushing the old shingles off the roof and into a dump truck. 30 The dump truck was
moved around the Restaurant as the roofers moved around the roof. In so doing, the
roofers tore the Restaurant's window awnings and popped the handicap ramp out of the
cement by the 1101th entrance.
14.

One Friday afternoon, after the Briggs Roofing crew exposed the roof

down to the wood on the Restaurant' s south side stacked new shingles four feet high on
the roof, and left for the weekend, a heav y rain set in and continued throughout the
weekend. Storms received a telephone call from the Restaurant manager, infom1ing him
that the roof leaked in numerous places, water was causing the paint on the walls to
bubble and tape was hanging down from the ceiling. Storms alerted Mr. Watkins to the
problem.

Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonne vi II County case no. CY-20 I 0-5958 (admi tted by stipulation October 14
20 10).
29

Trial Exhibit P.

30

See: Defe ndan t's Trial Exhibits T.34 and T .35 .
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15.

The following Monday, the roofers from Briggs Roofing returned . Over

the course of the next several weeks, ending in early May 2006, Briggs Roofing finished
the Restaurant's new roof.

In the process, one of the roofers broke through the

Restamant's ceiling, spilling debris into the Restaurant and onto a customer.
Approximately one week later, Mr. Watkins approached Storms at the Restaurant and
requested an additional $2,000.00 for new wood placed on the roof. Storms refused to
pay additional money without proof of new wood actually being laid onto the roof. Mr.
Watkins abandoned his request.
16.

Storms could not get Mr. Watkins to address the water-leak repair issues

inside the Restaurant. Finally, in the Fall of 2006, Storms threatened to decrease the
amount of monthly rent paid for the Premises. Soon thereafter, an employee of Waters
Construction appeared at the Premises and announced that he had been hired by Dane
Watkins to fi x the interior of the Restaurant. After assessing the interior damage, Waters
Construction began making repairs. However, when a heavy rain fell in late September
or early October of 2006, Waters Construction contacted Storms to say that leaks were
occurring all over the Premises and, without repairs to the roof, any additional work on
the interior was pointless, since the water leaks were degrading the repair-work.

A

Waters Construction employee took Storms up on the roof to demonstrate where the
leaks were occurring. Thereafter, Waters Construction did not undertake any additional
repairs to the Premises.
17.

The damaged rain gutter was replaced some time in 2007.
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18.

In August of 2007, Waters Construction sued Watkins and Storms for

failure to pay for services rendered. 3 1 Almost one year later, in July of 2008 judgment
was entered in favor of Waters

onstruction as against Watkins.32 Waters Construction's

claim against Storms was d nied because Storms had no contractual relationship with
· 33
W aters Constrnct10n.
J 9.

On November 19 2008, Watkins sued Storms and Burggraf, in Bonneville

County case no. CV-2008-7258 (hereinafter the "2008 Lawsuit"), and alleged that Storms
and Burggraf breached the Lease by failing to pay rent, and failing to provide monthly
sales reports. 34

Watkins sought to evict Storms and Burggraf from the Premises. 35

Watkins further requested accelerated rent late fees costs of roof repair, rent for the
upstairs storage space, unjust enrichment, and food and drink credits. 36
20.

On March 16 20 10 in the 2008 Lawsuit, Judge Joel Tingey held that

Burggraf no longer ovmed an interest in the Brownstone. 37 Judge Tingey found that
Storm materially breached the Lease by withholding rent (without pe1mission for such
action under the Lease) and determined that Watkins was entitled to evict Storms from
the Premises. 38
21.

On April 21 2010, Watkins received a judgment in the 2008 Lawsuit

terminating the Lease. 39 Following the entry of the April 21, 2010 judgment, Storms and
Brownstone retained possession of the Premises and paid rent on a month-to-month

3 1 Trial

Exhibit N .
Trial ExhibitN, at p. 00019.
33 Tria l Exhibit N , at pp. 00004, 00019 .
34 Tria l Exhibit P, at pp . 00001 -00009.
35 T r ial Exhibi t P, at p. 00009.
36 Trial Exh ibit P, at pp. 00009 - 00017.
37 Trial Exh ibit P, at p. 00002.
38 Trial Exhibit P, at pp. 00006 - 00009.
32
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ba is. 40 Th reafter, the parties disagreed as to whether or not the Lease applied to their

· h"1p.41
re l atlons
22.

Storms became a tenant-at-will, possessing the Premises with Watkins'

consent, but without fixed lease tenns. 42
23.

In August of 20 10, in response to encouragement from Dane Watkins,

Gerald Mitch 11 (owner of White Water Grill and Wasabi Japanese Restaurant) inspected
the Premises in consideration of opening a restaurant there.
24.

On August 15, 2010, a process server delivered a letter from Watkins,

dated August 13 2010 (hereinafter the "August 13 Letter"), to Burggraf by delivering a
copy of the August 13 Letter to Burggraf at her home. 43
25.

On August 16, 2010, a process server delivered the August 13 Letter to

van Bowman, assistant manager of the Restaurant by delivering a copy thereof to Evan
·
44
Bowman at tl1eprem1ses.
26.

The August 13 Letter, addressed to "Mike Storms, Brownstone Restaurant

and Brewhouse 999 South Lee, Idaho Falls Idaho 83404 " stated:
I have tried to talk to you several times over the last few weeks about the
rent and other responsibilities the Watkins Company LLC expects from
you and the Brownstone as tenants. I regret that we till have not been
able to agree on the te1ms of the lease so this letter is to notify you of the

39

Comp laint, at p. 3, ~ I I.

°Co mp laint, at p. 3, i112.

4

4 1 Decision

Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment and Granting in Part Plaintiffs
Request for a Preliminary Injunction, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville Co unty case no.
CV-20 I0-5958 ( filed ovember 4, 20 l 0) (hereinafter the "Partial Preliminary lnju11ctio11"), at p. 12.
42 Partial Prelimina,y Injunction, at p. I I· Order Granting Preliminar
Injunction in Part The Watkins
ompany, LLC v. Storms Bonnevi lle County case no. CV-2010-5958 (fi led ovember 24, 20 10)
(hereinafter the "Second Partial Prelimimuy /11j1111ctio11" ), at p. 8.
43 Affidavit of Dane Watkins, The Watkin Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV201 0-5958 (filed October l, 20 I0) (hereinafter the "Watkins I Affidavit"), at Exhibit C, p. 3.
44 Watkins I Affidavit, at Exhibit C.
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changes to the lease. 1 hese changes will take effect at the end of tl1is
month.
The terms of the lease between you and Watkins Company will be the
same as the old lease that I have attached to this letter, except you will
now be responsible for I 00% of the roof repairs, the rent will be due the
1st day of the month, you will pay the annual food and drink credit of
$3 ,000 on November 151 of each year and the credits will be good for 12
months, and you have no right to use Space # 16 or the upstairs storage or
the sidewalk area. The lease will expire 10/31 /20207 [sic]. 45
27.

On September 13

2010

Dane Watkins, on behalf of "Watkins &

Watkins" sent a letter addressed to Storms at the Premises address (hereinafter the
" September 13 Letter"). 46 The September 13 Letter informed Storms that he was in
default in his payment to Watkins & Watkins under the lease for the rent of the
Restaurant and demanded payment within three days under penalty of eviction. 47
28.

On September 14, 2010 , Dane Watkins, this time writing on behalf of

Watkins, sent another demand Jetter, at.h.lressetl lo Storms (at the Premises address),
Burggraf (at her home), the Restaurant (at the Premises address) and Brownstone (at the
Premises address) (the "September 14 Letter"). 48 The September 14 Letter not d that the
recipients were in default under the Lease with Watkins demanded payment within three
days, and threatened eviction for non-payment. 49 The September 14 Letter also stated
that it superseded the September 13 Letter. so
29.

The parties stipulated that Storms had no actual notice of the August 13

Letter until September 14, 20 10.

~ T RO Exl1ibit 14, at p. l.

Exhibit 15. The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms , Bon nevi lie County case no. CV-20 I 0-5958 (admitted
b stipulation October 14, 2010).

46

47

Id .

Exhibit 16, The Watkins Company, LLCv. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-5958 (admitted
by stipulat ion October 14, 2010).
49 .l_Q.

48
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30.

By letter dated September 15, 2010, counsel for Brownstone informed

Watkins of its intention to vacate the Premises on October 17 2010. 51

Storms' and

Brownstone's operated the Restaurant for the Jast time on September 30 20 10.
31.

Herbert Rockhold agreed to help Storms move everything that belonged to

Storms and Brownstone out of the Premises and into storage.

They discussed an

approximate fee for Rockhold 's services in the amount of $2,500.00 to $3 ,500.00. On
October 1, 20 10, Rockhold began moving small items out of the Premises for a few hours
b fore being directed to stop by Storms due to the Tempora,y Restraining Order. In
addition to friends and family members, mployees of the Brownstone were on hand to
help · ith the move.
32.

On Octo ber 1, 2010, Watkins moved for a temporary restraining order

prohibiting Storms and Brownstone from removing any property located in or on the
Premises.52 Watkins' Motion was granted and the parties were directed not to remove
any property fro m the Premises unti I a decision issued on Watkins' application for a
prejudgment writ of attachment. 53
33.

On November 4 20 10

Watkins ' Motion for Prejudgment Writ of

Attachment was denied, but his request for a preliminary injunction was partially
granted.54 Storms and Brownstone were enjoined from removing brewing equipment,
brick structures and divider walls, staircases a loft seating area, kettles fenn entation

Id.
Watkin I Affidavit, at Exhi bit E.
2 Motion fo r Temporary Restraining Order and Appl ication for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment The
Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonnevi ll e County case no. CY-2010-5958 (tiled October I , 2010)
(herei nafter "Watkins' Motion").
53 Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Ca use, The Watkins
Company, llC v. Storms Bonneville County case no. CV-20 I 0-5958 (ti led October 7, 20 I 0) (hereinafter
the "Temporary Restraining Order").

50

1
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tanks, framing,

p1pmg, ventilation components, air conditioners

mills,

sinks

dishwashers, boilers, ovens stoves coolers and freezers , signs lighting, racks physically
connected to the floors, walls and exposed trusses on the Premise .55
34.

On November 9, 2010, Watkins moved for reconsideration of the Partial

Preliminary Injunction , because the "New Lease" issue had not been briefed by the
·
56
parties.

to1ms and Brownstone also moved for reconsideration of the Partial

Preliminary Injunction based upon a premature decision on the preliminary .inj unction
issue without appropriate briefing or evidence. 57

This Court set aside the Partial

Preliminary b1junction on the same date. 58
35 .

On November 9, 2010 at 10:41 o'clock a.m., counsel for Watkins sent

counsel for Storms and Brownstone the following e-mail:
Thanks, Dean.
Also Mr. Watkins contacted me this morning and said that Mr. Storms
and a few other men are over at the building trus morning starting to
remove property from the premises. Mr. Watkins approached them and
asked what they were doing ince the court entered the preliminary
mJunction. Mr. Storms said no one had told him of any preliminary
injunction. So my client contacted me. I called your office but they said
you were in court in Madison County. In the meantime, I gave Mr.
Watkin a copy of the court's order issuing the preliminary injunction and
I believe Mr. Watkins is going to take the copy over to Mr. Storms. I trust
your client will comply with the injunction, but I wanted to keep you
informed of what my client is reporting to me.59

54

See: Partial Pre/imina,y fnjunclion.
Partial Prelimina,y Injunction, at p. 14. See also: Watkins Affidav it, at p. 4, 1 I6a.-d.
56 Motion for Reconsideration, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonnevill e Co unty case no. CV20 l 0-5958 (fi led November 9, 20 l 0) (here inafter "Watkins' Reconsideration Motion").
57 Motion for Reconsideration and Request for Heari ng on Preliminary Injunction/Restrain ing Order, The
Watkin Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville Coun ty case no. CV-2010-5958 (filed November 9, 20 l 0)
(hereinafter "Storms' and Brownstone's Reconsideration Motion").
58 Order Sett ing Aside Decision Granting in Part Plaintiff's Request for Preliminary InjW1ction, The
Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-5958 (filed November 9, 201 0)
(hereinafter the "Set Aside Order").
59 Trial Exhib it A at p. 000025.
55
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36.

On November 24, 2010 at 3:21 o'clock p.m. this Court again granted

Watkins a partial preliminary injunction applicable only to the outdoor poles in the
vicinity of the Premi.ses. Storms and Brownstone were not enjoined from removing other
disputed fixtures, including the wooden bar, the signs affixed to the poles, and the
awnings on the east and north walls of the Premises. 60 On the san1e date, and at the same
time, this Court denied Watkins' request for an Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)
certificate of a final judgment as to this Court's denial of Watkin's Reconsideration
Motion.61
37.

Rockhold returned to the Premises in late November or early December

2010 to move equipment out of the Restaurant. Few if any former employees of the
Brownstone were available for the disconnection and moving of goods and equipment.
Snow and ice made the move difficult. Rockhold finished Lhe move on December 30

2010.
3 8.

Rockhold made sure the Premises were clean as items were moved out

inc luding sweeping and mopping the floors and cleaning dirty areas on the walls.
39.

As a result of the additional time required to move out, Rockhold charged

Storms and Brownstone $5 500.00 for his services.62 Rockhold testified that had he been
able to move Storms and Brownstone out of the Premises in October of 20 IO the price
would have been around $3 500.00.

econd Partial Preliminaty Injunction, at p. 11.
Order Denying Plaintiffs Request for a Rule 54(b) Certificate, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms,
Bonne ille County case no. CV-2010-5958 (filed ovember24, 2010).
62 ~
: Trial
x hibit K, at p. 16.

60
61
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40.

Storms and Brownstone hired Alan Flores to deep clean the Premises.

Flores finished his work in late December of 2010.
41.

Upon fully vacating the Premises, Storms and Brownstone left behind a

br ken vestibule window pane, a broken crash bar on the north entrance door grease in
the kitchen's grease trap, and dust on the fans and beams above the brewing equipment
and dining area.
42.

In January of 2011 , Watkins hired Blaise Kauer to go through the

Premises and make it electrically safe to show potential tenants. Kauer spent seven (7)
hours to assure that any loose wires were safe, repair lights, replace light bulbs
43.

On or about January 31, 2011, Dan Carter owner of Bennett's Paint and

Glass, inspected the Premises to determine what issues with the doors needed to be
addressed. He replaced the panic bar system on the northeast door and the closer on one
of the entrance doors. Cai.ter also installed new lock rods on the exterior French doors in
the vestibule.
44.

Gerald Mitchell testified that he began to seriously consider moving into

the Premises "in the first part of 2011." He engaged in lease negotiations with Dane
Watkins approximately three (3) months before he opened the Snow Eagle G1ill and
Brewery.
45.

On April 4 20 11, Mitchell signed a "Commercial Lease and Deposit

Receipt" with Watkins for rental of the Premises. 63
46.

After renovation and reconfigmation of the Premises Mitchell opened the

now Eagle Brewing and Grill in the former Restaurant Premises on July 4, 2011.

63

Trial Exhibi t 2.
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47.

Watkins never served Burggraf with this lawsuit.

Therefore Watkins

hall take nothing by its Second Amended Complaint or any previous allegations, against
h r.

48.

Watkins' Count One breach of contract claim, as it related to a document

Watkins referred to as the ''New Lease," was summarily adjudicated in Storms' and
Brownstone's favor. 64 Watkins shall take nothing by its Count One (breach of contract)
claim against the defendants.
49.

Watkins' Count Two request for injunctive relief (which addressed

removal of furnishings and fixtures from the Premises) was granted in part and denied in
part in prior rulings.65 Storms and Brownstone vacated the Premises as of December 30
201 0. 66 Thus Watkins' request is now moot.
50.

Watkins' Count Three request for an accounting was summarily

adjudicated in Storms' and Brownstone's favor. 67 Watkins shall take nothing from the
defendants based upon its request for an accounting.
51.

Watkins' Count Four request for eviction is now moot since Storms and

Brownstone vacated the Prem ises in 2011. 68

Second Amended Comp laint at pp. 4-6; Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, and Granting in Patt Defendants' Mot ion for Partial Summary Ju dgment, The Watkins
Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-20 I 0-5958 (filed May 13. 2013) (hereinafter the
"Summary Judgment Order") at p. 14.
6- ~
: Second Amended Complaint, at p. 6· Summaiy Judgm ent Order, at pp. 14-J S.
r, 6 Affidavit of Dane Watkins, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms Bonneville County case no . CV20 I0-5958 (fi led December 12, 20 12) (hereinafter the "Watkins II Affidavit"), at p. 4, § l 7; Summa,y
Judgment Order, at p. 14.
67 ~ : Summa1y Judgment Order, at p. 14
D. I.
68 ~
: Second Amended Complaint, at pp. 6-7 ; S11mmaiy Judgment Order at pp. 15-1 6.
64 ~ :
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52.

Storms and Brownstone were granted summary judgment as to Watkins '

Count Six claim for breach of contract and the covenant to repair to the extent such claim
alleged damages under the "New Lease." 69
53.

St01ms' and Brownstone's third, fourth, fifth, and sixth affirmative

defenses all relate to Watkins' claims under the alleged "New Lease." 70 This Comt
previously determined that the "New Lease" never came into effect between the parties. 71
Thus Storms' and Brownstone's third, fourth, fifth, and sixth affirmative defenses are
moot.
IV.
A.

APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF LAW

Tenancy at Will
1.

When a lessee holds over after his tenancy for a fixed tem1 of years

expires the lessor must elect to either treat the lessee as a trespasser or hold him to a new
tenancy. 72 If he treats the lessee as a trespasser, the lessor may bring an action for
unlawfu l detainer. 73 If, however the lessor seek , implicitly or explicitly, to hold the
lessee to a new tenancy, a new lease arises by operation of law. 74 The tenant's right to
possession, if any, is not based upon the original lease but upon a new tenancy created
by law.75

Sum111c11y .Judgment Order, at p. 16.
Answer and Co unterclaim , at pp. 2-3 .
7 1 Partial Prelim ina,y Injunction, at p. 12.
72 Lewiston Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Rohde, 110 Idaho 640, 644-5, 7 18 P.2d 55 1, 555-6 (Ct. App. 1985)
[ci ti ng: R. chosh insk i, American Law of landlord and Tenant§ 2:23 (1980); Annot. , 45 A.L.R.2d 827

69

70

( 1956)).
73 Lewiston Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Rohde, 110 Jdaho at 645 , 718 P.2d at 556 [citing: Idah o Code
303].
74 Lewiston Pre-11/!ix Concrete, Inc. v. Rohde 110 Idaho at 645 , 7 18 P.2d at 556.
75 ]Q.
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2.

A court must look to the lessor's intent, as revealed by either his words or

his actions to determine whether a new tenancy results. 76 If a lessor demands or accepts
rent from the lessee, he will be presumed to have elected to hold the lessee to a new
tenancy absent a clearly expressed intention to the contrary.77
3.

The terms of the original. lease are usually carried over into the new

tenancy. 78
B.

Standard of Review - Breach of Contract/Covenant to Repair.

1.

2.

The elements necessary to claim a br ach of contract include:
(a)

the existence of a contract;

(b)

the breach of the contract;

(c)

the breach caused dan1ages; and

(d)

the amount of those damages. 79

A lease, like any other contract, is to be construed to give effect to the

intention of the parties. In so doing, the courts generally hold that covenants for
maintenance and repair and covenants to surrender in good condition are to be construed
together, and so construed the covenant to surrender in good condition, wear and tear
due to reasonable use excepted. 80
3.

The general force and effect of a covenant by the lessee to make all repairs

to the leased premises during the term of the leas is restricted and limited by a surrender

76
77

Id.

ld.

Lewiston Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Rohde, 110 Idaho at 645, 718 P.2d at 556 [citing: Yachts America,
Inc. v. United States, 673 F.2d 356, 230 Ct.Cl. 26 ( 1982)].
79 /11/osell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Company, Inc., 154 Idaho 269, 278, 297 P.3d 232, 241 (2 013).
so Millerv. Belknap, 75 Idaho 46, 52-3, 266 P.2d 662, 665-6 (1954).
7R
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clause containing an exception as to ordLnary wear and tear. 81 The two provisions are
construed together to impose upon the lessee an obligation to make all such repairs as
may be necessary for the preservation of the premises in the condition in which the lessee
received them from his lessor, except repairs required by reason of ordinary weaJ and
tear.82

Ordinary wear and tear includes any usual deterioration from the use of the

premises and by lapse of time. 83
4.

The landlord bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence, the condition of the premises when the tenant took possession or to establish
specific acts of waste or damage during the tenancy.84
5.

The measure of damages for breach of covenant to repair when the lease

term has expired is the cost of putting the premises in repair. 85
C.

Standard of Review - Unjust Enrichment.

l.

The elements of unjust enrichment mclude:
(a)

a benefit is conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff;

(b)

the defendant appreciates the benefit; and

(c)

it would be inequitable for the defendant to accept the benefit

without payment of the valu of the benefit. 86
2.

Unjust enrichment, also refe1Ted to as an implied-in-law contract, ts an

equitable remedy. 87

81

Miller v. Belknap 75 Idaho at 53 , 266 P.2d at 665-6 [citing: 45 A.LR. Annotation 70]).

sz Id.
Id.
Poe y v. Closson, 84 Idaho 549, 553 374 P.2d 710, 712 ( 1962) [ci ti ng: Millerv. Belknap, 75 Idaho at 51,
266 P.2d at 665].
85 Santillanes v. Property Manageme/11 Services, Inc. 110 Idaho 588, 591 , 7 16 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Ct. App.
1986) .
86 Indian Springs, LLC v. Andersen, 154 Idaho 708 , 7 J 2, 302 P.3 d 333 , 337(2012).
SJ
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3.

An implied-in-fact contract exists where there is no express agreement

between the parties, but their conduct implies an agreement from which an obligation in
·
88
contract exists.

4.

An award for unjust enrichment may be proper even though an agreement

exists. 89 This occurs when the express agreement is found to be unenforceable. 90
5.

The application of equitable remedies is a question of fact because it

requires a balancing of the parties' equities.91
6.

The party who has conferred the benefit and who is seeking the return of

the full amount thereof has the burden of proving that it would be unjust for the recipi nt
to retain any part of the benefit. 92
D.

Standard of Review - Waste.

1.

"Waste" is defined as

[a]ction or inaction by a possessor of land causing unreasonable injury to
the holders of other estates in the same land. An abuse or destructive use
of property by one in rightful possession. Spoil or destruction, done or
permitted, to lands houses, gardens, trees, or other corporal
bereditaments, by the tenant thereof, to the prejudice of the heir or of him
in reversion or remainder. 93
2.

"Waste" has also been defined as "the permanent or lasting injury to the

estate by one who has not an absolute or unqualified title thereto. " 94

87

Clayson v. Zebe, 153 Idaho 228 232, 280 P.3d 731 , 735(20 12).
Clayson v. Zebe 153 Idaho at 232 280 P.3d at 735.
89 Buku Properties, LL C v. Clark 153 Idaho 828,291 P.3d l 027 (2012) [citing: Bates v. Seldin 146 Idaho
772, 776, 203 P.3 d 702, 706 (2009)].
90 Id .
91 Clayson v. Zebe, 153 Idaho at 232, 280 P.3d at 735 [citing: Farrell v. Whiteman , 152 Idaho 190, 194 268
P.3d 458 462(2012).
92 Toews v. Funk 129 Idaho 316 322,924 P.2d 217 223 (Ct. App. 1994).
93 Black's Law Dictionary 1589-90 (6 1h ed. 1990) [as cited with approval in: Kimbrough v. Reed 130 Idaho
512, 5 I 4 943 P.2d 1232 1234 ( 1997)].
9-1 Consolidated AG of Curry, inc. v. Range11. inc., 128 Idaho 228,230 912 P.2d 11 5, 11 7 ( 1996).
88
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3.

Idaho Code§ 6-201 authorizes a suit for waste by a "tenant for ... years."

Tr bl damages may be awarded upon a finding that the waste was wilfully wantonly, or
maliciously committed.95
E.

Expert Testimony.
1.

The admissibility of expert testimony 1s governed by Idaho Rule of

Evidence 702, which provides that an expert witness may testify and offer opinions
regarding specialized knowledge that will "assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue .... " 96
2.

To be admissible, "[t]he information, theory or methodology upon which

the expert's opinion is based need not be commonly agreed upon by experts in the field ,
but it must have sufficient indicia of reliability to meet [Rule] 702 requirements."97

F.

Standard of Review - Unclean Hands.

l.

"The clean hands doctrine 'stands for the proposition that a litigant may be

denied relief by a court of equity on th ground that his conduct has been inequitable
unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy in issue."'98
2.

The doctrine of "unclean hands , is based on the maxim that, "he who

comes into equity must come with clean hands. " 99
3.

The conduct must be intentional or willful, rather than merely negligent. 100

95

Pearson v. Harper, 87 ldaho 245, 258 392 P.2d 687, 694 ( 1964) .
Pocatello Ho.spital, LlC v. Quail Ridge Medical lnve.s·tor, llC 156 Idaho 709, 330 P.3d I 067, I073
(20 14) [ci ting: Idaho Ru le of Evidence 702] .
97 Pocatello Hospital, LLC v. Quail Ridge Medical Investor, LLC 156 Idaho at _ , 330 P.3d at l 073
(citing: City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 ldaho 580 585, 130 P.3d 1118, 1123 (2006)· State v. Konechny, 134
Id aho 410. 4 17, J P.3 d 535 542 (Ct. App. 2000)] .
98 Ada County Highway District v. Total Success Investments, LLC. 145 Idaho 360, 370, 179 P. 3d 323, 333
2008) [citing: Gilbert v. Nampa School Di trict No. I 31, I 04 Idaho 137, 145, 657 P.2d 1, 9 ( 1983)].
99 Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 25 1, 92 P.3d 492, 50 I (2004) [citing: Gilbert v. Nampa
chool District
No. /3 / , 104 Idaho at 145 , 657 P.2d at 9] .
96

FIND INGS OF FACT AN D CONCLUS ION Of LAW

21

97

4.

The clean hands doctiine is not one of absolutes and should be applied in

the court's di cretion, so as to accomplish its purpose of promoting public policy and the
·mtegnty
· of t h e courts. IOI

"' quity will consider the conduct of the adversary, the

requirements of public policy, and the relation of the misconduct to the subject matter of
the suit and to the defendant. 102
5.

A proper exercise of discretion reqmres this Court to "(a) correctly

perceived the issue as one of discretion; (b) act within the outer boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
availabl to it; and (c) reached its decision by an exercise ofreason." 103
G.

Standard of Review - Failure to Mitigate Damages.

1.

The doctrine of avoidable consequences, or the duty to mitigate, 1s an

affirmative defense that provides for a reduction in damages where a defendant proves
that it would have been reasonable for the plaintiff to take steps to avoid the full extent of
the damages caused by the defendant's actionable conduct. 104
2.

W11ere an injured party takes st ps to mitigate the damages caused by

another, she i enti tled to the costs she reasonably incurs in avoiding those damages. 105

Grazer v. Jone , 154 Idaho 58, 68, 294 P.3d 184 194 (2013).
Ada County Highway Distric1 v. Total Success Inve tments, LLC, 145 Idaho at 370, 179 P.3d at 333
2008) [citing: Gilbert v. Nampa School District No. J31, I 04 Idaho at 145-6 657 P.2d at 9-1 OJ.
102 Id.
103 Ada County Highway Districl v. Total Success Investment , LLC, 145 Idaho at 370, 179 P.3d at 333
2008) [cit ing: Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 76 1,765, 86 P.3d 475 ,
479 (2004)].
104 McCormick International USA , Inc. v. Shore, 152 Idaho 920, 924, 277 P.3d 367 371 (2012) [citing:
Davis v. First Interstate Bank of Idaho, .A., 115 Idah o 169, 170 765 P.2d680 681 (1988)].
105 McCormick International USA , Inc. v. Shore, 152 Jdaho at 924,277 P.3d at 371 [citing: Casey v.
ampa
& Meridian irrigation District, 85 Idaho 299 305, 379 P.2d 409, 412 ( 1963)].
100

10 1
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3.

The doctrine of avoidable consequences seeks to "discourage even persons

again t whom wrongs have been committed from passively suffering economic loss
which could be averted by reasonable efforts .... " 106
4.

Whether it is reasonable to expect a plaintiff to perform specific acts of

· · , 1s
· a quest10n
· o f .~1act. 107
1mt1gat10n
5.

he defendant bears the burden of proving that the proposed means of

mitigation were reasonable under the circumstances, could be accomplished at a
reasonable cost and were within the plaintiffs ability. 108 Proof of the latter of these three
requires more than a mere suggestion that a means of mitigation exists. 109
H.

Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction - Damages.

l.

The plaintiff to an action upon a contract for the direct payment of money

may, at the time of issuing the summons or any time afterwards, mak application to
have the property of the defendant attached in accordance with Title 8, Chapter 5 of the
Idaho Code. 110
2.

In lieu of an immediate issuan.ce of a writ of attachment, a court may issue

such t mporary restraining orders directed to the defendant prohibiting acts with respect
to the property at issue as may appear to be necessary for the preservation of the rights of
the parties and the status of the property. 111

106 McCormick International USA . Inc. v. Shore. J 52 Idaho at 924, 277 P.3d at 371 [citing: Indus/rial
Leasing Corporation v. Thomason , 96 Idaho 574, 577, 532 P .2d 916, 919 ( 1974)].
107 Mc ormick International USA, Inc. v. Shore, 152 Idaho at 924 277 P.3d at 37 1 [citi ng: Casey v. Nampa
& Meridian Irrigation Dis1rict, 85 Idaho at 307 379 P.2d at 413].
108 Jd.
109 M Connick l111ernationaf USA, Inc. v. Shore, 152 ldaho at 924, 277 P.3d at 371 [citing:
lark v.
lniernalional Harve ter Company, 99 Idaho 3.26, 34 7 58 1 P.2d 784, 805 ( 1978)].
1iO Idaho Code§ 8-50 I.
11 1 Idaho Code § 8-502(d) .
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3.

lf the defendant recovers judgment, or if the attachment was wrongfully

issued, the plaintiff will pay all costs that may be awarded to the defendant, and all
damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, not exceeding the sum
specified in the bond. 11 2 And if the attachment is discharged on the ground that the
plaintiff was not entitled thereto under Idaho Code § 8-501 , the plaintiff will pay all
damages which the defendant may have sustained by reason of the attachment, not
exceeding the sum specified in the undertaking. 11 3
I.

Temporary Restraining Order
1.

Idaho Rule of ivil Procedure 65 (c) reads, in pertinent part:

o restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the
giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper,
for the payment of such costs and damages including reasonable attorney's
fees to be fixed by the court, as may be incurred or suffered by any party
who is found to have been wrongfully enjo ined or restrained.
2.

Rule 65(c) allows the trial court to award costs and reasonable attorney

fees to any patty who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. 114
3.

Tf a party requesting a temporary restraining order ultimately fails on the

merits of the basis for the restraining order, then the "wrongfully enjoined or restrained
paity" may recover its damages. 115
4.

The recoverable attorney fees under Rule 65(c) are those incurred in a

proceeding to dissolve a temporai·y restraining order or a preliminary injunction, rather
than those earned through defending the merits of the action. 116

Idaho Code § 8-SOJ(a).
Id .
114 Durrani v. Christensen 117 Idaho 70 73785 P .2d 634. 637 ( 1990).
w See: McAtee v. Faulkner Land & livestock, Inc.. 113 Idaho 393, 395-6, 744 P. 2d 121, 123-4 (Ct. App.
1987).
112
113
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5.

Recovery of damages

costs and attorney fees occasioned by the

temporary restraining order is limited to the amount of the bond. 11 7

J.

Standard of Review - Reasonableness of Attorney Fees and Costs.

1.

The factors to be considered in determining an award of attorney fees, as

set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(e)(3), include:
(a)

the time and labor required;

(b)

the novelty and difficulty of the questions;

(c)

the skill requisite to pe1form the legal service properly and the

experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law;
(d)

the prevailing charges for like work;

(e)

whether the fee is fixed or contingent;

(f)

the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of

the case;
(g)

the amount involved and the results obtained;

(h)

the undesirability of the case·

(i)

the nature and length of the professional relationship with the

(j)

awards in similar cases;

(k)

the reasonable cost of automated legal research, if th court finds it

client;

was reasonably necessary in preparing a pmiy's case; and

(1)

any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular

case. 118

11 6

Devine v. Ch{[f, 110 Idaho 1, 3, 7 13 P.2d 437 , 439 (Ct. App. 1985)
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2.

Although a court must consider the factors listed in Rule 54(e)(3) of the

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure when detem1ining the amount to award in attorney fees
the court need not demonstrate how it employed any of the factors in reaching an award
amount. 11 9 The court need not specifically address each of the factors, as long as the
record indicates that it considered them all. 120

V.
A.

ANALYSES

Leasehold Tenancy at Will.
Watkins continued to accept rental payments from Brownstone following Judge

Tingey's April 2010 judicial termination of the Lease in the 2008 Lawsuit. 121

Dane

Watkins affied that Storms paid rent of $4 000.00 per month for May, June, July August
and September of 2010. 122 From Watkins' Affidavit, it can be infen ed that Mr. Watkins
accepted Storms' rent payments for May, June, July, August, and September of 2010.
However, the parties could not agree as to the terms of their relationship after
April of 2010.

They con ti nu d to do business with each other as "Lessor-Lessee,"

without formulating the precise terms of their agreement. Thus, despite tennination of
the Lease, the relationship between Watkins, as lessor, and Storms and Brownstone as
lessee, continued.

This Court previously determined that Storms and Brownstone

became tenants at will after April of 2010. 123
At trial, both parties relied upon term

of the Lease in arguing their relative

positions with regard to Watkins' claims and Storms and Brownstone's defenses and

McA tee v. Faulkner land & Livestock, Inc., I 13 Idaho at 402 744 P.2d at 130.
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3).
119 In re Univer ·ity Place/Idaho Waler Center Project, 146 Idaho 527, 544, 199 P.3d l 02, l 19 (2008).
iw Id.
121 Watkin s II Affidavit, at p. 3, 1 9.
11 7

118
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counterclaims. The parties' conduct suggests that the terms of the Lease carried over to
Storms and Brownstone's tenancy at will. Therefore, this Court shall apply the t rms of
the Lease to determine the merits of Watkins' claims and Storms and Brownstone's
defenses.
B.

Breach of the Covenant to Repair.

At trial, Dane Watkins presented evidence of specific areas within the Premises
which he found dirty or in disrepair. In its written closing argument, Watkins clarified
the specific repairs or cleaning it sought as damages for Stonns' and Brownstone's
alleged breach of the covenant to repair found in paragraph 7 and Addendum B of the
Lease. 124 Each of Watkins ' claims for damages shall be analyzed seriati..m.
1.

Cracked Vestibule Glass. 125

Upon surrender of the Premises one of the arched glass windows in the vestibule
of the Restaurant's main enh·a.nce was cracked. 126 Watkins seeks damages in the amount
of $440.00 from Stonns and Brownstone for the replacement of the cracked glass. 127
Stmms and Brownstone admitted that the window was cracked at some point
during the defendants' occupancy of the Premises. 128 Stom1s and Brownstone did not
deny that the covenant to repair under the Lease required the tenant to repair broken glass

Id .
Partial Prelimina1J Injunction, at p. 12; econd Partial Prelimina,y injunction at p. 8.
124 ~ : Plaintiffs Closing Argument, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no.
CV-20 I0-5958 (filed September 19 2014) (hereinafter "Watkins' Closing Argument").
125 See: rial Exhibits 3 .23 and 3.25.
126 ee: Tr ial Exhibits 3.23, 3.25. and 38. 10.
127 Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 11; Trial Exhibit 21.
128 D fendants Storms and Brownstone Companies, Inc. , Proposed Findings of Fact, Conc lusions of Law
and Argument. The Watkins Company, LL v. torms Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-5958 (filed
eptember 19, 20 14) (hereinafter "Storms' and Brownstone's Argument"), at p. 3 1 1 134.
122

123
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on the Premises. However Storms and Brownstone argued they should not pay for
tempered glass, when the broken glass was non- tempered.
Storms testified that Watkins or its hired contractor installed the window, depicted
in Trial Exhibit 3.23, on the Premises. The window was in existence when Stonns took
possession of the Premises.

Storms understood that, at the time the window was

installed, tempered glass was required by the requisite building codes. Dane Watkins
testified that the broken glass in Trial Exhibit 3.23 was not tempered glass. Mr. Watkins
explained that he was required by the 201 1 building code to replace the vestibule window
with tempered glass.

Whether or not tempered glass was ever required by the

contemporaneous building codes was never proved at trial by either party. The evidence
did show, however, that Watkins replaced untampered glass in the vestibule with more
costly tempered glass.
The only proof of the cost of repair submitted by Watkins was Trial Exhibit 21 an
invoice from Cherry Glass and Aluminum, I.nc. 129 Trial Exhibit 21 shows a charge for
the removal of two, arched vestibule windows and the installation of new, tempered
glass windows. 130 Nothing in the evidence shows the cost of replacing one tempered
glass, arched window with non-tempered glass.
Thus the evidence supports a finding that Storms and Brownstone breached their
at-will relationship with Watkins, as exemplified by the former Lease by failing to
replace the cracked vestibule window. In the alternative, the record reflects that Stonns
and Brownstone committed waste on the Premises by failing to replace the broken
window pan . The cost of repairing the broken window glass is not properly established

119

Trial Ex.h ibit 2 1.
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m the evidence, however.

Therefore, Watkins shall take nothing by its claim for

replacement of the cracked, vestibule window.

2.

Broken Mezzanine Window. 131

Watkins seeks damages in the amount of $1 100.00 for a broken window in the
mezzanine. 132 Dane Watkins testified that the sign in the mezzanine window, which
read: "Do NOT attempt to open this window. It is broken." existed when he retook
possession of the Premises.

Mr. Watkins did not know what was wrong with the

window only that it would not close. Storms testified that after Briggs Roofing finished
replacing the roof shingles and during periods of rain or snow melt leaks occurred at or
around the outside wal1and windows of the mezzanine.
The evidence infers that the window depicted in Trial Exhibit 3 .4 7 was exposed to
water. The mezzanine was mentioned as one of the areas requiring paint and drywall
repair in the Small Claims lawsuit between Waters Construction and Watkins/Storms. 133
The wood frame around the window in Trial Exhibit 3 .4 7 became swollen from the water
leaking into the Premises from the faulty 2006 roof repair.
For these reasons, Watkins' mezzanine window repair claim shall be denied. The
dysfunctional frame around the window resulted from water leaking from the roof.
Watkins hired Briggs Roofing without input or agreement by Storms. Watkins did not
address the roof leak issues after Briggs Roofing finished the roof, despite notice and
complaints by Storms. Therefore, Watkins shall recover nothing for the broken window
depicted in T1ial Exhibit 3.47.

Trial Exhibit 2 1.
See: Trial xhibits 3.45, 3.46 and 3.47.
132 Watkins Closing Argument, at p. 12; Trial Exhibits 3.47 and 23 .

130
131
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In addition, the invoice for the repair of the window shown in Trial Exhibit 3 .4 7
states:
Brownstone: Repair drywall , fix nail holes water damage to drywall,
install drywall up stairs and tape. Repair broken windows. Framed wall
in back haJlway for door. installed door and drywall. Replace door kno b
on back door, installed new emergency exit latch on garage door, installed
new door closure and tumbler for lock on front door. Replace panic bar on
side door.
Labor only $1 100.00 134
The Labor cost fo r the repair of the broken windows is not separated from the labor costs
of the other repair work described in Exhibit 23. Mr. Watkins did not know the amo unts
charged for each of the repair items. Even if the broken window, illustrated by Trial
Exhibit 3.47, was the responsibil ity of Storms and Brownstone, Watkins ' claim for repair
damages fails for lack of specificity.

3.

Drywall Damage. 135

Watkins compl ains that Storms and Brownstone left significan t drywalJ damage
to the Premises. 136 Watkins complains of holes filled in the drywall without repainting,
and unfilled holes in the unpainted drywall. 137 Watkins argues that "[u]sual deterioration
from L1Se and Lapse of time would not cause the damage illustrated in the photographs or

. repamtmg
. . the wa11s."138
require
Under the former Lease, Storms agreed to "at his own expense and at all times,
maintain the premises in good and safe condition ... and shall surrender the same, at
termination hereof, in as good condition as received , normal wear and tear excepted.

Trial Exh ibi t N, at p. 00008 .
Trial Exhibi t 23.
135 See: Trial Exhibits 3.1 1 through 3.17, 3.57 through 3.62, 3.67 through 3.72, 3.94, 3. 107, and 3.132.
136 Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 13.
137 Id.
133

134
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Lessee shall be responsible for all repairs required [which included Storms' responsibility
for interior walls] which shall be maintained by Lessor." 139 Ordinary wear and tear
includes any usual deterioration from the use of th premises and by lapse of time.
The question raised by the parties became whether the drywall highlighted by
Watkins resulted from normal wear and tear or from damage by Storms and Brownstone
which should have been repaired. Unfortunate!

Watkins offered no expert testimony as

to what kind of norn1al wear and tear can be expected from a conunercial tenant who has
used a building for thirteen (13) years as a restaurant. Although specialized knowledge
might not be necessary in determining normal wear and tear in a residential lease
commercial leases and pa1ticularly the wear and tear expected in a building used as a
restamant over a thirteen year period, are not within a factfinder's common knowledge.
Watkins points to Trial Exhibits 3.11 through 3.17, and 3.57 through 3.64 as
examples of holes in the drywall which Storms and Brownstone filled without repainting
the wall. All of these exhibits show what appear to be nail or hanger holes in the drywall
which have been filled. The holes do not appear to be anything other than use of the
walls to han 0 pictures or other decorations. The fom1er Lease did not require Storms to
return the Premises in like-new condition. Herbert Rockhold testified that the paint on
the walls was old and could not be easily matched.
Requiring Storms and Brownstone to repaint walls subjected to ordinary use does
not comport with the terms of the former Lease.

either do nail holes in a wall, without

evidence that such holes are not normal wear and tear in a commercial leasehold, support

138

Jd.

139

Trial Exh ibit J, at pp. I , 4.
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a :finding of a breach of Storms' and Brownstone' s at-will tenancy with Watkins or
committed waste upon the Premises.
In the alternative, if expert testimony is not necessary to establish abuse versus
normal wear and tear to the walls, or if Mr. Watkins' testimony equates to expertise given
his experience as a commercial lessor, the ho les in the walls exhibited in Trial Ex hibits
3. l I tlu·ough 3. I 7, and 3.57 through 3.64 show normal wear and tear rather than abuse.
Watkins also underscores Trial Exhibits 3.68, 3.92, 3.94, 3.107, 3.111 , and 3.132
as examples of walls with unfilled holes. Trial Exhibit 3.68 depicts round holes that
appare ntl y anchored a towel dispenser. The new lessee, Gerald Mitchell, testified that
Trial Exhibit 3.68 depicted the men's bathroom.

Witness Herbert Rockhold, who

assisted Storms' move from the Premises, observed a towel dispenser sitting on the floor
of the men's bathroom, and a working towel di spenser, seen on the right-hand side of
Exhi bit 3.68, on the wall. Rockhold testified that the holes in the wall shown in Exhibit
3.68 resulted from the removal of the towel dispenser found on the floor. If expert
testimony is not required to establish abuse versus normal wear and tear to the walls, or if
Mr. Watkins' testimony satisfies the expert witness requirement, the holes in the wall
shown in Trial Exhibits 3.68 are the product of show normal wear and tear rather than
abuse.
Trial Ex hibit 3.92 reveals a nail head swrnw1ded by the torn surface of drywall.
No testimony was offered identify ing Trial Ex hibit 3.92.

Trial Exhibit 3.92 fai ls to

support Watkins' allegations of breach of the covenant to repair or waste for lack of
identification.
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Trial Exhibit 3.94 shows a round hole in drywall.

Dane Watkins could not

identify the location of the wall in the picture. Trial Exhibit 3.94 also fails to supp011
Watkins' allegations of breach of the covenant to repair under the former Lease or waste
for lack of identification.
Trial Exhibit 3.107 appears to be gashes in the surface of drywall. Dane Watkins
identified the wall depicted in Trial Exhibit 3 .107 as an upstairs storage area (referred to
by Jared Hatfield, who painted the wall as an upstairs office). 140

Other than Jared

I at:field's invoice for painting the walls (Trial Ex hibit 25), no other evidence of the cost
of repair to the storage area wall was admitted.
As noted above, the former Lease did not require Storms to leave the Premises
like new. Instead, Storms and Brownstone were required to make repairs necessary to
keep the Premises in a good and safe condition. Furthermore, Storms agreed under the
former Lease to leave the Premises in as good condition as received, normal wear and
tear excepted. All of the trial exhibits underscored by Watkins as evidence of damage,
ave for Trial Exhibit 3.107, do not prove that the condition of the wall went beyond
what might be expected from the use of the Premises over a thitteen-year period.
Without expert testimony to suggest that old paint is not normal wear and tear to a
commercial bui lding, Wat.kins has not shown that repainting old walls amounts to repair
work. In the alternative, this Court finds that old paint in a commercial building typifies
normal wear and tear.
Although the gashes shown in Trial Exhibit 3 .107 are not normal , ear and tear
nothing in the record identifies the cost to repair the drywall shown in the pictme, other

140

Sec: Trial Exh ibit 25.
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than Jared Hatfield 's fee to paint the drywall. Repainting walls does not hint of repair
work, but of aesthetic appeal. Without a specific showing of the costs incurred to repair
the drywall in Trial Exhibit 3.107, Watkins claim fo r damages to that wall fai l for lack of
specificity.
Trial Exhibit 3. 111 illustrates a li ght fixture hanging from , rather than attached to,
a ceiling. Electrical contractor Blaise Kauer could not identify the location of the light
fixture seen in Trial Exhibit 3.111. He testified, however that for a light fixture in the
condition seen in Trial Exhibit 3.1 11 , he would have simply reattached the light fixture to
the ceiling. Herbert Rockhold testified he did not see or observe a light fixture hanging
in the condition depicted in Trial Exhibit 3. 111.

Storms did not recognize the light

fixture and testified it did not exist on the Premises when he and Brownstone vacated the
building. The fo undation of the evidence being too vague, Watkins has not shown a
breach of the covenant to repair, exemplified by the former Lease, in its Trial Exhibit
3.111. Neither has Watkins shown waste to the Premises.

Trial Exh ibit 3.132 shows two holes in brown drywall. Dane Watkins thought the
photograph was taken in the upstairs area of the Premises. Without a solid identification
of the location of the wall in Trial Exhibit 3 .132, a finding of a breach of the covenant to
repair, carried over from the former Lease, cannot be made. Neither can a finding of
waste be suppo1ted. Furthermore, nothjng in the evidence suggests whether or not such
holes, if they existed on the Premises when Storms and Brownstone vacated the building,
were normal wear and tear. In the alternative, this Court find s such holes are normal
wear and tear to commercial walls over the period of thirteen years. For these reasons,
Watkins has not shown a breach of the covenant to repair or waste by Trial Exhibit 3.132.
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In his closing argument, Watkins identified Trial Exhibit 17 as evidence of costs
for damage repair to the drywall on the Premises.

Trial Exhibit I 7 consists of two

receipts from The Home Depot, dated January 12 and 13 of 2011, for tape, ready mix,
knives, a sander head and drywall. Other items on the receipts are unidentifiable. Dane
Watkins testified that he bought the items listed on the receipts and gave them to his
handyman Jared Hatfield. Mr. Watkins frniher testified that he could see that Jared
Hatfield was using the tape, the texture, and all of the items Mr. Watkins pmchased.
Jared Hatfield did not testify at trial. Nothing in the evidence shows that Hatfield
or anybody else actually repaired the damage shown in Trial Exhibit 3.107, the only
photograph showing recognizable damage (as opposed to normal wear and tear) to
drywall.

ven if an inference could be made that the wall in Trial Exhibit 3.07 was

repaired, no evidence was presented to indicate the cost of repair to the wall shown in
Trial Exhibit 3.07. The purchase of supplies which were apparently used throughout the
Premises cannot be charged to Storms and Brownstone, since the specific uses of the
supplies were never identified.
Dane Watkins also identified Trial Exhibit 34 as what he believed to be painting
supplies provided to Jared Hatfield. Watkins has not shown that painting old walls is a
necessary repair or that walls in need of painting after thirteen years of business are not
expected normal wear and tear to a building. Indeed this Court finds that repainting
interior walls in a commercial structure u ed as a restaurant for thirteen years is expected
wear and tear. Furthermore, Gerald Mitchell testified that he did not like the wall colors
used by Burggraf and Storms and painted the walls with colors to suit his tastes. For
these reason

Watkins shall not recover the expenses charged in Trial Exhibit 34.
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Watkins argues that "some of Jared Hatfield's labor charges are on Ex. 23
mentioned above plus additional charges for $350.00. See Ex. 25." 141 Trial xhibit 23
cited above consists of the $1 100.00 "labor only" invoice from Hatfield Construction
for numerous tasks . The invoice does not break down the charges or time spent on the
various efforts undertaken by Hatfield. Without more detail as to the amounts charged
for Hatfield's labors, Trial Exhibit 23 cannot be attributed to repairs necessitated by
failures of Storms and Brownstone.

Trial Exhibit 25 applies to paint work which

Watkins has not shown to be a recoverable repair item.
Watkins then adds Trial Exhibit 3.8 as evidence of alleged damage to dJywall
cau ed by Storms and Brownstone. Trial Exhibit 3.8 reveals what appear to be filled nail
holes in a wall. Dane Watkins testified that Jared Hatfield did not paint the wall shown in
Trial Exhibit 3.8. Mr. Watkins later testified that repairs to the wall in Trial Exhibit 3.8
would have been part of Simon Gisin's invoice, Trial Exhibits 12 and 13 . Once again,
however, nothing in the evidence showed what part of Trial Exhibits 12 or 13 contributed
to repair work, if any, to the wall depicted in Trial Exhibit 3.8. Watkins' claim for
damages to the wall in Trial Exhibit 3 .8 fails for lack of specificity.
4.

Broken Doors

Watkins alleges that Storms and Brownstone left a broken door in the northeast
corner of the Premises because the door was missing the crash bar and closer. 142 Watkins
submitted evidence that Dan Carter the owner of Bennetts Eastside Paint, sold a crash

1·11
142

Watkin s' Closing Argument, at p. 13.
Watkins ' Closing Argument, at p. 14. See also: Trial Exhibits 3.1, 3.2 3.3, and 38.12.

FIND INGS OF FACT AND CONCLU IONS OF LAW

36

112

bar and closer to Snake River Equipment Company. 143 Carter testified that the crash bar
and closer were used to repair the doors located on the Premises.

a.

Crash Bar on the North Public Entrance 144

Restaurant employee Katie Williams testifi d that the crash bar
(alternately referred to as a panic bar) on the northeast door was in operation when she
became employed at the Restaurant in 2006. Williams did not know when the crash bar
went missing. Restaurant employee Ryan Getsinger recalled that some screws on one
side of the crasg bar had come loose, causing the bar to sag. In order to keep the crash
bar from breaking or pinching patrons, employees removed the sagging bar.

This

occurred approximately one month prior to closing of the Restaurant. Getsinger recalled
that the screws had probably been stripped and required repair.
Storms acknowledged that on the date he and Brownstone vacated the Premises
the crash bar had come off the northeast door.

Storms testified that he found a

replacement part on the internet which was less expensive than replacement of the entire
system, but he provided no proof of his findings, no evidence that the crash bar he
discovered was the same make or model as the device on the northeast door, and no
testimony that the crash bar system on the

11011h

ast door was capable of repair rather

than repl acement.
Dan Carter testified that replacement of the crash bar alone (as opposed to the
entire system) might cost 35.00 to $40.00. However nothing in the evidence suggested
that the existing crash bar system could be repaired with a replacement crash bar alone.

1~ 3

IH

See: Trial xhibi t 33 .
See: Tr ial xhibits 3. l and 3.2 .
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Thus, Storms failed to prove his claim that Watkins did not mitigate its damages with a
cheaper crash bar replacement.
Since the fom1er Lease provided that the tenant was responsible for maintenance
of doors on the Premises, 145 and since the

vidence suggests the crash bar on the

nmiheast door was missing at the time Storms and Brownstone vacated the Premises
Watkins has shown that Storms breached his at-will tenancy exemplified in the terms of
the form r Lease, by failing to maintain the crash bar system on the nm1heast door. In
the alternative, Watkins has shown that Storms and Brownstone committed waste by
failing to leave the crash bar in working condition. Watkins shall recover the cost to
replace the crash bar system $259.09, plus six percent (6%) interest of $15.55 , for a total
recovery of $274.64.

b.

Closer on the Inside Doors to the Main Entrance 146

The closer at i sue was identified by Dan Carter as attached to one of the
main entrance doors to the Premises, not the northeast door (where Dane Watkins placed
it). Although Carter testified that the closer was not functioning he did not personally
inspect the door or the mechanism. Employee Tamara Metcalf clarified that the closer
existed on the inside main entrance door. She testified that the closer was functional
throughout the time she worked at the Restaurant, from 2002 until April of 2010. Storms
recalled that the closer was fully functional when he and Brownstone vacated the
Premises.
Given the lack of foundation for Dan Carter s observation about the inside main
entrance door Watkins has not shown that Storm and Brownstone breached its at-will

w Trial

xhibit 1, at p. 4.
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tenancy, premised upon the former Lease by failing to maintain the door closer on the
in ide main entrance door.

either has Watkins shown waste to the Premises by its

evidence regarding the door closer on the main entrance door.
c.

Lock Rods on the Outside Main Entrance Doors 147

Watkins further alleges that Storms and Brownstone sunendered the
Premi es without a functional locking front door. 148 Instead, Storms and Brownstone
us d a chain and padlock to secure the front entrance doors. 149
Dane Watkins testified that the front entrance doors would not work properly and
needed repairs. Dan Carter testified that the lock rods were worn out. He stated that the
area where the Jock rods entered the threshold and the header was full of di1i and debris.
Restaurant employee Katie WilJiams recalled that the front entrance doors were
chained and padlocked every night for security during her entire tenure as an employee
for Storms and Brownstone from January to May 2006 and again from May 2007 until
the Restaurant closed in September of 2010. Storms testified that there were no issues
with the lock rods when he and Brownstone vacated the Premises. He recalled that the
lock rod secured into the top of the door jamb (referred to by Carter as the "header") but
not into the bottom threshold. He explained that from the outset of his occupancy of the
Premises the door had "play" in it of two to three inches, even after the lock rod had
been secured into the door jamb (or header). Although Storms saw no issue with the lock
rod other than instability, Storms secured the front doors with chain and lock each night
for added safety. He further testified that he received no photographs depicting problems

146
147
148

ee: Trial Exh ibit 3 .19.
See: Trial Exh ibit 3.20.
Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 15.
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with the lock rods from Watkins. Storms added that he has returned to the Premises since
Gerald Mitchell opened the Snow Eagle Brewery and Grill, and the front entrance doors
still sway if pulled upon even with the new lock rods engaged in the door j amb.
The evidence does not infer that the lock rods were broken or non-functioning
merely because Storms added a chain and lock to secure the front doors at night.
Assuming that Carter's testimony regarding dirt and debris in the threshold and door
jamb or header holes is true, nothing in the record aids the determination of whether or
not such dirt and debris is normal wear and tear versus abuse. In the alternative, this
Court finds that dirt and d bris in the threshold and door jamb constitute normal wear and
tear to a commercial leasehold over a thirteen year period. Therefore, Watkins has not
shown that Storms and Brownstone breached their at-will tenancy or committed waste by
failing to maintain or repair the lock rods.
In the alternative Watkins seeks $151.46 for repairing the front entrance door
Jock by replacing the lock rods. 150 Trial Exhibit 4 is an invoice from Bennetts Paint &
Glass dated June 29, 2011 which details "new lock rods" at a cost of $48.55 and 'on site
labor check panic hardware and install new lock rods on front door" at a cost of
$100.00. 151 The panic hardware had been installed by Bennetts Paint and Glass on or
about January 31 , 2011. 152 The labor costs for checking the panic hardware and installing
the new lock rods are not separated. Storms and Brownstone were not in possession of
the Premises during any of the intervening days between January 31, 201 I and June 29
201 l.

Mr. Mitchell took possession of the Premises in April of 2011.

St01ms and

14

Id. See also: Trial Exh ibits 3.19. 3.20, and 3.22 .
See: Trial Exhib it 4.
15 1 Jd ., at p. I.
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Brownstone are not responsible for labor to recheck a panic system installed one month
after they vacated the Premises.
In addition, since Mr. Mitchell had been in possession of the Premises for three
months before Carter replaced the lock rods and ince Watkins did not identify the
alleged non-functioning of the lock rods within a reasonab le time after Storms and
Brownstone vacated the Premises, any damages for an alleged breach of Storms' and
Brownstone's at-wiJl tenancy or alleged waste based upon the lock rods fails for lack of a
causal connection between the alleged damage and Stom1s/Brownstone.
5.

Cleaning E.xpenses

Next, Watkins alleges that Stonns and Brownstone left a majority of the Premises
I -3

"very dirty" after they vacated the Restaurant. )

Watkins requests $9,065.00 for fees

.
d to c lean th. e p rem1ses.
.
154
mcmTe

Restaurant employee Katie Williams, who worked at the Brownstone for five
months in 2006 and then from May 2007 until September of 20 l O when the Restaurant
closed, testified about routine cleaning during the Restaurant's operation. She explained
that day-hostesses at the Restaurant were expected to dust the tops of the wood on the
walls and windows depicted in Trial Exhibit 3 .10 . Servers and managers dusted the grey
beams shown in Trial Exhibit 3 .10 on a daily basis or as necessary when they were
dusty including in-between each of the lines within the grid on the ceiling. Day-servers
and bar-servers scrubbed the floors daily with bleach water. Night-hostesses would clean

152
153
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Trial Exh ibit 33.
Watkins' Closing Argument, at pp. 15- 18.
Id.
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the doors wi th Windex. Night-servers, at the end of their shi fts, were expected to wipe
down the window sills.
Employee Ryan Getsinger testified that he boiled a tlu·ee to fo ur gallon pot of
water every night, to which was added bleach and degreaser, to clean the floors. The hot
water was poured on the floor and then the floor was scrubbed with a stiff-bristled deck
brush. The water was then "squeegeed" into the floor drain. The damp floor was then
dry-mopped.
Tamara Metcalf created a list of what employees were supposed to do at each of
the various stations in the Restaurant. Williams helped prepare punch lists for the daily
chores required of hostesses and servers. Willian1s testified that the Brownstone was a
very busy restaurant.
According Metcalf, the kitchen hood system was maintained by a company hired
by Storms. Getsinger testified that kitchen staff cleaned the exhaust filters approximately
every two weeks by running them through the dishwasher.
Storms and the beer-brewer were responsible for cleaning the brewery area
because a certain kind of cleaning chemical was required and because the brewing
equipment was expensive. With regard to the brewery area, Metcalf testified: "we don't
want very many people back there responsible for that. "
Every year, Storms conducted an "annual cleaning day" at which time he closed
the Restaurant. It was a mandatory day for all employees. Approximately forty (40)
employees came to work early in the morning and conducted extensive cleaning
tlu·oughout the day, until late in the afternoon. The General Manager was responsible for
the supervision of the annual cleaning.
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Kitchen equipment was taken outside and scrubbed, pressure-washed and hosed
down. Tamara Metcalf testified that the kitchen equipment would sparkle "like brand
new" following these annual cleanings. The kitchen area where equipment had been
removed was cleaned, and then the kitchen equipment was re-installed. Chairs and tables
were removed and the floor was cleaned with bleach water a hard scrub-brush, and
sometimes with a butter knife. 155 The grease, dust, and black grime on the brick walls
were scrubbed down. The walls and windowsill of the bathrooms were scrubbed. The
large window in the ladies' bathroom was scrubbed. Sinks were cleaned with Lysol or
Jorox . Employees got down on the bathroom floors and cleaned arow1d the toilets and
scrubbed the floors. Tiles on the walls in each stall were cleaned and washed down the
doors and doorknobs were cleaned, and the pictures were dusted. Th large rafters in the
open ceiling were dusted using hydraulic lifts or ladders and large fluffy dusters. 156
Beams and ceiling fans were cleaned. The brewery area was cleaned. The exterior brick
was cleaned. 157 The final annual cleaning took place in September of 2009.
Storms hired Alan Flores to deep clean the Premises after the Brownstone ceased
operation in September of 2010. Flores began his work in October of 2010 but ceased
for a number of weeks. He then removed the contents and fixtures within the Premises
and clean d the entire Premises save for the ceiling area, ceiling fans, and upstairs storage
rooms. Flores described his method of deep cleaning by using degreaser and hot water so
as not to damage the drains. Flores finished his work after Christmas of 20 10.

155

156
157

See: Defendants Trial Exhibits T.27 and T.28.
See: Defendants' Trial Exhibit T.30.
See: Defendants' Trial Exhibit T.29.
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ew tenant Gerald Mitchell who testified that he became serious about renting
the Premises "in the first part of 201 1," was asked about the condition of the Premises
when he first inspected it.

Although Mitchell did not specify whether his testimony

related to his inspection in August of 2010 (at which time the Restaurant was still in
operation) or after Storms and Brownstone moved out, the evidence infers that Mitchell
looked at the Premises some time after the building became vacant because Mitchell
described the kitchen as "stripped out."
At his inspection

Gerald Mitchell commented to Dane Watkins that the

Restaurant "wasn't usable." Mitchell specified leaks in the roof, the stripped kitchen and
all of the plumbing, which Mitchell described as "in pretty bad shape." He noticed
grease build-up that required cleaning before he could do basic things like choosing a
paint color. Mitchell contracted with S & R Carpet Upholstery Cleaning to clean the
ceilings in the kitchen the walls, and the bathrooms. 158
Mitchell testified that the Premises were "pretty dirty" with a lot of grease buildup
and dirt, requiring a lot of clean up before be could prepare to reopen the Premises as the
Snow Eagle Brewery and G1ill. In Addendum A to the April 4 2011 Commercial Lease
and Deposit Receipt between Snow Eagle Brewery and Watkins, Mitchell rec ived a
$6,000.00 " cleaning credit" in acknowledgement of the fact that ''the Premises are not in

.. ,,1·9
a c1ean cond 111011.
Mitchell hired Simon Gisin to conduct a thorough cleaning because the build-up
of dirt prevented any painting. Mitchell testified that Gisin was to clean walls, beams,
exterior ductwork, the mezzanine floor and trim board, and brick and to paint the

158

See: Trial Exhibit 16.

FIND[ GS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

44
120

Premises in the color(s) Mitchell wanted. 160 Watkins argued that he paid for the cleaning
with th $6 000.00 cleaning credit to Snow Eagle Brewery and Giill. 161 Gisin's invoices
(Trial Exhibit 12 and I 3) were charges in addition to his $6,000.00 cleaning, painting,
and texturing contract with Mitchell.
Gisin testified that Mitchel I hired him to clean and paint the ceilings and "pretty
much everything in there." He stated that the general condition of the Premises was
"pretty dirty, pretty bad." Gisin explained that he "pretty much wiped everything down
and vacuumed everything pretty good." Gisin cleaned the bathrooms and the mezzanine,
painted the ceilings and the walls, including texturing, at a contracted rate of $6,000.00.
Gisin acknowledged that restaurant grime can be diffic ult to clean. He stated,
"when you've got a restaurant, that kind of like a grease-dust stuff just is murder." Gisin
recommended that the ceiling and walls should be repainted, rather than scrubbed down,
because "No one is going to come in here and scrub them down. It would be just a little
bit faster to dust them off and repaint them." Gisin charged an amount for painting the
ceilings and walls in addition to the $6,000.00 contract already in place.
Prior to opening the Snow Eagle Brewery and Grill, Gerald Mitchell hired Rusty
Kappel, a professional carpet cleaner, to clean the Premises to allow Mitchell to finish
renovating the Restaurant. Kappel was hired to clean the floors throughout the Premises.
Kappel testified that when he entered, the Premises appeared to have been vacant for a
while.

159
160
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Trial Exhibit 2, at p. 5.
See: Trial Exhibits 12 and 13.
Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 16.
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a.

Exposed Beams, Vaulted Ceiling and High Ceiling Fans 162

Initially, Watkins points to the exposed beams, vaulted ceiling, and high
ceiling fans w hich were "covered with grease and dust" as objects requiring cleaning. 163
Watkins identifies Trial ~xhibits 3.40, 3.4 1, 3.42 3.43 , 3.48 3.1 32, 3.133, 3.134, 3.135,
3 .1 36 3 .13 7, and 3 .13 8 as examples of dirty beams, ce ilings, and ceiling fans. 164
Storms identified Trial Exhibits 3.40 and 3.41 as depicting rafters m the
Restaurant directly above the brewery. Tri al Exhibit 3.40 shows a slanting beam with a
fair amount of dust covering the surface. Trial Exhibit 3.41 also displays a beam with a
lighter coating of dust on the surface. Mr. Watkins testified that the beams had not, to his
lrnowledge, been cleaned in the thirteen (13) years that Storms and Brownstone occupied
the Premises. Alan Flores did not clean the large, wooden beams. Simon Gisin testified
that he vac uumed off the beam shown in Trial Exhibit 3.40.
Dane Watk ins identified Trial Exhibit 3.42 as the ceiling fan above the dining
area. Trial Exhibit 3.42 shows a ceiling fan with dust on the upper sides of the blades and
the motor housing. Storms conceded that Trial Exhibit 3.42 displays the condition of the
fan when he and Brownstone vacated the Premises. Simon Gisin cleaned the ceiling fan
dep icted in Trial Exhibit 3.42.
Trial Exhibit 3.43 was identified by Mr. Watkins as "what could have been a
swamp cooler" with dust and dirt on top of it. Gisin testified that the duct work shown in
Trial ~xhibit 3.43 was removed when the Restaurant was remodeled for Gerald Mitchell
and the ceiling was patched. Gisin did not clean the ducts shown in Tr.ial Exhibit 3.43.

162
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See: Trial Exhibits 3.42, 3 .1 36, 3 .137, and 38. 16.
Watkins' Closing Argument, atp. 15.
Watkins' Closing Argument, at pp. 15-16.
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Alan Flores identified Trial Exhibit 3.48 as the second floor area (or mezzanine).
Flores testified that he only cleaned the floor area shown in Trial Exhibit 3.48.
Dane Watkins recognized Trial Exhibit 3.132 as an area of drywall damage in
need of repair.

He did not testify about T rial Exhibit 3. 132 in terms of cleaning

expectations.
T rial Exhibit 3.133 showed what Mr. Watkins described as dust and grime on the
trim board . Flores identified the area depicted in Trial Exhibit 3.133 as the second floor
(the mezzanine). Flores cleaned the walls and the floor in that area, including the use of
hot water on the floor. Simon Gisin identified the area depicted in Trial Exhibit 3.1 33 as
" in the back up above where the tanks were. " Gisin vacuumed, and mopped the floor and
wiped down the trim board. He testified that the " light colored stuff' on the trim board in
Trial Exhibit 3.133 was "a dust-greasy thing that was hard to get off."
Trial Exhibit 3.134 was identified by Storms as the second cei ling directly above
the kitchen. Storms identified areas of leakage in the photograph. Otherwise, dust can be
seen on the top of the ductwork in Trial Exhibit 3. 134. Alan Flores testified that he did
not clean the "vents or where the AC goes."
Trial Exhibit 3.135 was identified by Storms as a photograph taken when Storms
and Brownstone vacated the Premises. Trial Exhibit 3. 135 reveals a pinkish-red colored
wall with pipes extruding above the trim board and with two, row1d holes in the wall.
None of the witnesses testified about the cleanliness of the area depicted in Trial Exhibit
3.135, although some dust is visible on the trim board.
Mr. Watkins identified Trial Exhibits 3. 136 and 3.1 37 as dirty ceiling fans, which
he observed when he re-entered the Premises after Storms' and Brownstone' s departure.
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Storms likewise identified Trial Exhibits 3 .136 and 3 .13 7 as ceiling fans in the Restaurant
directly over the brewery.

He admitted they were not cleaned because the brewing

equipment was the last thing moved off the Premi ses and the ceiling above the brewing
area was not cleaned.
Storms identified Trial Exhibit 3.138 as

fill

auger-hole directly above the brewery

in the Restaurant. He conceded that the part of the wall depicted in Trial Exhibit 3 .13 8
was not cleaned before he and Brownstone vacated the Premises.
· othing in the record informs the Court whether or not some dust and di1t are to
be expected on the ceilings and upper beams of vacated commercial premises. Simon
Gisin's testimony seemed to infer that greasy dust is not uncommon in restaurants and is
very difficult to remove. Without expert guidance regarding normal wear and tear in
circumstances such as the Restaurant, the record does not support a finding that the dusty
beams, vaulted ceiling and high ceiling fans breached Storm's and Brownstone's at-will
tenai1cy with Watkins or amounted to waste upon the Premises.

In the alternative, this Court finds that the dust on the beains, vaulted ceiling, and
high ceiling fans, as seen in Trial Exhibits 3.42 3.136, ai1d 3.137, is excessive and
represents a breach of the expectations of Storms' and Brownstone's tenancy at will with
Watkins. But Watkins' evidence does not specify the costs incurred to clean the beams,
high ceiling fans and vaulted ceiling.

Instead, Watkins offers the fact that he gave

Gerald Mitchell a $6 000.00 cleai1ing credit on Mitchell's lease as evidence of such
costs. 165 Such evidence offers no information from which an award for cleaning the

16"

Watkins ' Closing Argument, at p. 16. See also: Trial Exhibit 2 at Addendum A.
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ceiling beams and fans can be fashioned. Therefore, Watkins' claim for damages to
clean these high areas of the Premises fails for lack of specificity.
b.

Stained Brickwork 166

The next area identified by Watkins as problematic was the stained
brickwork, which Watkins identified as Trial Exhibits 3.52 38.6, 38.10, 38.12, 38.17,
38.18, 38.20 and 38.24.

167

Dane Watkins identified Trial Exhibit 3.52 as the floor and brick wall in the
brewery area that needed heavy cleaning. He identified the dark material on the brick as
mold. Alan Flores testified that Trial Exhibit 3.52 did not depict mold, but dirty brick
and grout, which he cleaned in December of 2010 . In fact, Flores testified that Trial
Exhibit 3.52 was taken after he cleaned the wall and floor. Simon Gisin testified that the
bottom two bricks shown in Trial Exhibit 3.52 were "pretty dirty." He explained that the
dark coloration was hard to remove. In fact, he testified that he did not remove all of the
dark coloration but that he brightened the brick up. Gisin's work was done in May and
June of 20 11 some five to six months after Flores' work. 168
Burggaf testified that when the cement floors were completed in the course of the
Brownstone Restaurant remodel, she and Storms had a concrete stain applied to the
floors. Burggraf was very unhappy with the end result of the concrete stain because,
among other things, the bricks at the base of the walls were oversprayed with the stain.
Burggraf testified that Trial Exhibit 3 8.6 illustrated the overspray problem. Alan Flores
cleaned the brick shown in Trial Exhibit 38.6 in December of 2010. He testified that the
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See: Trial Exhibits 3.52, 38.6, 38.10, 38. 12, 38.17, 38.20, and 38.24.
Watkins' Closing Argument, at pp. 16, 17
See: Trial Exh ibits 12 and 13 .
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photograph was taken after he cleaned. Rusty Kappel testified that he also cleaned the
brick shown in Trial Exhibit 38.6. Kappel's work was done in June of 2011. 169
Burggraf also identified the brick in Trial Exhibit 38.l O as an example of the
overspray issue. Alan Flores testified that he cleaned the brick shown in Trial Exhibit
38 .10 in December of 2010. Flores stated that the photograph was taken after he had
cleaned. He explained that he could not restore the brick to its natural color.
Burggraf was the only witness to address Trial Exhibit 38 .12 . She could not
positively identify whether overspray was depicted in Trial Exhibit 38.12.
Trial Exhibit 38.17 was never identified at trial.
The only testimony related to Trial Exhibit 38.18 came from Alan. Fl.ores, who
observed that the floor shown in Trial Exhibit 38. 18 was clean.
Alan Flores identified Trial Exhibit 38.20 as the area in which the walk-in cooler
had been located during Storms' and Brownstone's tenancy of the Premises.

Flores

cleaned the walls degreased the floor, and cleaned the posts in December of 2010. He
stated that the Premises, as hown in Exhibit 38 .20, were clean.
Storms identified Trial Exhibit 38.24 as the food preparation area m the
restamant. No testimony was given as to the condition of the bricks shown in Trial
Exhibit 38 .24.
The reason for the black stainjng on th
preponderance of the evidence, as mold.

bottom bricks was not proved by a

Only Dane Watkins identified the black

discolorati on on the bottom rows of bricks as mold . 170

Watkins did not lay any

foundation as to Dane Watkins' ability to distingwsh mold from cement overspray. Trial

169 ~ :

Trial Exhibit 16.
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xhibit 3.52, which shows a close-up view of the bricks on the bottom of the wall
reveals signs of scrubbing.
Instead the evidence supports a fmding that the black staining on the lower bricks
of the walls was caused by concrete overspray which was part of the renovation of the
Premises by Burggraf and Storms. Assmning the black staining was overspray, such
condition did not result from lack of maint nance or abuse by Storms and Brownstone.
Burggraf and Storms began operation of the Restaurant with the overspray in place.
Other staining visible on the higher levels of brick, as particularly seen in Trial
Exhibits 38.6 and 38.20 were not specifically identified as to the cause of the
discoloration. Alan Flores cleaned the brick walls as torms and Brownstone vacated the
Premises in December of 2010. Simon Gisin cleaned the walls of the Premises in May
and June of 2011. Rusty Kappel apparently cleaned the same surfaces again, in June of
2011.
Watkins offered no expert testimony as to nonnal wear and tear to the walls of a
rental building which was used to operate a restaurant for some thirteen (13) years.
either was expe1.t testimony offered as to the level of cleaning required when a tenant
moves out of a leasehold building. The evidence inferred that Storms and Brownstone
hired Alan Flores who had experience deep cleaning restaurants in the Yellowstone Park
area to deep clean the Premises prior to completely vacating the building.

That

additio nal cleaning was necessary after the bui lding sat vacant for some five months is to
be expected, and should not be charged to Storms and Brownstone.

170

See: T rial Exh ibit 3.52 .
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In the alternative this Court finds no evidenc , other than concrete overspray and
normal wear and tear, of abuse to the interior brick walls of the Premises.
For these reason , Watkins has not shown that Stonns and Brownstone breached
their at-will tenancy with Watkins or c01mnitted waste by failing to maintain the
brickwork.

c.

Walls and Floors. 171

Next, Watkins points to Trial Exhibits 3.10 1, 3.102, 3.103 , 3. 117 3.118,
3.119 3.120, 3.12 1 3.122, 3.123, 38 .1 , and 38.2 as evidence of the lack of cleaning to
the kitchen walls, floors, ceiling and concrete back room. 172 Watkins argued that Rusty
Kappel of S & R Carpet Upholstery Cleaning charged $1 ,470.00 to clean the "problem
areas." 173
Trial Exhibits 3.101 , 3 .102 and 3 .103 depict a concrete floor (with evidence of
scrubbing), and green, tan, and white drywall. Dane Watkins placed the area shown in
Trial Exhibits 3.101, 3.102, and 3.103 as the outside walls ofthe kitchen. He complained
that damage was done to the sh etrock.

Mr. Watkins testified, with regard to Trial

Exhibit 3.102 that when Storms and Brownstone vacated the Premises they replaced
some of the sheetrock where equipment was removed. The green-colored wall in Exhibit
3.102 was an example of the material put in by Storms and Brownstone as they left the
building. Mr. Watkins complained that St01ms and Brownstone did not complete any
taping or texturing on the replaced sheetrock.

17 1
172
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See: T rial Exhibi ts 3.101 , 3 .11 7 through 3.123, 38 .1 and 38.2.
Watkin s' Closing Argument at p. 17.
Watkin s' Closing Argument, at p. 17. See also : Trial Exhibit 16.
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Mr. Watkins also observed water continuously running from a piece of equipment
formerly located in or around the area shown in Trial Exhibit 3.102.

On cross-

examination, Mr. Watkins was not sure whether the leak was located in the area shown in
Trial Exhibit 3.102 or behind it.
Employee Ryan Getsinger testified that Trial Exhibits 3. 101 and 3.102 show the
same wall on opposite sides. He observed a leak in the area whenever a heavy rain fell or
when the snow melted in the spring. He also testified that snow from the parking lot,
wh ich was plowed up against the north side of the building, would melt in the spring and
come through the garage door on the north side. Melted snow water would pool in the
preparation area depicted in Trial Exhibits 3.101 and 3.102.
Trial Exhibits 3 .117, 3.118, and 3.119 reveal a corner in what Dane Watkins and
Tamara Metcalf identified as the dishwasher area of the former kitchen in the Restaurant.
Green and white paneling, with visible stains, is evident, as is a portion of the concrete
flooring. Herbert Rockhold identified the white paneling as a Masonite-type hard board
with a slick coating on the outside surface. Rockhold explained that the green paneling
was moisture-resistant sheetrock.
Tamara Metcalf identified that a waist-high counter had been located on the righthand wall shown in Trial Exhibit 3.118, as well as a heavy-duty dishwasher.

The

dishwasher reached over Tamara's head (and Tamara described her height as 5'7"). The
corner depicted in Trial Exhibit 3 .118 was covered by equipment.
Mr. Watkins argued that the white hardboard needed to be repaired and changed
because it was rotted out. The green material was new sheetrock put in by Rockhold at
the request of Storms and Brownstone, but was neither taped nor textured. Rockhold

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

53
129

replaced those sections because the wall was damaged. The sheetrock near the floor was
"substantially busted up" according to Rockhold. Both Storms and Rockhold observed
water damage to the sheetrock near the floor, which was the reason why Rockhold
replaced the sheetrock, as seen in Trial Exhibits 3. 11 7, 3.1 18, and 3. 11 9. Tamara Metcalf
noted that the floor shown in Tri al Exhibits 3. 117, 3,1 18, and 3. 11 9 was usually wet
because of all the washing.
Mr. Watkins testified he thought the valve depicted in Trial Exhibit 3.1 19 was
continuously leaking, although he was unsure. Gerald Mitchell testified that the leak was
shown in Trial Exhibit 3. 118, coming from a piece of plumbing sticking out of the wall.
Metcalf testified that a water leak came from the backside of Exhibit 3.118 (she identified
Trial Exhibit 3. 101 as the backside of Trial Exhibit 3. 118) off and on, usually in the
spring or when heavy rain occurred. Metcalf testified that the only water leaks in the
plumbing depicted in Trial Exhibits 3. 11 7 and 3. 11 8 would have come from the sinks,
which were then taken care of immediately.
Metcalf identified the markings on the wall in Trial Exhibit 3. 11 7 as rust from the
stainless steel shelves formerly located there.

Metcalf differentiated between dirt or

grease and stains and testified that the walls had been clean to the point that paint was
rubbed off. Alan Flores deep-cleaned the white walls depicted in Trial Exhibits 3.1 17,
3. 118. and 3. 119 but could not erase the stains.
Both Flores and Rockhold testified that the green sheetrock shown in Trial
Exhibits 3.117, 3.11 8, and 3. 119 was covered in stainless steel when they worked in the
building. Storms testified that the stainless steel sheathing, which glued to the wall, was
removed when the dishwasher was taken out of the building.
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Mitchel I replaced the sheetrock shown in Trial Exhibits 3 .11 7, 3. 118, and 3 .119
with tile because, in his experience, the sheetrock did not hold up and the existing studs
in the area were spaced in such a way that the sheetrock would do exactly what was
shown in the pictures. Mitchell admitted that tile installation was a significant upgrade
from the white board used by Storms and Brownstone. Mitchell tore out the right-hand
side wall shown in Trial Exhibit 3.118 in his renovations, and replaced it with a stubwall.
Trial Exhibit 3 .1 20 shows another corner in what was the kitchen area of the
Restaurant with visible grease staining on the wall. Tamara Metcalf identified the white
wall area as the location of the fryer. Dane Watkins complained of the " discoloration of
the rot" and the need for repairs. He thought the brownish/orangish/yellowish coloration
of the wall in Trial Exhibit 3 .120 was the result of dirt and grease. Metcalf testified that
the discoloration was the result of staining from heat and hot fryer oil. She identified
areas where the white board on the right-hand wall had actuall y been scrubbed off when
the wall was cleaned.
Metcalf also testified that the dark, straight line under the light switches on the
left-hand wall as where a table had been located which wore off the paint. She infotmed
the Cou11 that the Health Department had inspected the building on numerous occasions
and never cited the Brownstone fo r the conditions shown in Trial Exhibit 3.1 20. Alan
Flores deep-cleaned the wall with degreaser to the point of exposing some of the wood
from underneath the fini sh. Flores testified that when you work in a kitchen and have
heat " of course, you' re going to see discoloration." Gerald Mitchell testified that the
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walled area shown in Trial Exhibit 3 .120 was remo ed during his renovations in order to
enlarge the kitchen.
Trial Exhibit 3 .121 illustrates a wall area, with white patching and some brownish
staining. Dane Watkins identified the area as pmi of the kitchen hood system going out
to the outside. He testified that "[t]here was an attempt I think made to do some drywall
work that doesn't look like it worked or did the job." Alan Flores testified that the
picture was taken after he had cleaned the area. He stated: "I'm pretty sure if you go to a
restaurant, I mean, there ' s stuff that gets stains after that many years and the grease you
kind of 1 mean, you try to clean it and it stays." Gerald Mitchell testified that the pattern
of staining in Trial Exhibit 3.1 21 resulted from grease going tlu·ough the cold air return.
Storms explained that the white patches on the ceiling and the peeling paint on the black
duct work resulted from Waters Constructions' attempts to repair the inside walls
following the roof leaks in 2006.
Trial Exhibit 3 .122 depicts a white wall with greenish-brown markings around
what had been a square-shaped structure. Dane Watkins testified that the markings were
di1t. 174 Tamara Metcalf identified the pictur as the outside wall of the kitchen facing the
bar.

A chalk board hung inside the square-shaped markings on the wall.

Metcalf

testified that the wall was cleaned as part of the "3 :30 side work" as well as the annual
cleaning.

She identified the dark mark in the center of the wall as wear, because a

counter had been located at that position.

The square marking surrounding the spot

wher the chalkboard hung was, she believed dirt from the chalkboard. Metcalf testified

174 With regard to his testimo ny Dane Watkins mi sident ified Trial Exhibit 3.122 as Trial Exhibit 3.121
when he testified about square or rectangular markings on a wal l. Since Tria l Exhibit 3.122 clearly shows
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that the chalkboasd was taken down daily, and the wall was wiped down. Alan Flores
testified that Trial Exhibit 3. 122 was taken after he cleaned the wall.
Trial Exhibit 3 .1 23 reveals another corner with drywall and a small patch of the
floor visible. The wall on the left-hand side is the back of the wall depicted in Trial
Exhibit 3.122.

Tamara Metcalf testified that the metal plate shown at the base of the

wall in Trial Exhibit 3.123 was installed during her t nure at the Brownstone in order to
stabilize the wal I.
Trial Exhibit 38 .1 shows the dining area of the Restaurant, looking empty and
clean. The picture was taken from the front door. Alan Flores testified that Trial Exhibit
3 8 .1 shows the Restaurant in a clean state. The last thing Flores deep-cleaned was the
floor in the Restaurant. He used hot water and degreaser and scrubbed the floor with a
brush. He then sprayed the floor with hot water and used large squeegees and a mop.
Trial Exhibit 38.2 illustrates the ladder to the mezzanine over the brewing area.
Alan Flor s testified that the same ladder in Trial Exhibit 38.2 can be seen in the lefthand corner of Trial Exhibit 38.20. Flores deep-cleaned the area just as he had other
areas in the Restaurant.
Rusty Kappel charged Gerald Mitchell $1,470.00 to pull down kitchen wall(s),
clean and degrease the kitchen floors, walls, and ceiling, and to clean the concrete back
room. 175 Kappel performed the work on or about April 6, 2011. 176 Kappel testified that
when he entered the Premises "you could tell that somebody had moved out and it
seemed vacated for a while."

square or rectangular marking on a wall (and Trial Ex hibit 3.121 does not), Mr. Watkins' testimony
regarding square or rectangu lar markings shall be attributed to Trial Exhi bit 3. 122.
175 Trial Exhibit 16.
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Kappel' s testimony was unclear whether he tore down walls in the kitchen
b cause they needed to be replaced or because Mitchell determined to reconfigure the
kitchen area for the White Eagle Brewery and Grill.

Furthermore, without expert

testimony as to expected wear and tear to walls floors, and ceilings in a restaurant
operated over a period of thirteen years, no determination can be made as to whether the
marks and staining to the walls visible Trial Exhibits 3.101 3. 102 3. 117 3. 118 3.119
3.120, 3.1 21, 3.122, 3.123, 38.1 and 38.2, were to be expected or was unusual. In the
alternative, this Court finds that the marks and staining shown in Trial Exhibits 3.101 ,
3.102, 3.117, 3.11 8, 3.1 19, 3.1 20, 3.12 1 3.122 3.123, 38 .1 and 38.2 were within the
reasonable bounds of normal wear and tear.
Storms and Brownstone hired Herbe1t Rockhold to replace some of the damaged
sheetrock in the kitchen area. Storms and Brownstone also hired Alan Flores to deepclean the entire Premises after the equipment had been removed. Several months after
Flores completed his cleaning, Kappel came in and cleaned the same areas again.
Although Watkins was unhappy that Storms and Brownstone did not tape or
texture the replaced sheetrock, the former Lease did not require Storms and Brownstone
to return a building in new condition to Watkins. Stonns and Brownstone repaired walls
they believed had been damaged. And in fact, Gerald Mitchell not only reconfigured the
Premises to hi s tastes but also repainted because he did not like colors originally selected
by Storms and Burggraf. Thus, Mitchell took out some of the new sheetrock installed by
Storms and Brownstone.

His use of tile was a significant upgrade from the white

hardboard installed by Storms and Burggraf.

176

Id.
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The attempt to repair drywall work, identified by Dane Watkins in Trial Exhibit
3. 121 , was undertaken by Waters Construction after Storms complained to Mr. Watkins
about internal damages from water leaks. Waters Construction never completed its work
because the leaking roof was not repaired and because of a payment dispute with
Watkins. The dark areas emanating from the cold air return may have been grease or
dust related.

Flores testified that such staining was both expected in a restaurant

operating for many years and not the sort of stain that could be removed. Whether or not
such staining could be considered abuse versus normal wear and tear was not proved by
Watkins. This Court finds the testimony of Alan Flores credible that the staining was
normal wear and tear to a building operated as a restaurant over the course of thirteen
years.
The greenish-brown markings on the wall in Trial Exhibit 3.122 were stains or
dirt from the chalkboard that formerly hung on the wall. Flores cleaned the wall depicted
in Trial Exhibit 3. 122. Whether or not such stains or dirt could be considered abuse
rather than normal wear and tear were not shown by Watkins. In the alternative, this
Comt finds the stains represented normal wear and tear to the wall.
Nothing in the evidence revealed what complaints Watkins had with regard to
Trial Exhibits 3. 123, 38.1 and 38.2.
Based upon the lack of evidence that the staining identified by Watkins in Trial
Exh ibits 3.10 1, 3.102, 3. 11 7, 3.118, 3. 119, 3. 120, 3.121 , and 3.1 22 was abuse, the
evidence does not support a finding that Storms and Brownstone breached their at-wi ll
tenancy with Watkins or committed wasted by failing to maintain the walls and floors.
Fwthe1more, without testimony identifying the alleged abuse in Trial Exhibits 3.1 23,
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38.1, and 38.2, Watkins has not shown that Storms and Brownstone breached their at-will
status with Watkins or committed waste upon the Premises with regard to thos exhibits.
d.

Upstairs Storage Room Floor. 177

Next, Watkins complains that Storms and Brownstone left the floor of the
upstairs storage room "very unclean." 178 Watkins points to Trial Exhibits 3.108 and 27 in
support of its allegation, and argues that $110.00 was spent to strip, refinish and clean
• · storage room fl· oonng.
· 179
I existmg
t,e

Trial Exhibit 3.108 shows a portion of a black-and-white formica floor and a
portion of the adjoining wall with what appears to be an empty space where a piece of
equipment was removed. Dane Watkins identified the removed equipment as a heater.
e identified the exhibit as the upstairs area because of the "checkered floor. "
Kathy Bmggraf testified that Trial Exhibit 3.108 was upstairs storage room on the
west side of the building. The same type of flooring is seen in Trial Exhibits T.75, T.77,
and T. 78, which Burggraf also identified as the upstairs storage rooms. Burggraf testified
that the black an.d white flooring shown in Trial Exhibits 3.108 T.75 T.77, and T.78 was
the same in 2010 as it had been in 1997 when Stonns and Burggraf received possession
of the Premises.
Watkins testified that he ordered the floors d picted in Trial Exhibits 3.108, T.75,
T.77, and T.78 stripped and refinished because they were "just a disaster." The floors
appear to be dirty in

rial Exhibits 3.108 T.75, T.77, and T.78.

othing in the record

discusses what is actually visible in Trial Exhibits 3. 108 T.75, T.77, and T.78 , however.

177

See: Trial Exhib its T.75 , T.77, and T. 78.
Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 17.
179 l.Q. See also : Trial Exhibit 27.
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The

ourt cannot discern if it is in fact viewing dirt or staining, or wear and tear over

years of use.
Watkins did not submit pictmes of the condition of the floors when Storms and
Burggraf took possession of the Premises.

o pictures showing how the floors appeared

after Watkins had them stripped and refinished were offered in evidence.
Tamara Metcalf related that the G neral Manager was tasked with cleaning the
area, including cleaning the floor and dusting. Alan Flores did not specify the upstairs
storage rooms as areas he deep-cleaned after Storms and Brownstone vacated the
Premises.
Based upon the lack of evidence of precisely what is depicted in Trial Exhibits
3. 108, T.75, T.77, and T.78, how the floors appeared when Storms and Burggraf took
possession of the Premises, and the result of the stripping and refinishing to which Dane
Watkins testified, the record does not suppo1t a finding that Storms and Brownstone
breached their at-will tenancy with Watkins or committed waste by failing to maintain
the upstairs storage room floors . Watkins shall not recover the $110.00 charged by
Pioneer Janitorial Services Inc., shown in Trial Exhibit 27 as dan1ages for Storms' and
Brownstone's alleged failure to maintain the upstairs storage room floors.
e.

Bathrooms. 180

Watkirls also seeks damages for cleaning the bathrooms. 181

Gerald

Mitchell hired Rusty Kappel to clean the tile and walls of the bathroom to get rid of what
Mitchell testified to be "layers of filth that was in there." Kappel cleaned the bathrnoms

180
181

See: Trial Exhibits 3.6 1, 3 .67 - 3. 7 l , 38.22, and 38.23.
Watkin s' Closing Argument at p. 18.
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in June of 2011. Kappel charged Mitchell $1 485.00 to "clean bathrooms" and "stairs on
, fl· oor. ,, 182
mam

In terms of general maintenance, Katie Wil Iiams testified that the Brownstone
employee hired as the dishwasher was responsible for cleaning the bathrooms on a daily
basis, including the sinks and the toilets.

Tamara Metcalf testified that she (as the

General Manager) or the dishwasher cleaned the bathrooms every day . She specified that
the day-dishwasher would do a deep-clean in the mornings by scrubbing the floor,
washing the stalls down, taking out the garbage, wiping off the door, sanitizing the sinks,
cleaning th mirrors, cleaning the toi let wiping the window down, and cleaning the
pictures in the bathrooms.

The night-dishwasher, who relieved the day-dishwasher

would do the same thing when he came in around 5 o'clock p.m. Metcalf would check
the bathrooms throughout her shift and clean again if necessary.
R staurant employee Allison

oble, who worked at the Brownstone from 2002 to

2008, remembered that the bathrooms were remodeled in either 2003 or 2005, including
new tile paint and grout. 1he bathroom fixtures all looked brand new.
Alan Flores testified that he deep-cleaned the bathrooms in December of 2010.
He used a toothbrush to scrub the grout on the tiles. He used a toothbrush and degreaser
to clean the sinks. The floors were sprayed with degreaser and scrubbed. He identified
Trial Exhibits 38.22, T.91 , and T.92 as photographs of the bathrooms after they had been
cleaned. He also pointed out that oxidation on the toilets was not dirt or grime. He
explained that the discoloration on the toilet seats, seen in Trial Exhibits T. 91 and T.92

182

Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 16.
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was a function of time rather than uncleanliness. He also explained that the stains shown
in Trial Exhjbit T.90 occurred with age.
Kappel testified that he completely cleaned the bathrooms : the walls, fixtures,
urinals sinks mirrors toilets, and the floors~ from the tile down. 183 He recalled that the
grout throughout the bathrooms was dirty. He found hard water deposits. He compared
the toilet seat shown in Trial Exhibit T.91 to the toilet seat shown in Trial

xhibit T.92

and observed that the seat in Trial Exhibit T.91 looked more yellow than the seat in Trial
Exhibit T.92. He testified that he observed "Just a normal wear and tear and use in
there."
Kappel's invoice for cleaning the bathrooms and stairs on the main floor was
dated June 18, 201 1. 184 Gerald Mitchell opened the Snow Eagle Grill and Brewery on
July 4 2011. This infers that the remodeling of the Premises was on-going when Kappel
entered the Prem ises to deep-clean the bathrooms.
Trial Exhibit 37.10 appears to show dirty floors in one of the bathrooms. That
photograph was taken in January of 20 13, however, two years after Storms and
Brownstone vacated the Premises and approximately eighteen (18) months after the
Snow Eagle Brewery and Grill had been in operation. Trial

xhibits 37.14 and 37.25

were also taken in January of 2013. Trial Exhibits 38.22, 38.23, T.90, T.91 and T.992
taken by Storms prior to vacating the Premises, do not show abnormal dirt or grime in the
bathrooms.
Given the facts that Alan Flores cleaned the bathrooms in December of 2010, and
that Kappel s cleaning services were undertaken in a period that involved, more likely

183 ~ :

Trial Exh ibits 37.10, 37.14, 37.2S, 38.22 and 38.23.
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than not, traffic from various construction workers undertaking the remodeling project,
the evi dence does not support a finding that the bathrooms were left in an abnormally
dirty condition. Furthermore, without expert testimony about normal wear and tear to
bathrooms used by the public over a thirteen-year period, without more specific te1ms as
to the parties' agreement regarding final cleaning before the tenant quitted the Premises,
and without expert guidance as to the depth of cleaning expected of commercial tenants
Watkins has not show11 that Storms and Brownstone left the bathrooms in a state beyond
normal expectations.
In the alternative, the evidence submitted by the parties convinces this Court that
the bathrooms exhibited nothing more than normal wear and tear for a commercial
restamant operated over the course of thirteen years. For these reasons, Watkins shall not
recover for Kappel's bathroom cleaning services.
6.

North Rain Gutter. 185

Watkins argues that Storms and Brownstone left the north ram gutter
"nonfunctional" when they vacated the Premises. 186 Watkins obtained an estimate from
Green Acres Home Improvement, dated September 29, 20 11, to replace the rain gutter, at
a cost of $580.00. 187 No evidence was presented as to what Watkins actually paid to
replace the north rain gutter.
Gerald Mitchell testified that the rain gutter on the north side was impacted with
gr ase. He observed from below the water coming over the rain gutter, down the wall,
and into the bottom left-hand side of the framing of the window depicted on the left side

Tria l Exhibit 16.
ee: Trial Exhibit T.94.
186 Watkin s' Closing Argument at p. 18.
1~4
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of the bar in Trial Exhibit T.98 . Mitchell believed that the hood vent fans were impacted
with grease and that the grease would follow along the roof and end up in the rain gutter.
Mitchell did not know if the gutter could have been cleaned out with a hot-water
pressure wash r. He testified that the window framing was not sealed to control the leak.
Mitchell also testified that because of the porous nature of the walls, being cinder block
with a brick fa9ade, he did not believe the walls could be sealed from water leakage. He
admitted that he insisted upon replacement of the rain gutter because he did not believe
sealing the outside of the building was a viable option.
Mitchell never observed the replacement of the rain gutters, but he testified the
replacement would have occurred before he opened the Snow Eagle Brewery and Grill on
July 4, 201]. Mitchell testified that since the gutter were replaced, he had not observed
the phenomenon of water coming off the roof and then corning back into the building as
before. He noted, however, that leaks are still occurring in the building, including a leak
on the ceiling close to the north wall, in the bar area.
Storms identified the window and wall between the kitchen and bar as one of the
leaking areas after Briggs Roofing completed the new roof Storms also identified the

n011h rain gutter as the gutter damaged by Briggs Roofing when old roofing material was
dumped from the roof into a dump truck. The damaged gutter was replaced in 2007.
Storms identified on-going leaks in the kitchen area in 2013. 188
Employee Ryan Getsinger, who worked for Stom1s and Brownstone from April of
2007 until the Restaurant closed in 2010 (save for a one year period from June of 2008
until Jw1e of 2009), and who worked for the Snow Eagle Brewery and Grill from July 4

187

Trial Exhibit 6.
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201 l until Mru:ch of 2012 and again from October of2012 until March of 2013, testified
that he never observed rain coming out of the gutters other than through the downspouts.
Getsinger never saw the rain gutters actually replaced during the time he worked for
Snow Eagle. Herbe1t Rockhold testified that when he worked on the Premises in the fall
and winter of 2010, he never saw the rain gutters dysfunctional or overflowing.
The Restaurant's hood and vent system was inspected by the Bonneville County
fire marshal on a regularly-scheduled basis.

Brownstone never failed an inspection.

Storms and Brownstone also hired contractors to clean and maintain the exhaust
system. 189 The last cleaning took place on August 15, 2010. 190 After September 30
20 10, Brownstone did not operate the grill or the cook line.
The original building prior to Storms' and Burggrafs renovations, was a cinder
block structure with a brick fa<;ade. Watkins tendered no exhibits showing grease in the
rain gutters. At the time of Green Acres Home Improvements estimate, Snow Eagle
Brewery and Grill had been in possession of the Premises approximately five months,
and in operation over two and one-half months.
The evidence infers that Storms did not leave the north-side rain gutter in an
unusable state. Whether the leaks that Mitchell noticed came from the compromised roof
(which continued to leak after the Snow Eagle Brewery and Grill opened), or from
operations of the Snow

agle Brewery and Grill Watkins has not shown that Storms

should be responsible for replacing the north-side rain gutter. The evidence does not
suggest that Storms and Brownstone breached their at-will relationship with Watkins or

188
189
t9o

ee: Trial Exhibits T.124, and T.142.
ee: Trial Ex.hi bit R. The Restaurant's exhaust system is shown on Trial Exhibit T.93.
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committed waste upon the Premises. Therefore, Watkins shall not recover damages for
the replacement of the north-side rain gutt r.
7.

Kitchen Walls and Floors. 191

Next Watkins seeks $3,200.00 for repair or replacement of damaged kitchen
walls and floors. 192 Watkins specifically mentions the east wall of the kitchen the white
walls in the kitchen, and the concrete floor of the kitchen. 193 Watkins specified Trial
Exhibits 3.117 through 3.1 23 , 38.7, 38.13, 38.25 through 38.30, 39.09, 39.10, and Trial
Exhibit V as illustrative of the alleged damages at issue.
Gerald Mitchell hired American Commercial Services to wash and prepare the
floor (for tiling), set up the tile pattern, and install durock (a substance placed under tile
for levelling) at a cost of $800.00. 194 American Conm1ercial S rvices finished tiling the
floor at a cost of $200.00 and tiled the wall for $2,200.00. 195
In addition Watkins requested damages for costs to clean the walls depicted in
Trial Exhibits 3.117, 3.118 3. 119, 3.120 3.12 1, 3.1 22, and 3.123. Included in the walls
necessitating cleaning was the east wall jn the kitchen shown in Trial Exhibits 3.122,
3.123, 38.25 , and 38.30. However, Watkins maintains that the east wall in the kitchen
had to be removed because of rotted wood framing. 196 Incurring costs to clean a wall
infe rs that the wall was in a useable condition. This inference coupled with the lack of
expert testimony regarding expected wear and tear to restaurant walls, particularly in the
kitchen area exposes a record devoid of evidence supporting a finding that Storms and

: Trial Exh ibits 3. 117 through 3.120 3.122, and 3.123.
Watk ins' Closing argument, at pp. 19-22.
193 ld.
194 Trial Exh ibi t 7.
195 ~ : Tria l Exhibi t 8.
19 1 ~
192
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Brownstone breached their at-will relationship with Watkins by failing to maintain and
repair the walls in the kitchen. Indeed, the vidence showed that Storms and Brownstone
replaced some of the green, moisture-resistant sheetrock in the kitchen prior to vacating
· . 197
t-he p_rern1ses
Trial Exhibits 38.7 and 38.25 reveal a north and east view of the kitchen area.
T1ial xhibit 38.7 shows stainless-steel sheeting hung on the north wall and what appears
to be new or very white Abitibi board (or Masonite-type hard board with a slick coating
on the outside surface). Restaurant employee Ryan Getsinger identified the white board
in Trial Exhibit 38 .7 as the east wall in the kitchen. Herbert Rockhold testified that the
same wall (the east wall of the kitchen) shown in Trial Exhibit 38 .25 was new Abitibi
board installed by Storms and Brownstone prior to vacating the Premises.

Sto1ms

clarified that the new wall was white, fi berglass panel. Storms testified that this new wall
was taken out by Gerald Mitchell when he reconfigured the kitchen.
Trial Exhibit 38.13 was never identified or discussed by any witness during the
trial.
Trial Exhibit 38 .26 shows a wall of the kitchen partia!Jy replaced with new green
sheetrock. Ryan Getsinger identified a black strip along the bottom of the wall as plastic
or rubber stripping to keep moisture from reaching the wall. Herbert Rockhold testified
that Trial Exhibit 38.26 shows the wash area of the Restaurant.
Getsinger testified that Trial Exhibit 38 .27 shows the west wall of the kitchen.
Getsinger identified the black stripping along the bottom of the wall as the same rubber
or plastic used to keep moisture off the wall. He noted that the stripping appears to stop

196

Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 19.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CO CLUS!O S OF LAW

68
144

at one point on the wall. Getsinger explained that the wall in the photograph stood
behind forty (40) to fifty (50) racks of glasses. No stripping appears on the north wall,
which frames a portion of what Getsinger described as a broom closet.
Despite the stainjng that appears on the left side of the wall and along the bottom,
Storms testified that those areas were inspected by the Health Department. Storms and
Brownstone never received a citation by the Health Department when the Restaurant was
in operation. Furthermore, Brad Simonson testified that whereas the whiteboard used in
the kitchen was inherently problematic because of moisture leakage allowed at the seams
he had seen the same whiteboard used in kitchens elsewhere. Gerald Mitchell tiled the
kitchen walls in the area where no stainless steel previously existed.
Trial Exhibit 38.28, which shows the north wall of the kitchen covered with
stain less steel sheets, is where the grills and oven were located during the operation of the
Restaurant, according to Alan Flores. Th.is was also known as the cook line, according to
Flores. Flores identified the discolored wall area above the stainless steel. He testified
that the di.scoloration resulted from the heat from the cook line.
Trial Exhibit 38.29, according to Ryan Getsinger, shows the west side of the
garage. Part of the north wall of the kitchen, covered in stainless steel is also visible in
the photograph. Getsinger testified that no black stripping is visible on the portion of the
broom-closet wall on the west side of the photograph, underneath the light switches. The
staining above the stainless steel did not merit citati.on by the Health Department during
the operation of the Restaurant. Stonns testified that Gerald Mitchell removed the west
wall and the broom closet when he reconfigured the kitchen.
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See: Trial Exhibits 3 .101 3.102, 3.103, 3.117, 3. 118 3.119, 38.26, and 39.07.
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Trial Exhibit 38 .30 reveals the north and west walls of the bar area, the west wall
being steadied by a large metal sheet along the floor. The west wall of the bar area was
the same as the east wall of the kitchen area. Storms testified that the west wall was
removed by Gerald Mitchell when he reconfigured the Premises.
Trial Exhibits 39.09 and 39. 10 were identified by Storms as the west side of the
kitchen. Storms testified only that Trial Exhibits 39.09 and 39. 10 did not show pitting or
cracks in the fl oors. Nothing in the record offered any other explanation of the wall s
shown in Trial Exhibits 39.09 or 39.l 0.
Storms and Brownstone used Trial Exhibit V to demonstrate leaks into the
Premises from the faulty roof. Storms testified that Trial Exhibit V also showed the
kitchen wall s removed by Gerald Mitchell during his reconfiguration of the kitchen.
In summary, the evidence does not support a finding that Storms and Brownstone
breached their at-will relationship with Watkins or committed waste upon the Premises
by failing to maintain or repair the kitchen wall s. Storms replaced some of the green
sheetrock in the kitchen. Other walls, including the brand new east wall of the kitchen,
were torn out by Gerald Mitchell when he remodeled the Premises. Nothing in the
evidence reveal s what would be considered normal wear and tear to kitchen walls in a
restaurant over a thirteen year period. Mitchell 's tiling upgrade is not an expense that
should be borne by a former tenant who used a lesser, but commonly used, method to
install walls in a commercial kitchen.
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As for the floors, Watkins alleged the concrete was cracked or pitted. 198 Again
no evidence guided the Court regarding normal wear and tear expected of concrete floors
used in a commercial restaurant over a thirteen-year period of operation.
The trial evidence revealed the following: restaurant employee Ryan Getsinger
testified that he never observed cracks or pitting in the concrete floor of the kitchen. He
did not observe water pooling in holes or depressions in the concrete when the floor was
clean d with hot water.
Storms pointed to the floor of the Restaurant as depicted in Trial Exhibits T.27
and T.28. He explained that the cement floors were not designed to have a uniform look,
but a variegated mottled appearance with darker and lighter spots or areas throughout the
floor. Storms testified there were no cracks in the kitchen floor when he vacated the
Premises, other than the texturing built into the concrete in 1996. Storms stated there was
no pitting in the floor that would have been a source of contamination. He affirmed that
the floors met the criteria of the Health Department jnspections, since the Restaurant
never received a citation. Storms never received a notation on any health inspection
notice indicating that the floors were a problem.
Alan Flores testified that the concrete floor was not pitted when he cleaned just
prior to handing the Premises over to Watkins. Brad Simonson testified that the "traffic
pattern in the kitchen was such heavy traffic that the concrete had abraded where that
pattern was." Whether a traffic pattern in concrete flooring is nonnal wear and tear or
abu

198

was not clarified by any expert testimony. In the alternative, this Court finds that a

Watkin s' Closing Argument, at p. 2 1.
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traffic pattern a concrete floor used continuously over a thirteen year period represente
normal wear and tear to the floor.
Simonson also testified to "grease impregnation" of the floor. Nothing in the
evidence instructed the Court as to whether or not grease impregnation is normal wear
and tear in a commercial restaurant over a thi1teen year period. Neither was grease
impregnation shown in photographs or mentioned by other witnesses.

This Couit is

unable to determine whether grease impregnation existed, particularly in light of the fact
that the Brownstone was never cited for health or safety violations by the Health
Department or the Fire Department during th course of its operations.
Gerald Mitchell testified that although concrete is an acceptable floori ng for a
conm1ercial kitchen, the integrity of the .floor on the Premises had been degraded to the
point it would no longer function. He clarified that the kitchen flo or was pitted and
cracked. After investigating a number of options, Mitchell decided to tile the kitchen
floor.1 99
In summary the evidence fai led to convince the Court that pitting or cracks,
necessitating floor replacement existed when Storms vacated the Premises.

Expert

testimony might have enlightened the Cou1t as to how concrete floors wear over time,
particularly in commercial restaurants. Without such evidence, and without visual proof
of the cracking and pitting, the record does not support a finding that Storms and
Brownstone abrogated their responsibilities w1der their at-will tenancy with Watkjns or
committed waste upon the Premises by failing to maintain or repair the kitchen floor.

199 ~
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Furthermore, this Court finds that some pitting and cracking of concrete in high traffic
areas ought to be expected in the normal wear and tear of the building.
For the reasons set forth, Watkins shall not recover costs associated with repairing
or replacing the kitchen walls or floor.

8.

Electrical Repairs?10

Watkins then asks for $661.00 m electrical repairs, required by "unresolved
electrical issues" allegedly left behind by Storms and Brownstone. 20 1 Watkins specified
exposed and unknown wires, broken light fixrures umesolved electrical connections and
lack of functional lighting in a back room. 202
Kathy Burggraf testified that she ai1d Storms removed the fo1mer electrical wiring
in the building when they renovated it in 1996. Storms and Burggraf installed all new
electrical wiring in the Restaurant.
Blaise Kauer, an electrical contractor, entered the Premises in January of 2011 at
Dane Watkins' request. Kauer understood that Mr. Watkins wanted to show the building
and needed the electrical connections to be safe. Kauer noticed wires hanging out and
exposed pipes from machines that had been removed by Storms and Brownstone. He
testified that "a lot of times in a commercial area, that can happen. It depends on who
takes out the equipment whether an electrician takes it and covered it up."
Kauer checked electrical boxes, such as those seen in Trial Exhibits 39.05 and
39.06. Kauer fixed a couple of broken light fixtures, and replaced burnt-out light bulbs.
H found wires coming out of the conduits but could not remember if the breaker had

200
20 1

202

See: Trial Ex hibits 3.34 through 3.36, 3.52, 3.111 and 38.6.
Watkin ' Closing Argument, at pp. 22, 23 .
Id.
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been shut off or not. Kauer stated that his work for Watkins was ' just a temporary fix
until the next tenant gets there and decides what they're going to do with it." He testified
that a lot of the work he did for Watkins was "common sense by my trade. You look
around £ r things that are electrically unsafe." Kauer charged and received $661.00 for
203
. services.
·
h1s

Kauer identified a decorative light fixtur

shown in Trial Exhibits 3.34, 3.35 and

3.36, which he "would have just hauled off and then capped the top." He did not have
any specific recollection as to what he did regarding the broken light fixture shown in the
pictures. Dane Watkins testified that the light fixture that lies broken on the floor in Trial
Exhibits 3.34, 3.35, and 3.36 was found in that condition when Mr. Watkins re-entered
the Premises in January of 2011. Herbert Rockhold explained that the fixture was broken
before Storms and Brownstone moved out of the Premises and that he installed the simple
light socket and bulb, seen in Trial Exhibits 3.33 3.34 and 3.35. to replace the decorative
light fixture that was lying broken on the floor.

Rockhold did not know how the

decorative li ght fixture was broken.
Kauer identified Trial Exhibit 3.52 as a broken cover that he "probably capped."
He testified that he most likely found another way to cover the outlet rather than to buy a
new patt but he could not remember.
Kauer described Trial Exbjbit 3. 70 as a junction box which he typically wo uld
have covered. Rockhold testified that he did not remove any light fixtures in the area
depicted in Trial Exhibit 3.70. The wires in the j unction box in Trial Exhibit 3.70 appear
to b capped.

203

Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 19.
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The light fixture hanging from the ceiling in Trial Exhibit 3.11 1 was identified by
Kauer as needing only screws to mount it back into the ceiling. He did not remember the
location of the fi xture, however.

Herbert Rockhold did not observe a light fixtme

hanging in the condition depicted in Trial Exhibit 3. 111 . Rockhold testified that he never
observed that light particular fixture on the Premises. Storms did not recognize the light
fixture in Trial Exhibit 3. 111.

Storms testified that the fixture did not exist on the

Premises when he and Brownstone vacated the building.
Tti al Exhibits 3. 125 and 3. 128 show several electrical wu es that required
removal, unhooking, or placing in a box for safety, according to Kauer. He noted that the
wires had wire nuts on them, but testified that a person could be shocked if the wire nuts
fe ll off.

The white wire in Trial Exhibit 3.1 28 did not have a wire nut.

Rockhold

testified that the white wire was a common wire and that he did not test its voltage.
Kauer did not elaborate whether he tested the white wire to see if it carried electricity.
Kauer did nothing with the grey wire shown in Trial Exhibit 3. 128. Rockhold testifi ed
that the grey wire was computer wire or telephone wire which carried a very low voltage.
Kauer explained that " most people hire an electrician to leave [a building] in a
safe way."

Storms and Brownstone hired Herbert Rockhold , who is not a licensed

electrician, to remove equipment from the Premises. Rockhold supported his expertise
with testimony that he built his home in Idaho Fall s and wired the entire house himself.
Rockhold sealed open wires with wire nuts and turned off the breakers supplying the
wires. He used a multimeter to determi ne that none of the wires were hot.
Kauer's testimony was disturbingly imprecise and general . He gave a description
of why Watkins hired him to check over the Prem ises. When asked about the specific
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tasks he undertook, however, his testimony became much more vague and indefi nite. He
could not remember if the Premises had dark areas because li ghts were burnt out or
because bulbs were gone. He could not recall if wires coming out of conduits were
energized or not. He was not sure what he had done to address broken fixtures. Often he
testified about what he "would have done," but could not remember what he actually did
with a particular fixture.

He was not sure if wires were simply removed from the

electrical panel or boxed. He could not recall where light fixtures or electrical outlets
were located on the Premises and therefore could not testify what he had done with the
fi xtures or outlets. Kauer recalled that he was asked to do "something with the switches,"
but he did not recall what he did. Although he was hired to check for safety issues, Kauer
did not check each one of the outlets.

He could not recollect the condition of the

Premises in January of 2011.

In addition to the vague nature of Kauer's testimony, the record does not support
a finding that Storms and Brownstone breached their at-will tenancy with Watkins by
fai ling to ask a certified electrician to cap off loose wires or shut down breaker boxes.
The former Lease did not specifically require such services, nor was an expert called to
testify as to a particular expectation or level of care which should be exercised after
electrical equipment is removed from a commercial building. This Court does not find
that Storms and Brownstone were required to hire a certified electrician to ascertain the
safety of the electrical connections left behind when the Premises were returned to
Watkins. Furthe1more, thi s Court find s that Herbert Rockhold had sufficient knowledge
of electrical outlets and wiri ng to leave the building in a reasonably safe condition.
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For these reasons Watkins has not shown that Storms and Brownstone breached
their at-will relationship with Watkins or committed waste upon the Premises by leaving
the Premises in an unsafe condition.

Watkins shall not recover bis fee to Kauer,

represented in Trial Exhibit 19.
9.

Grease Trap. 204

Watkins seeks $2,025.00 from Storms and Brownstone for services rendered to
empty the grease trap on the Premises, to restore its functionality, and to equip Gerald
Mitchell with a new grease trap system. 205
Ryan Getsinger testified that the grease trap was located on the floor of the
kitchen near the sink trap depicted in Trial Exhibit 3.117. It was covered by a heavy
metal cover. Storms explained that the metal lid was at floor level and below that was
located the actual lid to the grease trap. Restaurant employee Tan1ara Metcalf testified
that the kitchen manager was responsible for cleaning the grease trap and, on a rare
occasion the Brownstone hired a professional cleaning service as well. The grease trap
was cleaned every two months or when it began to smell.

Getsinger testified that

cleaning the grease trap required two (2) to three (3) hours.
Storms did not know the condition of the grease trap when he quitted the Premises
at the end of December 20 10.
Dane Watkins did not inspect the grease trap when he first took repossession of
the Premises in January of 2011. The grease trap, shown in Trial Exhibits 39.0 1 and
39.02, was located under the concrete floor in the kitchen, accessible by a steel Lid at the
floor level and another steel lid o er th trap itself. Trial Exhibit Z depicts the floor level

204 ~ :

Trial Exhibits 39.0 I and 39.02.
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grease trap lid with the handle visible. The lid does not appear to be broken or unusable
and the handle is clearly visible. Gerald Mitchell testified that the grease trap was not
useable, and that he spent time and money trying to open it. Mitchell hired two different
services, the second of which was successful in prying off the lid. Mitchell testified that
the grease trap was totally encased in grease and had not been maintained for some time.
Mitchell related that once the grease was removed he discovered that the inside metal was
completely rotted and the grease trap was not salvageable.
Parkers Septic Tanks Service LLC charged Mitchell $425.00 to pump the grease
out of the grease trap. 206 Parkers rendered its services on or about April 11 , 2011. 207
Mitchell testified that he also paid Idaho steel $ 100.70 to fabricate a new lid for the grease
trap before he discovered that the metal walls were rotted .208 The Idahosteel invoice
which describes new angles mounted to an aluminum plate, is dated April 12, 2011. 209
Storms testified that the original grease trap cover was made of steel, not
aluminum.

Storms also testified that he saw an aluminum p late in the Snow Eagle

Brewery and Grill which was positioned on the floor underneath the brew kettle.
Mitchell recounted that he ultimately filled the old grease trap full of cement and
bought an aboveground grease trap for use in the White Eagle Brewery and Grill.
Mitchell paid American Commercial Services Corporation $100.00 to backfill the old
grease trap.2 10

205
206

Watkins' Closing Argument, at pp. 23-24.
Trial Exhib it 15.

207

Jd.

208

Trial ExJ1ibit l 4.
ld .
2 10 Watkins' Closing Argument at p. 25; Trial Exhibit 9.
209
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Mitchell described the capacity of the original grease trap as "a fraction" of the
aboveground system he now employs . He later estimated the capacity of the old grease
trap to be one-hundred ( 100) gallons. He estimated his new system holds between sevenhw1dred and thfrty-:five (735) and one-thousand five-hundred (1,500) gallons of grease.
Storms' testimony that he did not check the grease trap or have it emptied prior to
moving out of the Premises infers that the grease trap was left with grease in it.
Regardless of what grease may have been added by cleaning procedures which took place
at Watkins' behest, standard cleaning of the Premises and maintenance of the building
would infer that a tenant should empty an underground grease trap before vacating the
leasehold. Therefore, Storms and Brownstone breached their at-will relationship with
Watkins, by fai ling to empty the grease trap before they returned the Premises to the
lessor. Watkins shall recover $425.00 for costs incurred to empty the grease trap.
As for the lid and the wall s of the grease trap, Watkins offered no testimony
whether or not such underground grease traps deteriorate from normal wear and tear.
Neither was testimony offered as to what kind of maintenance, other than periodically
emptying the trap, might be required for underground grease traps. Instead, the evidence
infers that the grease trap deteriorated from contact with grease.

The Court has no

expertise as to whether such deterioration is typical or unusual. Therefore, Watkins has
not shown that Storms and Brownstone breached their at-will tenancy, or committed
wasted, by returning the Premises to Watkins with an unusable grease trap.
Furthermore, Watkins shall not recover costs incutTed to manufacture a new
grease trap lid (assuming, without finding, that the ldahosteel invoice applied to the
grease trap lid and not the plate under the brew kettle), to backfill the old grease trap, or
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to purcha e a new grease trap system for the White Eagle Brewery and Grill.

Such

charges have not been connected to a duty breached by Storms and Bro~'llStone.

10.

Investigation and Repair of Plumbing Mainlines.

Watkins seeks to recover $220.00 that J & R Pltunbing paid AAA Sewer Services
to send a camera down the plumbing mainlines. 211 Watkins specifies Trial Exhibits 3.95
through 3.102, 3.125 through 3.127, and 36 as evidence of his claims. 212
In its closing argument Watkins contends that
... when Storms and Brownstone vacated, they left a number of exposed
plumbing Jines and fixtures without any indication of their purpose. See
Exs. 3.95-.102, 3.125-127. Storms had been using one of the drainage
lines, but the other drainage line was from the original restroom in the
northeast corner that Storms had not used. Mr. Mitchel did not know
which one Storms used and when Mr. Mitchell tried to use them, he found
they had a bunch of stuff in the lines. Mr. Watkins was not involved or
consulted in the remodel process, so he could not identify the lines either.
Mitchell had to determine which of the two lines was functional , and to
clear the line. To accomplish this, Mr. Mitchell hired AAA Sewer Service
to camera and clean out the lines at a cost of $220.00. See Ex. 36. 2 13
Trial Exhibits 3.95 through 3.99 and Trial Exhibits 3.125 through 3.127 appear to
relate to the beverage lines between the brew tank and the bar. Trial Exhibits 3. IO 1 and
3.102 show hook-ups and floor pipes in the kitchen. None of these exhibits appear to
relate to Trial Exhibit 36, which is an invoice from AAA Sewer Services to J & R
Plumbing regarding a camera used on the "mainline."

a.

Costs to "Camera" the Mainline.

The only evidence Mr. Watkins offered at trial regarding the plumbing and
Trial Exhibit 36 did not refer to cameras u ed to explore the mainline. During his

2 11
2 12

See: Trial Exhibit 36.
Watkin s' Closing Argument, at p. 25.
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testimony, Dane Watkins alluded to "a lot of problems with the septic tank."

Mr.

Watkins testified that he knew there were some problems in the bathrooms. When asked
for specifics, Mr. Watkins said the sink in the bathroom leaked. He thought it was in the
men's bathroom. He also mentioned leaks in the kitchen where the equipment was
removed.
Mr. Watkins pointed to Trial Exhibit 3 .102 as evidence of leaks in the kitchen.

Trial Exhibit 3.102 shows a hose connection and a pipe into the floor of the kitchen. Mr.
Watkins stated that it was continuously running.

Nothing in the Trial Exhibit 3.102

photograph depicts a water leak. Mr. Watkins was not sure which piece of equipment
was tied to the leak.

He then waivered as to where the leak was located within the

kitchen.
Gerald Mitchell testified that the plumbing was in bad shape. He added, however,
"maybe I shouldn't say this, but it probably wouldn' t make any difference because the
plwnbing had to be replaced anyway."

Mitchell testified that because of the

reconfiguration of the kitchen, he would have replaced the plumbing regardless of its
condition.
Despite Watkins' reference to T rial Exhibits 3. 101 and 3.102 in regard to Trial
Exhibit 36, the leaky plumbing described by Dane Watkins appears to have nothing
whatsoever to do with Trial Exhibit 36.
Kathy Burggraf recalled that when she and Storms first obtai ned possession of the
Premises, there was one bathroom on the north comer of the building.

Storms and

Burggraf completely reconfigured the plumbing in the building. Mr. Mitchell testified
that there were two sewer lines that ran out of the building. Mitchell did not know if both
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of them were fw1ctional. As for Trial Exhibit 36, Mitchell did not know if the invoice
was connected to the main line sewer. He testified, "I only know that they carnera'd the
brew lines or the access lines and whether this is pa1t of that -- or whether the $75 charge
is part of that or the $145 is the other part of that 1 don't know.'

othing in the evidence

linked Trial Exhibit 36 with any payment made to AAA Sewer Service by Watkins or
Gerald MitchelI. Instead, Trial Exhibit 36 shows that AAA Sewer Service invoiced J &
R Plumbing for its work, not Watkins or Mitchell.
The foundation for Trial Exhibit 36 was not properly laid at trial.

Neither

Mitchell nor Dane Watkins could identify whether or not the services performed in Trial
Exhibit 36 went to the brew lines or the sewer line. Trial Exhibit 36 makes no indication
of "clearing" the lines, only of using a camera. Nothing in the evidence linked a payment
by Watkins or by Mr. Mitchell with Trial Exhibit 36.

Furthermore, if Watkins was

unsme which sewer line was used by Storms and Brownstone, a telephone call or two
between the attorneys representing the parties wa a quick and inexpensive answer.
With regard to Trial Exhi bit 36 and Watkins' claim that it did not know which
sewer line were used by Storm and Brownstone, Watkins has not shown that Storms
and Brownstone breached their at-will tenancy with Watkins or committed waste upon
the Premises. Watkins shall take nothing by its claim for the $220.00 charge shown in
Trial Exhibit 36.
b.

Costs to Clean and Extend the Brew Lines. 21 ~

As for the brew Jines Mr. Watkins testified that "some of the plumbing
had to be changed over that wasn't working and it was just a major, major overhaul what

21 4

See: Trial Ex hib its 3.95 through 3.99, 3. 125 throug h 3. 127, and AA-3 .
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we had to repair and fix ." When asked to specify the problems with the plumbing,
Watkins merely stated that he was referring to "the underground plumbing" which was
"over by the bar section and that was underneath."

He then clarified that "it's my

understanding they couldn't use that." Mr. Watkins conceded that all of his knowledge
about the underground plumbing came from Gerald Mitchell.
Mr. Watkins identified the conduits coming up through the floor, shown in Trial
Exhibits 3.96, 3.97, 3.98 and 3.99, as paii of the housing for the underground tubing
used in St01ms' and Brownstone's brewery system. Herbert Rockhold testified that the
tubing connected the walk-in cooler and beer serving tanks to the bar spigots. Rockhold
testified that Trial Exhibits 3 .126, ai1d 3 .127 showed conduit located in the bar area.
Trial Exhibit 3 .127 is a photograph looking down into the conduit shown in Trial Exhibit
3.126. Rockhold testified that expanding foam was sprayed around the tubes where they
entered or exited the conduit to keep foreign matter out of the conduit. When Rockhold
pulled the tubes he noted that some of that expanding foam could have broken ai1d fallen
i.nto the conduit.
Watkins references Trial Exhibit 11 with regard to the "obstructed and unusable"
J 15
.
supp1y 1mes.-

At trial, however, Dane Watkins testified that he was not seeking

reimbursement for the charges r fleeted in Trial Exhibit 11. Therefore, Watkins shall not
recover the charges shown therein.
Watkins also s eks $1 675 .00 to "cut and remove the concrete and run new
conduit pipe for the beverage supply lines" because the lines were "plugged and

215

Watkin s' Closing Argument, at p. 25.
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unusable."216

Trial Exhibit 9 includes two charges: "Scheduling and oversight of

concrete cutting and plumbing installation. Meeting with James, Andy Ivan and J&R"
for which $200.00 was charged; and "Concrete saw cutting and removal. 16" slab and
partial 4" original slab" at a fee of $1,475.00.
Gerald Mitchell testified that the saw cutting and removal was part repair and part
remodel of the Premises. The evidence reflects that Mitchell moved the bar from its
previous position back toward the north wall. Trial Exhibit AA-3 shows the outline of
the bar when Storms and Brownstone operated the Restaurant, drawn in blue ink with
cross-hatches. Mitchell moved the bar north of its previous position. The new bar is
shown in Trial Exhibit AA-3 as it was being installed.
The water line used by Storms and Brownstone is depicted in Trial Exhibit AA-3
as two black squares. The beverage lines came out of the flo or at a black square which is
filled in, next to the left foot of the man wearing suspenders. All of those lines were
moved by Mitchell behind the new bar he in.stalled, depicted in Trial Exhibit AA-3.
Nothing in the invoices shows that the brew lines were cleaned or emptied. Instead, the
charges infer that the brew lines were moved to accommodate the reconfiguration of the
bar desired by Mitchell.
The evidence refl ects that the charges incurred in Trial Exhibit 9 were not repair,
but remodeling costs. Watkins has not shown. that torms and Brownstone breached their
at-will relationship or committed waste upon the Premises with regard to the brewery
supply lines. Watkins shall not recover the $1 675.00 he requests under Trial Exhibit 9.

2 16

Id. See also: Trial Exh ibit 9.
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11.

Repainting Expense.

FinaJly, Watkins seeks $1, 149.00 for repainting the walls. 217 It declares that "this
is not a r ult of deterioration from normal use and the passage of time. The new tenant
had no option to use the existing paint due to the condition it was in."218
Watkins points to the fact that Storms and Brownstone left some of the walls
spackled but not painted. 219 Herbert Rockhold testified that the paint on the walls was so
old it would be difficult to match. Furthermore as noted above Storms and Brownstone
originally agreed under the Lease to maintain and repair the Premises normal wear and
tear excluded. Without expert testimony to guide the Court as to whether holes in walls
(which appear predominantly to be nail holes) constitute abuse as opposed to normal
wear and tear to a commercial building, Watkins has not shown the breach of a duty by
Stonns and Brownstone. Conversely old paint that requires updating seems very much

in line with normal wear and t ar to a commercial building particularly one that houses a
restaurant. Nothing in the former Lease required Storms and Brownstone to leave the
walls in a like-new condition.
In summary, Watkins has shown that Storms an.cl Brownstone breached certain
expectations under their at-will tenancy, or in the alternative, committed waste upon the
Premises in everal instances.

Watkins proved damages of $274.64 for the unusable

crash bar system on the north-side entrance, and $425 .00 for the uncleaned grease trap in

Watkins' Closing Argument, at pp. 26-27.
Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 26.
2 19 Id. See also: Trial Exhibits 3. 11 , 3.12, 3.13 , 3.14, 3.15, 3. 16, 3.1 7, 3.26, 3.27, 3.28, 3.29, 3 .30 3.31 ,
3.32, 3.57, 3.58 3.59, 3.60, 3.61 , 3.62 3.63 3.64 3.67 3.69,3 .71,3.72, 3.77 38.3 38. 10,38.20 and38.22
(those tr ial ex hibits to which no witness testified were excl uded from the list).
217

2 18

FI NDINGS OF FACT AND CONC LUS IONS OF LAW

85
161

the kitchen. Therefore Watkins shall recover a total amount of $699.64 from Storms and
Brownstone fo r damages beyond normal wear and tear to the Premis s.
C.

Unjust Enrichment - Rent.
Watkins argues that Storms and Brownstone were unjustl y enriched by remaining

in possession of the Premises without paying rent after September 30, 2010.220 Taking
into consideration the temporary restraining order issued by this Court (at Watkins'
behest) the follow-up motions surrounding Watkins' request for a writ of attachment, the
time requested by Storms and Brownstone to move out of the building, and the number of
days Storms and Brownstone necessitated for the move, Watkins requests rent for fortytwo (42) days in the an1ount of $133 .33 per day or $5,600.00. 22 1
In their closing Argument, Sto1ms and Brownstone point to the first page, first
unnumbered paragraph of the former Lease between the parties, which shows that
Storms' and Burggraf's initial $23,750.00 deposit to Watkins included $5,000.00 for
"Last month's rent." 222 Nothing in the record upports a finding that Watkins credited
the $5,000.00 prepaid rent toward the last month the parties operated under the Lease, to
the at-will tenancy period or to period of time Stonns' and Browristone remained in
possession of the Premises after September 30 2010.
Based upon the temporary restraining order issued on October 1, 2010, the partial
preliminary injunction announced (but not issued) on November 4, 2010 and withdrawn
on

ovember 9, 2010, the prutial preliminary injunction announced (but not issued) on

ovember 24 20 10, and the Court's denial of Watkins' request for a Rule 54(b)

220
121
222

Watkins Closing Argument, at pp. 27-3 1.
Watkin ' Closing Argument, at p. 30.
Trial Exhibit l , at p. I.
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c rtificate (in order to appeal the November 9 2010 Partial Preliminary Injunction)
torms and Brownstone could not reasonably begin to remove items from the Premises
until after 3:21 o'clock p.m. on November 24, 2010.
While Storms and Brownstone were responsible for paying rent for the move-out
period, that period was extended by weather conditions which existed in late November
and December of 2010. Herbett Rockhold testified that when he resumed his efforts to
empty the Premises, the north side of the building (the primary location for moving the
equipment out of the building) was covered in ice. Rockhold recalled snow virtually
every morning. Such conditions slowed the efforts to move heavy equipment, back the
trailers into the loading zones, cany heavy loads, and operate a fork lift.
In addition, on November 19, 2010 Dane Watkins asked Storms and Brownstone
to consider selling the signs, poles, awnings bar and bike racks on the Premises to
Watkins before removing them. 223 On

ovember 23 , 2010 (one day before the order

issued allowing Storms and Brownstone to remove everything except the poles), Watkins
again asked Storms and Brownstone not to remove the awnings bar, bike racks, signs,
and poles until Dane Watkins discussed the purchase of the items. 224
On December 1, 2010 counsel for Watkins e-mailed counsel for Storms and
Brownstone to say that he not received authorization from Watkins to make an offer on
any items removable by Storms and Brownstone. 225

On the san1e date, Dean

Brandstetter, counsel for Storms and Brownstone re ponded that time was of the essence

223
224

225

Trial Exhibit A, at p. 000029.
Id.
Trial Exhibit A, at p. 000014.
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regarding any offers from Watkins and that he (Brandstetter) did not expect Storms and
r
W atk"ms tom akea dec1s10n.
. . 226
Brownstone to wait. 1or

On December 10, 2010 Mr. Brandstetter e-mailed B.J. Driscoll counsel for
Watkins to inform Driscoll that Dane Watkins personally asked Storms for a price on the
bar, signs, and awnings. Mr. Brandstetter reminded Mr. Driscoll that Sto1ms was not
offering the bar, signs, and awnings for sale, and therefore did not have an asking
price. 227

Mr. Brandstetter requested that any offer from Mr. Watkins to Storms and

. d. via
·cotmse
1 .228
Brownstone b e su.bm1tte

Storms testified that he did not remove the bar, the signs, or the awnings pending
an offer from Mr. Watkins to purchase those items. Storms recounted that on December
23 2010, Mr. Watkins finally did make an offer for the bar, the signs and the awnings.
Apparently the offer was rejected. However, Storms had left those items in place while
waiting fo r the promised offer. The removal of the bar was necessary before the brewing
system the largest pieces of equipment in the building, could be removed.
Storms and Brownstone required thirty-six (36) days to move out of the Premises,
from

ovember 25 until December 30, 2010. Since torms and Brownstone waited, as

requested by Mr. Watkins from November 19 2010 until December 23 , 2010, for an
offer on some of the remaining equipment, the evidence shows that Sto1ms and
Brownstone had only seven (7) days of unhampered time to move the final pieces of
equipm.ent from the Premises.

226

Id.

Tri al Exhibit A, at p. 00001 2.
m lg.

227
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Storms and Brown tone have not requested a return of any p01tion of the
$5,000.00 prepaid rent for their final month in possession of the Premises. That amount
amply cover the seven days Storms and Brownstone utilized after accommodating Dane
Watkins' request to leave the bar and other items in place pending a purchase offer to
move out of the building.
Therefore, Watkins has not shown that Storms and Brownstone were unjustly
enriched by the thirty-six (36) days they used to vacate the Premises, only seven (7) of
which were without encumbrance by Mr. Watkins.

D.

Other Trial Issues.
Finally, a number of other disputed issues arose at tt·ial which Watkins did not

argue in closing. Whether or not Watkins intended to include those issues is unknown
but the Court shall address them briefly.
1.

Auger Holes.-"29

Watkins submitted photographs of holes dri lled through the ceiling of the
Restaurant.

torms identified these holes as auger holes through which barley, milled by

Storms, 230 was transferred to the brewery. Snow Eagle Brewery and Grill also installed
an auger for its brewing process. 231 Storms testified that Gerald Mitchell used the same
auger holes, originally drilled by Storms and Burggraf, for his restaurant.
Watkins shall not recover for any alleged damages caused by the auger holes.

229

230
231

See: Tri al Ex hibits 3.78 3. 114, 3.136
See: T1i al Ex hibi t T.97.
See : Trial Exh ibits T.168 and T.169.
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2.

. D oor. n2
Upstairs

Dane Watkins complained that Trial Exhibits 3.79 and 3.80 depicted "door
damage." He thought the duct tape was being used just to shut the door. He testified
repairs were necessary to "secure the location." Watkins could not say whether the door
in Trial Exhibit 3.79 and 3.80 was the same door as was in place in 1996 when the
Premises were turned over to Storms and Burggraf.
Tamara Metcalf testified that the door shown in Trial Exhibits 3.79 and 3.80
which lacks a deadbolt and has duct tape over the sliding latch was the door "into the
room where the manager s office is."

The duct tape was installed so that when

employees carried heavy items out of the storage room they could open the door without
putting down their burden.
Watkins fai led to carry his burden as to any damage to the upstairs door
attributable to Storms and Brownstone.
3.

Office Door. 233

Watkins testified that Storms and Brownstone left the office door without a
deadbolt and that the deadbolt had to be rep laced. Watkins believed that the office door
had a deadbolt when the Premises were turned over to Storms and Burggraf. However,
Watkins was unsure whether Trial Exhibit 3.91 was in fact, the upstairs office door. He
later waivered, stating that if the door had not had a deadbolt in 1996 such a condition
"would have been repaired."
Tamar Metcalf remembered that the office door never had a deadbolt in it, during
her employment for Storms and Brownstone, beginning in 2002.

232 ~

:

Kathy Burggraf

Trial Exhibits 3.79 and 3.80.
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testifi d that th

office door depicted in Trial Exhibit 3.91 was m the exact same

condition as when she and Storms took possession of the Premises.
4.

·
Emergency EX1t
Latch on Garage Door.-'34

Trial Exhibits 23 and 33 show charges for the installation of an emergency exit
device on the man door next to the north side garage door behind the kitchen on the
Premises. Restaurant employee Ryan Gets.inger testified that no emergency exit alarm
was installed on the man-door next to the garage door during his employment for Storms
and Brownstone from 2007 until the Restaurant closed in 2010. Storms also stated that
an alarm device on the man-door next to the garage door never existed during his
leasehold of the Premises.
Trial Exhibit 38.29 shows the man door next to the garage door without a red bar
or red device.

Trial Exhibit 38.29 was taken as Stom1s and Brownstone exited the

Premises.
Trial Exhibit 39.05, on the other hand shows the san1e door with a red handle or
device for sounding an alarm if the door is opened. Trial Exhibit 39.05 was taken during
the renovations of the Premises for Gerald Mitchell.
This Court finds that Watkins has not shown entitlement to the costs of installing
an emergency exit device where no such device was utilized by Storms and Brownstone.
5.

Storms' and Brownstone's Counterclaim.

Storms and Brownstone seek recovery of attorney fees, storage rental fees ,
insurance for the Premises, liability and equipment insurance, electricity costs, and added
move-out cost for the period of time they were forced to remain in possession of the

233

See: Tri al Exhibit 3.91.
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Premi s under the temporary restraining order, entered by this Court at Watkins'
request, and the follow-up litigation over Watkins' requested writ of attachment. 235
Storms' and Brownstone's counterclaim totals $21 ,078.39. 236
Watkins argues that Storms and Brownstone cannot recover damages incmred by
the temporary restraining order and follow-up litigation unless Stom1s and Brownstone
were "wrongfully enjoined or restrained." 237 Watkins contends there is no allegation or
evidence that it acted wrongfully in seeking the temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction, or that this Comt wrongfully issued the partial preliminary
. .

·

lllJ unct1011.

238

The parties arguments require a detailed look into litigation which occurred prior
to Storms' and Brownstone's relinquishment of the Premises to Watkins. On October 1,
2010 this Court issued the temporary restraining order, pmsuant to Idaho Code § 8502( d), enjoining Storms and Brownstone from removing "any property" from the
Premises. 239 Watkins posted the requisite $IO 000.00 bond on October 5 2010. 240
On October 14, 2010, this Court held a Show Cause hearing on Watkins' Motion
for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment and Preliminary lnjunction. 24 1 The matter was taken

See: Trial Exhibits 38.29 and 39.05.
_,, Storms' and Brownstone's Argument, at pp. 50-52.
236 Storms' and Brownstone's Argument, at p. 52,140.
237 Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 31; Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c).
238 Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 32.
- 39 Temporary Restraining Order, at p. 2.
240
otice of Filing Bond, The Watkin
ompany, LLC v. Storms Bonneville County case no. V-20105958 (filed October 5, 20 I 0).
- 41 Minute Entry, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-20 I 0-5958 (filed
November 24, 2010) (hereinafter the "November 24, 2010 Minute Entry"). This Court notes that the
handwritten date on page 1 of the ovember 24 2010 Minute Entty is erroneous.

234

?' ' -
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under advis ment, with the parties given additional briefing time. 242 The Tempormy

Re ·training Order remained in effect w,til the Court issued its ruling. 243
On November 4 2010, this

ourt issued its Partial Preliminary Injunction ,

wherein Watkins' request for a prejudgment writ of attaclunent was denied on the ground
that Watkins had not shown a reasonable probability that it would prevail on its claims
under the "New Lease."244 Thus, Watkins did not have a valid claim against torms and
Brownstone for which attaclunent would issue.
However this Court granted Watkins a partial preliminary injunction based upon
Idaho Code § 55-308, which prohibits a tenant from removing fixtures from rented
premises if such removal would cause damage to the premises. 245

In so doing, the

Temporary Restraining Order was dissolved. " [A] restraining order is effective only
until a hearing is had upon the order to show cause, and if upon such bearing, an
injunction pendent lite is granted, the latter supersedes the temporary restraining order
which has then served its purpose and becomefimclus ofjicio." 246
This Court also relied upon Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65( c) for the authmity
to issue the preliminary injunction. 247 Watkins was required to post a $10,000 cash or
surety bond prior to the issuance of the preliminary injunction. 248 Watkins did not post a
separate bond pertaining to the Partial Preliminary Injunction or request that the

Temporary Restraining Order bond be substituted for the Partial Preliminary Injunction
bond.

(Neither did Watkins request xoneration of the Temporary Restraining Order

242

November 24 20 IO Minu te Entry, at p. 4.

243

Id.

Partial Preliminary Injunction, at p. 12.
Partial Preliminary Injunction, at p. 13 .
246 Rowland v. Kellogg Power & Water Co., 40 Idaho 216. 233 P. 869, 872-3 ( 1925).
244

245
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bond, however.) Watkins was also ordered to prepare the preliminary injunction order,
which Watkins did not do. 249
Instead on November 9 2010 Watkins moved for reconsideration of the Partial

Preliminary Injunction and argued that the "New Lease" was a valid contract between the
parties pursuant to Idaho Code § 55-307. 250

Watkins renewed its request for a

prejudgment writ of attachment. 251 On the same date Storn1s and Brownstone moved for
reconsideration of the partial preliminary injunction only, on the grounds that no
evidence had been submitted for preliminary injunction or the amount of the bond. 252
This

ou11 set aside the Partial Preliminary Injunction that same day, November 9,

2010.253
A hearing was held on the two motions for reconsideration on

ovember 17

2010 .25 4 Watkins' Reconsideration Motion was denied. 255 Watkins oral.ly moved for a
Rule 54(b) ce11ificate for purposes of appeal. 256 As to the preliminary injunction issue,
the pai1ies stipulated to most of the items in dispute save for three: the bar, the outdoor
signs and poles and the no11h and east awnings. 257 The Court took under advisement the
matters of Watkins' Rule 54(b) certificate request and the three items in dispute. 2

247

ld.

24 8

Partial Prelimina,y lryunction, at p. 14.

249

Id .

250

Watkins' Reconsideration Motion, at p. 2.

2s1

Id.

8

See: Stonns' and Brownstone ' s Reconsideration Motion.
See: Set Aside Order.
254 MiJ1ute Entry The Watkins Company. LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-20 10-5958 (filed
ovember 24, 2010).
n Id. , at p. 2.
2s6 Id.
252

253

Id.

25 7
?58 -

- l!L at p. 4.
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On November 24 2010, this Court issued the Second Partial Preliminary

Injunction. This Court granted Watkins a preliminary injunction as to the outdoor poles
only. Watkins was required to post a bond in the amount of $10,500.00 to cover the cost
of the poles.2'9
)

The preliminary injunction was predicated upon the posting of the

bond. 260 Nothing in the record shows that Watkins posted the preliminary injunction
bond.

either did Watkins request to substitute the Temporary Restraining Order bond

for the Second Partial Preliminary Injunction bond. This Court by separate order dated
November 24, 2010, denied Watkins' request for a Rule 54(b) certificate. 26 1
Thus, a writ of attachment never issued in this case.

Indeed a preliminary

injunction never issued in this case either. Instead the Temporary Restraining Order,
originally granted on October 1 20 I 0, remained in effect until November 24, 2010. This
is because after the November 4, 2010 Partial Preliminary Injunction , wherein Watkins '
argument in favor of a writ of attachment was denied, Watkins moved for reconsideration
of thi s Court' s denial of a writ of attachment. Storms and Brownstone were not at liberty
to move anything out of the Restaurant until Watkins' request for a writ of attachment
was finally adjudicated (both on the merits and with regard to Watkins' request for a Rule
54(b) certificate). In short, Watkins prolonged the period of time in which Storms and
Brownstone remained in possession of the Premises through November 24 2010.
Fm1hermore the preliminary injunction granted pursuant to Idaho Code § 55-308
in the Partial Preliminary Injunction which issued on November 4 2010 never came

259
260

Second Partial Preliminary Injunction, at p. 12.
Id.

Order Denying Plaintiffs Request for a Rule 54(b) Certificate, The Watkins Company, lLC v. Storms
B onneville Coun ty case no. CV-20 I 0-595 8 (fil ed November 24, 20 I 0).
261
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into being.

Watkins never filed the bond required. 262

Watkins never prepared the

preliminary injunction order, as required by the Partial Preliminary lnjunction. 263
Storms and Brownstone requested reconsideration of the Partial Preliminmy
Injunction on the grounds that evidence to sustain the injunction had not been offered. 264
This Comi dissolved the Partial Preliminary injunction on November 9, 2010. 265 When
the Second Partial Preliminary Injunction issued on November 24, 2010, Watkins was
again ordered to post a bond with the Clerk of the Court in the amount of $10,500.00,
which represented the replacement costs for the poles supporting the two outdoor signs
Stonns and Brownstone were enjoined from removing. 266 Only the original $10,000.00
bond, paid at the issuance of the temporary restraining order, remained with the Clerk of
the Court. Watkins did not pay the additional amount required in the Second Partial
Preliminary Injunction.
Whether or not the Second Partial Preliminary Injunction came into being based
upon the $10,000.00 temporary restraining order bond is, in the end, of little relevance.
The Temporary Restraining Order based upon Watkin's request for a writ of attachment
under Idaho Code § 8-502(d), expired when this Cowi denied the writ. Watkins moved
for reconsideration of thjs Court's denial of the writ. 267 At the November 17 2010
hearing, this Court denied Watkins' Reconsideration Motion. 268

Watkins then orally

See: Partial Prelim inmy inj unction, at p. 14.
Partial Preliminary Injunction, at p. J 2.
264 Storms' and Brownstone's Reconsideration Motion, at p. 2.
265 Set Asi I Order.
- 66 Second Prelimina,y injunction, at p. 11.
267 Watk ins' Reconsideration Motion.
268 Minute Entry, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no,. CV-20 I 0-5958 (filed
ovember 24, 20 I0), at p. 2.
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requested a Rule 54(b) certificate to appeal thi Court's denial of the writ. 269

Watkins'

request for a Rule 54(b) certificate was denied on November 24 2010. 270
During the pendency of the writ question, not only did Watkins' temporary
restraining order bond remain with the Clerk of the Court but also, Storms and
Brownstone could not remove any of their property from the Premises. Simply put the
issue had not been finally adjudicated. Watkins sought a writ to attach on all of Stom1s'
·
27 1
andB rownstone , s property wit· h'mt'he p rem1ses.
While prohibited from removing property and equipment from the Premises,
Storms and Brownstone incurred costs and fees for insurance and utilities to protect both
the property within the Premises and the Premises itself.

either Idaho Code § 8-502(d)

nor § 8-503 addresses the wrongful issuance of a temporary restraining order, only the
wrongful issuance of a writ. (This Court notes that the term "wrongful," in the context of
a writ of attachment, does not mean a malicious attachment without probable cause, but a
writ for which no valid grounds for attachment exist.)2 72
On the other hand, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) which pertains to all
restraining orders issued requires a bond "for the payment of such costs and damages
including reasonable attorney's fees to be fixed by the court, as may be incurred or
suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained."
Wrongful restraint does not equate to malicious conduct, but to a determination that the
basis for the requested restraint was without merit.

269

Id.

Order Denying Plaintiffs Request for a Rule 54(b) Certificate, The Watkin Company, LLC v. Storms,
Bonneville County case no. CV-20 I 0-5958 (filed ovember 24, 2010).
2 1 Watkins' Affidavit at p. 5,
21.
272 See: Ta_) for v. Fluharty, 35 Idaho 705, 208 P. 866, 870-1 ( 1922).
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Such is the situation in this case. Watkins sought a writ of attachment based upon
the New Lease he claimed against Storms and Brownstone. This Court determined that
the New Lease never came into effect between the parties. Thus, Watkins' basis for the
temporary restraining order was ultimately found to be without merit. Therefore, Sto1ms
and Brownstone may recover their costs and fees up to the amount of the bond.
Storms identified attorney fees he paid to Mr. Brandstetter for time spent on the
temporary restraining order and writ of attachment issues.273 The fees indicated in Trial
Exhibit J were incurred from September 29, 2010 through December 2 1, 2010. 274
The litigation between the pa11ies to this lawsuit between the dates of October l ,
2010 and November 24 2010 revolved entirely around Watkins' request for a temporary
restraining order and writ of attachment. The issues which were eventually tried dealt
with the state of the Premises after Storms and Brownstone vacated the building. Thus, it
is clear from the record that the attorney fees incurred by Storms and Brownstone from
September 29, 2010 tlu·ough November 24 2010 are recoverable under Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 65(c) because the temporary restraining order was ultimately determined
to be without merit, and becau e the only issues before the Court from the inception of
the lawsuit (October 1 2010) until the writ and injunction issues were finally adjudicated
(Novemb r 24, 2010) were the writ and injunction matters.
Taking into consideration the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty
of the questions the skill requi ite to perform the legal services properly, the experience
and abi lity of Mr. Brandstetter in the particuiar field of law the charges incurred in
comparison to fees incurred in similar cases, the amount involved and the results

273

See: Trial Exhibit J.
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obtained the undesirability of the cas

and awards in similar cases, this Comt finds that

Mr. Brandstetter s fee of $11 815.00 is reasonable for the work Mr. Brandstetter
accomplished regarding the temporary restraining order and Watkins' efforts to gain a
writ of attachment. This fee encompasses the period of September 29, 2010 through
November 17, 2010.-?75
The remaining $810.00 requested by Storms shall not be included in the Rule
65(c) award for the reason that the temporary restraining order and writ of attachment
issues were finalized by

ovember 24, 2010. In addition, Mr. Brandstetter's time sheet

shows that after November 17, 2010, he was involved in preparation of the answer to
Watkins' Complaint, as well as correspondence and teleconferences with Storms and
with opposing counsel.

one of the entries after November 17 2010 reference the

restraining order or writ issues. Accordingly, the attorney fees charged after November
17 20 10 shall not be recovered by Storms and Brownstone under their Rule 65(c) theory.
In terms of the in urance an.d utilities Storms paid for the Premises during the
months of October,

ovember, and December of 20 10, Storms could not begin to move

out of the Premises until November 25, 2010. Therefore the costs Storms incurred from
October 1, 2010 through and including November 24 2010 are attributable to Watkins'
wrongful temporary restraining order and its failed efforts to impose a writ of assistance
on Storms and Brownstone. Therefore, Stonn s is entitled to recover as damages, those
insurance and utility costs and fees associated with the pe1iod of October 1, 2010 tlu·ough
and including November 24, 2010.

274

1d.

275

See: Trial Exhib it J.
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Storms rented storage space from Lincoln Storage (no. Al 8) at a cost of $120.00
per month beginning on September 29, 2010. 276 Storms rented space Al 8 for the months
of Octob r and November of 20 l 0. Storms is entitled to recover rent for the month of
October and twenty-four days of November (at the rate of $4.00 per day for a thirty-day
month) for the rental of Lincoln Storage space Al 8, fo r a total recovery of $216.00.
Storms rented Lincoln Storage space A12 at a cost of $135.00 per month,
beginning on August 24 2009.277 He moved personal items from space A12 to another
location so that he could use space A l 2 for equipment from the Restaurant. Storms' did
not identify when he mo ved his personal items out of space Al 2 but he did testify that he
rented the space for October November and December of 20 10.

Without better

evidence of when St01ms moved his personal items out of space A l2, however, the
record does not support a finding that Storms' rental of space Al2 is attributable to
Watkins.
Storms rented Lincoln Storage space A09 at a cost of $135 .00 per month,
beginning on September 22, 2010.278 St01ms rented space A09 for the months of October
and

ovember of 2010. Storms is entitled to recover rent for the months of October and

twenty-four days of November (at the rate of $4.50 per day for a thirty-day month) for
the rental of Lincoln Storage space A09, at a total recovery of $243.00.
Storms continued to insure the building in which the Restaurant had been located
through October 25 2010. The annual cost for the building insuranc was $2,385 .00.279
The monthly cost of the bui lding insurnnce ($2,385 .00 ..;- 12) equaled $198.75, making

276
277
278

Trial Ex hibi t B, at pp. 00001 and 00002.
Trial Ex hibi t B at pp. 00003 and 00004.
Trial Ex hibi t B, at pp. 00005 and 00006.
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the daily insurance rate for October $6.41. Storms is entitled to re over $160.25 for the
building insurance premium attributable to the period of October 1, 20 10 through
October 25 2010.
Storms also maintained business personal property insurance, liability rated on
sales/payroll, liquor liability, equipment breakdown coverage, terrorism coverage, cluster
endorsement, and food contamination insurance on the Premises tlu·ough January 11
2011. 280

he $4,334.00 combined annual premium breaks down to $361.17 per month.

Stom1s is entitled to recover the insurance premiums he paid on the Premises for the
month of October 2010 and for twenty-four days of the month of November 2010 (at
$12.04 per day for a thirty-day month), for a total amount of $650.13.
Storms paid $678.97 for electrical usage, water, sewer and garbage for the
month of October 2010.281 Storms is entitled to recover that amount under Rule 65(c).
Storms paid $1,246.80 for electrical usage, water sewer, and garbage for the
month of ovember 2010.282 This figure breaks down to $41.56 per day for a thi1ty-day
month. Storms is entitled to recover $997.44 for utilities for November 1-24, 2010 under
Rule 65(c).
Storms paid $298.54 to Inte1mountain Gas Company for October of 2010 and
$794.34 for

ovember of 2010 .28'.,

October of 20 10. The

Trial
Trial
281 Trial
282 Trial
183 Trial

179
280

Storms shall recover the gas charges he paid for

ovember charge breaks down to $26.48 per day for a thirty-day

Exhibi t D, at pp. 00004 and 00005.
Exhib it D at pp. 00004, 00008.
Exhibil. F, at p. I.
E hibit F, at pp. I, 2.
xhib it H
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month. Storms is entitled to recover, pursuant to Rule 65(c), $635.52 for November 1-24
of 2010, together with $298.54 for the month of October, for a total recovery of $934.06.
Furthermore, Storms paid Herbert Rockhold an additional $2,000.00 in moving
costs because the move took place in the snow and ice of late-November and December
of 2010 instead of early-October of 2010 due to the temporary restraining order and
Watkins' attempts to secure a writ of attachment. The weather conditions slowed the
move-out process, necessitating the additional $2,000.00 charged by Rockhold. Storms
is entitled to recover the additional $2 000.00 charged by Rockhold pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 65( c).
In sum Storms and Brownstone have shown themselves entitled to receive
$ 17,015 .88 in costs and fees attributable to Watkins' wrongful temporary restraining
order. Since Storms and Brownstone are allowed costs and fees only up to the amount of
the bond, they shall recover the full $10,000.00 bond from Watkins.
6.

Attorney Fees.
The pa1iies' attorney fee requests shall be determined upon the filing of motions,

if any, by the parties. Any attorney fee motions shalJ be filed within fourteen (1 4) days

of the date of the forthcoming judgment. 284

VI.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based upon the foregoing findings and analyses, the following conclusions are
appropriate:

m Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(5) 54(e (5).
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l.

The terms of the Lease carried over into Storms' and Brownstone' s

tenancy at wil l as guidel ines for determining whether or not Storms and Brownstone
breached their duties as tenants to Watkins.
2.

Storms and/or Brownstone breach the covenant to repair in the Lease with

regard to the broken vestibule window pane, the unusable panic bar on the north-side
entrance, and the uncleaned grease trap.
3.

Watkins should be awarded $699.64 for cleaning or repairs of the

Premises as a result of Storms' and/or Brownstone's breach. In the alternative, Watkins
should recover $699.64 from Storms and Brownstone for waste committed upon the
Premises.
4.

Storms and Brownstone were not unjustly enriched by possession of the

Premises from November 25, 2010 to December 30, 2010 without paying rent.
5.

Storms and Brownstone shown themselves entitl ed to recover storage

rental expenses, additional moving expenses, insurance expenses, utility expenses, and
attorney fees as damages for the temporary restraining order entered against them.
6.

Storms and Brownstone are entitled only to recover the amount of the

bond paid by Watkins for the temporary restraining order, which amounts to $ 10,000.00.

VII.

ORDERS

In accordance with the foregoing findings and conclusions, the fo llowing orders
are appropriate:
I.

Watkins shall take nothing by its allegations against Burggraf.

2.

Watkins shall take nothing by its Count One (breach of contract) claims

against the defendants.
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3.

Watkins' Count Two request for injunctive relief is denied as moot.

4.

Watkins' shall take nothing by its Count Three request for an accounting

under the "New Lease."
5.

Watkins' request for the defendants' eviction in Count Four of its Second

Amended Complaint is denied as moot.
6.

Watkins shall recover $699.64 from Storms and Brownstone for repairs to

the Premises necessitated by Storms' and Brownstone's breach of the expectations of
their at-will tenancy with Watkins or, in the alternative, for waste to the Premises.
7.

Watkins shall take nothing by its claim of unjust enrichment against

Storms and Brownstone.
8.

Storms and Brownstone shall recover the full amount of the $10,000.00

bond given by Watkins for the Temporary Restraining Order on their counterclaim
against Watkins.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
-of

DATED this Ji_ day of November
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Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600

D U.S. Mail ~ Courthouse Box
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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.DA1t'!~N
D1ST1UCT JUDGE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

THE WATKINS COMPANY LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual,
KATHY BURGGRAF, an individual, and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC. , an
Idaho Corporation; collectively doing
business as BROWNSTONE
RESTAURANT AND BREWHOUSE,
Defendants.

_______________

)

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2010-5958

JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Plaintiff The Watkins Company, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company
(hereinafter "Watkins") shall take nothing by its allegations against defendant Kathy
Burggraf, an individual.
Watkins shall take nothing by its breach of the "New Lease" claims against the
defendants.
Watkins' request for injunctive relief against the defendants is denied as moot.

JUDGMENT
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Watkins' shall take nothing by its request for an accounting under the ''New
Lease."
Watkins' request for the defendants' eviction is denied as moot.
Watkins shall recover $699.64 from defendant Michael Storms, an individual
(hereinafter "Storms"), and defendant Brownstone Companies, Inc., an Idaho
Corporation (hereinafter "Brownstone"), for repairs to the premises located at 455 River
Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho (hereinafter the "Premises") necessitated by Stom1s' and
Brownstone's breach of the expectations of their at-will tenancy with Watkins or, in the
alternative, for waste to the Premises.
Watkins shall take nothing by its claim of unjust enrichment against Storms and
Brownstone.
Storms and Brownstone shall recover the full amount of the $10,000.00 bond
given by Watkins for the Temporary Restraining Order on their counterclaim against
Watkins.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this

JUDGM ENT

E t1)Iday of November

2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on

k )/

'1}, }JJ_!f- I served a true copy of the

foregoing Judgment on the partfe~ w by deposit into the U.S . mail by deposit
into the attorney's courthouse mailbox, or by facsimile transmission.

B.J. Driscoll, Esq.
SMITH, DRISCOLL &
AS SOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls ID 83405
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq.
COX, OHMAN&
BRANDSTETTER,CHARTERED
510 "D" Street
P.O. Box 51600
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600

JUDGMENT

D U.S. Mail "lsi Cou1ihouse Box

~ Facsimile) ~

0

~

.S. Ma~

Courthouse Box

Facsimi le \ ~
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DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ.
COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETTER, CHARTERED
510 "D" STREET
P.O. BOX 51600
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-1600
(208) 522-8606
Fax: (208) 522-8618
Idaho State Bar No.: 2960
ATTORNEYS FOR MICHAEL STORMS AND BROWNSTONE COMPANIES

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC., an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintif£1Counter-Defendant

Case No. : CY-10-5958
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND
COSTS

vs.
WCHAEL STORMS, an individual; and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an
Idaho Corporation collectively doing ,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.
COMES NOW the Defendants/Counterclaimants, Michael Storms and Brownstone
Companies, by and through their attorney of record, Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq., and move the
Court for an award of attorney fees and costs necessarily incurred by
Defendants/Counterclaimants in successfully defending Plaintiff's causes of action and
prosecuting Defendants' /Counterclaimants' counterclaim. Said motion is made and based
pursuant to the provisions ofldaho Code §12-120(3). This motion is based on the record and file
in this matter and the affidavit and memorandum of costs and attorney fees filed simultaneously
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 1
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herewith. Defendants/Counterclaimants request oral argument.

DATED thi~day of December,

2~~

~~~
~=::::::::.
~---==------===?~~
,~~======--

DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho resident of and
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the .!t,1 day of December 2014 l caused a true and
con-ect copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below
theis names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage
thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.

B.J. Driscoll, Esq.
Smith Driscoll and A ssociates
414 Shoup
P.O. Box 5073 1
Idaho Falls ID 83405
Fax: 529-4166

[ ] By pre-paid post
[ ] By hand delivery
¥tl By facsimile transmission
[ ] By Courthouse box

Honorable Darren B . Simpson
Bingham County Courthouse
501 . Maple St. #402
Fax: 782-3167

[ ] By pre-paid post
[ ] By hand delivery
j.t'J By facsimile transmission
[ J By Courthouse box

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 2
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DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ.
COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETTER, CHARTERED
510 "D" STREET
P.O. BOX 51600
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-1600
(208) 522-8606
Fax: (208) 522-8618
Idaho State Bar No.: 2960
ATTORNEYS FOR MICHAEL STORMS AND BROWNSTONE COMPANIES
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC. , an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant

Case No.: CV-10-5958

MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS

vs.
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual; and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an
Idaho Corporation collectively doing ,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.
Defendants/Counterclaimants submit the following Memorandum of Attorney Fees and
Costs to be assessed against The Watkins Company, LLC.,:
$ 80,126.50
$
220.57

$

500.00

$ 80,846.97

Cox, Ohman & Brandstetter, Chartered Attorney's Fees;
02/28/2014 Electronic legal research
12/27/2012 Richard St.Clair Mediator Fee;

TOTAL

MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 1
S:IDEAN\CLIENTS • ACTIVE\Storms. Michae~Second Cau,elmemorandum of costs and attorn ey fees .wpd
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'

-

The above attorney fees are more particularly itemized in the Affidavit of counsel filed
herein of which is by reference made a part hereof as though fully set out herein.
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
)

County of Bonneville

DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, being first duly sworn, says that he is the attorney for
Defendants/Counterclaimants, in the above-entitled action and as such is fully informed relative
to the above described costs and attorney fees incurred by him in defense of Plaintiff's causes of
action and in prosecution of Defendants/Counterclaimants counterclaim against Plaintiff. That to
the best of Affiant's knowledge and belief, the costs and attorney fees incurred by Kirk Vance
herein and as set out in the above Memorandum and the Affidavit filed herein are true and
correct; that same have been necessarily incurred by Defendants/Counterclaimants in defending
and prosecuting this matter; and that the costs and attorney fees are in compliance with Idaho
law.

r-1

DATED this.I_ day of December, 2014.

~~:.a----

DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

.1 day of December, 2014.

TARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
Residing at: ~\~\\\e.,
My Commission Expires : q -7.'2~ 1.67..0

MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 2
S:IDE AN\CLIENTS - ACTLVE\Storms. Michael\Second Causelmcmorandum of costs and attorney fees.wpd
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and
,,.,(

with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the _1__ day of December 20 I 4 I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below
their nan1es either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage
thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsim ile as set forth bet.ow.
B .J. Driscoll, Esq.
Smith, Driscoll and Associates
414 Shoup
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls ID 83405
Fax : 529-4166

Honorable Darren B. Simpson
Bingham County Courthouse
501 . Maple St. #402
Fax: 782-3167

[ ] By pre-paid post
[ ] By hand delivery
By facsimile transmission
[ ] By Courthouse box

Af

[

] By pre-paid post

[

J

n

By hand delivery
By facsimile transmission
By Courthouse Box

DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ.

MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 3
S:IDE N\CUE NTS • ACT! VE\Storms. Michael\Second Cause\memorandum of cosn and attorney foes wpd
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DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ.
COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETTER, CHARTERED
510 "D" STREET
P.O. BOX 51600
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-1600
(208) 522-8606
Idaho State Bar No.: 2960
ATTORNEYS FOR MICHAEL STORMS AND BROWNSTONE COMPANIES
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC., an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintif£/Co unter-Defendant
vs.

Case No.: CV-10-5958

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS

MICHAEL STORMS, an individual; and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an
Idaho Corporation collectively doing ,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.
STATE OF IDAHO
)
)ss.
County of Bonneville
)
DEAN C. BRANDSTETIER, ESQ. , being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

Affiant is a partner in the law firm of Cox, Ohman & Brandstetter, Chartered,

which represents the Defendants/Counterclaimants in the above-entitled matter.
2.

The firm of COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETTER, Chartered, was retained by

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 1
S:\DEAN\CLIENTS · ACTrVE\S torms. Michael\affidvait ofot1 omey focs.wpd
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Defendants/Counterclaimants, to assist Defendants/Counterclaimants in defense of the causes of
action brought by Plaintiff and in prosecution of the Defendants/Counterclaimants Counterclaim
against the Plaintiff.
3.

Affiant' s hourly rate is $225.00.

4.

Affiant was required to participate in a multiple hearings and a trial lasting seven

days. Affiant defended and prosecuted multiple Motions for Summary Judgment. Affiant
propounded and answered extensive discovery, and brought and defended multiple motions to
compel. Filed answers to several amended complaints and prepared an Counterclaim on behalf
of Defendants/Counterclaimants. Affiant perfom1ed extensive legal research on the various
claims, causes of action and issues raised throughout the case and prepared multiple memoranda
and briefs. Further, affiant exhaustively interviewed large numbers of witnesses, reviewed
voluminous records, photographs, exhibits, and documents. Finally, affiant prepared
comprehensive proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and argument after the evidence
concluded.
5.

The case dealt with difficult questions of law and fact and did consume the

amount of time and effort set forth.
6.

The skill requisite to perform the services properly were that typical of

researching legal issues and presenting them in court.
7.

Affiant has been litigating cases since 1982 and has thirty two (32 ) years of

litigation experience.
8.

There was no time limitation imposed by the Defendants/Counterclaimants and

much of the work was responsive to the Plaintiffs actions in the proceedings.
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 2
S IDEA
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9.

The circumstances of the case imposed no time limitations except in regards to the

questions involved.
10.

The attorney fee is fixed.

11.

Affiant has represented Defendants/Counterclaimants since 2010 in other

proceedings and matters.
12.

The action was not undesirable and affiant's efforts were greatly successful.

Plaintiff sought damages in excess of $27,000, but were denied virtually all relief except $699.64
or roughly 2%. Further, on the Counterclaim, the Defendants/Counterclaimants requested an
award of $21 ,078.39, the court found damages in favor of Storms and Brownstone in the amount
of $ 17,015.88 and recovered judgment in the amount of $10,000 the amount of the bond posted
by Plaintiff and set by the court.
13.

Defendants/Counterclaimants are entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho

Code § 12- 120(3) in that a commercial transaction was alleged (all transactions except for
personal or household purposes).
14.

Between November 18, 20 10 and the date hereof the time and labor required

devoted exclusively to the defense of plaintiff's claims and the prosecution the counterclaim of
amounts to $86,876.50 or three hundred eighty six and twelve hundredths (386.12) hours.
Throughout, affiant' s representation of Defendants/Counterclaimants in these proceedings by
reason of the extensive time that was required and as a courtesy to Defendants/Counterclaimants
Affiant discounted the number of hours actually billed. As reflected in the itemized charges for
services attached hereto and made a part hereof thirty (30) hours were not charged. While in
Affiant' s opinion, the Plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of affiant's courtesy, Affiant claims
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 3
S:\DEAN\CLI ENTS . ACTIVE\Storms Mlchael\affidvait of auomey fees.wpd
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attorney fees only in the amount actually charged and paid by Defendants/Counterclaimants
amounts to $406.50 or three hundred fifty two and ninety-two hundredths (2.92) hours. That the
forego ing attorney fees pertain solely to the prosecution of the within action. Attached hereto as
Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of this office's billing setting forth costs and attorneys

fees incurred for the above purposes
15.

In add ition Affiant has incurred attorney fees in the sum of $720.00 or three and

two tenths (3.2) hours in the preparation of the Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, the
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and the Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs and
supporting exhibit. Since no hearing has been held and if objection is made to the request for
attorney fees additional attorney fees may be incurred, the Defendants/Counterclaimants reserve
the right to supplement the request as additional attorney fees are incurred.
16.

To the best of Affiant' s knowledge and belief, the amount of $80,126.5 0 for

attorney fees and $720.47 for costs is correct and to which the Defendants/Counterclaimants are
entitled to recover in the total sum of $80,846.97.
17.

Awards in similar cases are similar to the amount requested herein.

18.

In the course of my experience I have become familiar with the time other

attorney devote and charges other attorneys charge for like work and the prevailing charges for
like work would be comparable to those charged and sought herein.
19.

That based on Affiant's knowledge, belief and expertise as a practicing Idaho

attorney for over thirty years, Affiant veri ly believes and opines that the costs, disbursements and
attorney fees as charged and set for herein are fair, reasonable, correctly stated, properly claimed
and are in accordance with Idaho Law.
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 4
S \OEAN\CLIENTS - ACTIVE\S t0nns. Michaellaffidvait of attorney fees wpd
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20.

On behalf of Defendants/Counterclaimants affiant hereby requests that

Defendants/Counterclaimants be permitted to recover their attorney fees in the sum of
$80,126.50 and costs in the sum of $20.47 for the total sum of $80,846.97 and that
Defendants/Counterclaimants have judgment against Plaintiff for that amount.
f'l1
DATED this.I:_ day of December, 2014.

~ / ,.-95:.----DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3°day of December, 2014.

N~RY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
Residing at: 'i5cnne,"\) \ \\ -e..
My Commission Expires: 9,-"Z..'Z.-'ZC'Th

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 5
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and

r1

with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the J__ day of December, 20 14, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below
their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage
thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.
B.J. Driscoll, Esq.
Smith, Driscoll and A ssociates
414 Shoup
P.O. Box 5073 1
Idaho Falls ID 83405
Fax: 529-41 66

[
[

] By pre-paid post
] By hand delivery
J><j By facsimile transmission
[
] By Courthouse Box

Honorable Darren B. Simpson
Bingham County Courthouse
501 N. Map le St. #402
Fax: 782-3167

[ ] By pre-paid post
[ ] By hand delivery
)><(' By facsimile transmission
[ ] By Courthouse box

&2~<-6

DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ES Q.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 6
S \OEAN\CLIENTS - ACTIVE\Stom,s Michaellaffidvait ofanomey fees wpd
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COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETIER, CHARTERED
51 O "D" Street
P. 0 . Box 51600
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1600
(208) 522-8606
TIN 82-0365834

MICHAEL STORMS
999 S Lee
Idaho Falls ID 83404

Page: 1
December 03, 2014
25075-000M
ACCOUNT NO:
STATEMENT NO:
54

Landlord/Ten ant

12/01/2010

Office Conference with client
Review and respond to email from Mr. Driscoll
Preparation of Answer to Complaint

12/02/2010

Telephone Conference with client

22.50

12/03/2010

Review and respond to emails from counsel

45.00

12/06/2010

Telephone Conference with client

45.00

12/10/2010

Review and respond to emails from Mr. Driscoll

67.50

12/14/2010

Preparation of letter to Mr. Driscoll
Review email from Mr. Driscoll

45.00
22.50

12/1 5/2010

Preparation of email to client

22.50

12/21/2010

Telephone Conference with Mr. Driscoll
Telephone Conference with client
Review and respond to email from Mr. Driscoll

45.00
45.00
45.00

08/30/2011

Preparation of Motion to Dismiss and Notice of Hearing

09/06/2011

Telephone Conference with Mr. Driscoll

09/20/201 1

Office Conference with client

09/21/2011

Telephone Conference with client
Review of e-mail from client
Preparation of Notice Vacating Heating and Withdrawing Motion to Dismiss
Telephone Conference with Mr. Driscoll

22.50
45.00
67.50
22.50

10/13/2011

Preparation of Notice of No Conflict

45.00

10/18/2011

Review and respond to e-mail from Mr. Driscoll
Review of e-mail from Mr. Driscoll and preparation of e-mail to client

45.00
45.00

337.50
22.50
90.00

112.50
45.00
405.00
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Page: 2
December 03, 2014
ACCOUNT NO: 25075-000M
STATEMENT NO:
54

Landlord/Tenant

10/24/2011

Preparation of Motion, Order, and Affidavit for Retention

12/09/2011

Telephone Conference with client

45.00

01/03/2012

Review e-mails from client

45.00

01/11 /2012

Telephone Conference with client

45.00

05/11 /2012

Preparation of e-mail to client

45.00

07/17/2012

Review and respond to e-mail from Mr. Driscoll

45.00

08/01 /2012

Office Conference with client

292.50

08/07/2012

Court Appearance at Status Conference

225.00

08/17/2012

Preparation of letter to Mr. Whyte

45.00

09/12/2012

Preparation of letter to Mr. Driscoll

157.50

09/26/2012

Preparation of letter to Mr. Driscoll - 2nd cause

157.50

10/09/2012

Preparation of letter to Mr. Driscoll - 2nd cause

45.00

11/06/2012

Research landlord/tenant law tenancy at will, month to month , holdover tenancy, potential
effect of remaining in possession after order of eviction, creating a term for years, month
to month, or one year

225.00

11/07/2012

Review and respond to e-mail from Mr. Driscoll
Preparation of e-mail to client
Preparation of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents

45.00
22.50
337.50

11/08/2012

Preparation of final revisions to discovery

225.00

11/09/2012

Preparation of letter to client
Preparation of Notices of Service

45.00
112.50

11/13/2012

Preparation of e-mail to client and review of respon se

45.00

11 /1 4/2012

Review and respond to e-mail from Judge St. Clair

45.00

11/19/2012

Preparation of letter to client
Preparation of letter to client
Preparation of e-mail to client

67.50
67.50
22.50

12/04/2012

Preparation of e-mail to client
Review and respond to e-mail from client

45.00
45.00

12/06/2012

Office Conference with client

337.50

12/11 /2012

Preparation of letter to Mr. Driscoll
Preparation of Notice of Compliance Witnesses

45.00
112.50

12/13/2012

Preparation of letter to client

180.00

45.00
197
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ACCOUNT NO: 25075-000M
54
STATEMENT NO:

LandlordfTen ant

12/17/2012

Preparation for Mediation
Appearance at Mediation

12/18/2012

Preparation of Motion to Compel and Stay Summary Judgment proceedings, and Affidavit

12/26/2012

Review and respond to e-mail from client
Preparation of letter to Counsel

45.00
45.00

12/27/20 12

Preparation of letter to Richard St. Clair

45.00

01/03/2013

Preparation of Motion for Summary Judgment, Notice of Hearing, Motion and Order
Shortening Time
Partial preparation of Responses to Discovery Requests

337.50
562.50

01/04/2013

Review and respond to e-mail from counsel
Telephone Conference with client
Preparation of partial and additional responses to discovery req uests

45.00
45.00
225.00

01/07/2013

Office Conference with client

337.50

01/09/2013

Preparation of final revisions to discovery response and Notice of Service
Search of all e-mails to include in discovery

112.50
112.50

01/11/2013

Review and respond to e-mail from counsel
Partial preparation of Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment

11 2.50
225.00

01/12/2013

Further preparation on Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and partial
research on equitable relief

337.50

01/14/2013

Preparation of Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
Preparation of e-mail to client

450.00
45.00

01 /15/2013

Research "unjust enrichment, conferring of benefit, measure damages, unjust to retain the
benefit"
Review and respond to e-mail from client
Office Conference with client
Partial preparation of Brief in Opposition to Motion for Su mmary Judgment

337.50
45.00
112.50
112.50

01/16/2013

Office Conference with client, preparation of final revisions to Affidavit and Exhibits,
preparation of Memoran dum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, review and
respond to e-mail from counsel, preparation of Motion to Compel , Affidavit in Support of
Motion to Compel, and Notice of Hearing

01/17/2013

Telephone Conference with client
Preparation of Motion , Affidavit, and Order Shortening Time
Telephone Conference with Court Clerk

01/22/201 3

Telephone Conference with Court and Counsel
Telephone Conference with Mr. Driscoll
Preparation of e-mail to client

01/28/2013

Preparation of e-mail to client
Review of Watkins Supplemental Discovery
Preparation and organization of photos to be included in Affidavit (discounted 1 1/2 hrs.)

90.00
1,012.50
337.50

1,800.00
45.00
225.00
45.00
67.50
67.50
22.50
45.00
225.00
112.50
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ACCOUNT NO:
25075-000M
STATEMENT NO:
54

Landlord/Tenant

01/29/2013

Preparation of revisions and amendments to Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment and exhibits (discounted from 3.0 to 1.0)
Telephone Conference with client
Preparation of Supplemental Response to discovery (discounted)

225.00
45.00
337.50

01/30/2013

Preparation for Motion to Compel cross motions
Court Appearance at Motion to Compel cross motions
Preparation of e-mail to Mr. Driscoll
Preparation of two (2) e-mails to Mr. Driscoll (1/29/2013)

225.00
337.50
22.50
67.50

01/31/2013

Telephone Conference with client
Preparation of revisions to Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment

22.50
180.00

02/01/2013

Review of discovery responses and additional copies made, and preparation of letter to
Clerk
Preparation of revisions to Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment

67.50
180.00

02/06/2013

Telephone Conference with Judge Simpson's Clerk
Telephone Conference with Judge Simpson's Clerk

02/13/2013

Review and respond to e-mail from Mr. Driscoll
Research ability to file additional affidavits authorities

02/14/2013

Review of exit photos and preparation of e-mails to client
Review and respond to e-mails from client

02/15/2013

Partial preparation for hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment

225.00

02/19/2013

Court Appearance at .hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Amend
Office Conference with client
Review and forward e-mail to client
Preparation for hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment
Telephone Conference with Court and Counsel

450.00
337.50
22.50
225.00
45.00

02/20/2013

Preparation of letter to client
Review and respond to e-mail from Mr. Driscoll

112.50
22.50

02/21/2013

Preparation of witness list and e-mail to client
Preparation of e-mail to cl ient
Telephone Conference with client
Telephone Conference with client
Prepa ration of e-mail to Mr. Driscoll
Review and respond to e-mail from Mr. Driscoll

45.00
22.50
67.50
22 .50
22.50
67.50

02/22/2013

Review and respond to e-mail from Mr. Driscoll
Detailed review of discovery responses from Watkins and timing of same
Review and raespond to various e-mails from client

225.00
225.00
112.50

02/25/201 3

Telephone Conference with Judge Simpson's Clerk
Telephone Conference with client
Telephone Conference with client
Preparation of Counterclaim

22.50
45.00
22.50
225.00

02/26/2013

Office Conference with client
Preparation of e-mail to Mr. Driscoll and preparation of revisions to Counterclaim

225.00
67.50

45.00
45.00
22.50
112.50
90.00
22.50

199

MICHAEL STORMS

Page:5
December 03, 2014
ACCOUNT NO : 25075-000M
STATEMENT NO:
54

La ndlordfT enant

Review e-mai l from client
Review and respo nd to e-ma il from Mr. Driscoll

22.50
22.50

02/27/20 13

Telephone Co nference with cl ient
Preparation for Status Confe rence hearing
Te lephonic Status Confere nce hearing
Te lephone Co nference with Mr. Driscoll
Telephone Conference with client
Preparation of e-ma il to Mr. Driscoll

02/28/2013

Telephone Conference with client
Prepa ration of e-mail to counsel

45. 00
45. 00

03/05/20 13

Telephone Conference with Judge's Clerk

45.00

03/06/2013

Telephone Conference with client
Office Confe rence with client

45.00
225.00

03/11/2013

Telephone Conference with client
Office Co nference with cl ient
Preparation of letter to Mr. Drisco ll
Prepa ration of e-mai l to client

22 .50
22.50
45.00
22.50

03/12/2013

Rev iew of e-mail from Mr. Driscoll and forward to client
Review e-mail, preparati on of e-ma il to cl ient and to Mr. Dri scol l

45.00
45.00

03/13/2013

Preparation of e-mail to client

22 .50

03/14/2013

Review and respond to e-mail from client

22.50

03/19/20 13

Office Confe rence with client

03/20/2013

Preparation of letter to Mr. Driscoll

67.50

03/2 1/2013

Prepa ration of e-mail to clie nt

22.50

03/22/2013

Preparation of Notice of Settlement Fai lu re

04/02/2013

Review of e-mai l and attachments from Mr. Driscoll , and prepa ration of e-mai l to cl ient

04/03/2013

Office Confe rence with client

04/10/2013

Telephone Conference with Judge Simpson 's Clerk

04/1 1/2013

Office Conference with client

112.50

05/14/20 13

Review and forward of e-mail to Mr. Driscoll
Review Decision on Motion for Su mmary Judgment

22.50
112.50

05/15/2013

Office Conference with client

180.00

06/10/2013

Telephonic Court Appearance with Court and counsel.

45.00

06/17/2013

Office Conference with client.

67.50

45.00
112.50
11 2.50
45.00
45 .00
67.50

225.00

112.50
67.50
225.00
45.00
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07/23/2013

Office Conference with client.
Preparation for hearing on Motion for Sanctions and Motion to Amend.

45.00
225.00

07/24/2013

Preparation for hearing and argument outline.
Court Appearance for hearing on Opposition to Motion to Amend and Motion for
Sanctions.
Preparation of Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Sanctions.

225.00
337.50
11 2.50

08/21/2013

Preparation of Notice of Available Trial Dates.

45.00

09/17/2013

Review of email from counsel and preparation of email to client.

45.00

09/18/2013

Telephone Conference with client.

45.00

09/19/2013

Preparation of Defendant's 3rd Supplemental Answer to Discovery.

90.00

09/20/2013

Preparation of Amended Notice of Available Trial Dates .

67.50

09/23/2013

Office Conference with client.
Preparation of Notice of available trial dates.
Preparation of Notice of Service.
Review and respond to email from Clerk.

09/25/2013

Preparation of email to Clerk
Office Conference with client.

10/22/2013

Preparation of Answer to Second Amended Complaint and Counterclaim.
Preparation of email to client and review of damage claims.

337.50
112.50

10/23/2013

Office Conference with client.

225.00

11 /05/201 3

Research fil ing a first counterclaim in response to a 2nd Amended Complaint

225.00

11/07/2013

Review of discovery and supplementation
Preparation of email to client

112.50
45.00

11/12/2013

Office Conference with client

112.50

11/13/2013

Preparation of Response to Motion to Dismiss

112.50

11/15/201 3

Preparation of Supplemental Response to Requests for Production and Interrogatories
and Notice of Service
Office Conference with client
Telephone Conference with client

157.50
45.00
45.00

11/25/2013

Preparation for hearing on Motion to Strike Counterclaim
Court Appearance at hearing on Motion to Strike Counterclaim

450.00
112.50

12/06/2013

Review and respond to email from Mr. Driscoll and prepare email to client

45.00

12/09/2013

Review and respond to email from Mr. Driscoll

22.50

12/18/2013

Preparation of email to Mr. Driscoll

22.50

01/07/2014

Preparation of Notice of Intent to Take Default and fax to Court and counsel

90.00

225.00
67.50
45.00
45.00
45.00
67.50
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Research Construction of contracts, Obligation to maintain, obligation to restore premises
Research Idaho case law on issues raised by Motion for Summary Judgment on
interpretation of "surrender of premises" provision of lease.
Preparat ion of Memorandum to Mr. Brandstetter summarizing results of legal research

225.00
292.50
180.00

Preparation for hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment, detail review and analysis of
supporting and opposing cases.
Court Appearance at hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment

450.00
180.00

01/13/2014

Office Confere nce with client
Preparation of Settlement Statement

225.00
450.00

01/22/2014

Preparation of final draft and exhibits to mediation statement

225.00

01/29/2014

Preparation for mediation

112.50

01/30/2014

Participation in mediation in Pocatel lo
Preparation of letter to client

832.50
67.50

02/05/2014

Beginn ing of trial preparation, trial notebook, discovery notebook, exhibits
Court Appearance at Pre-Trial Conference
Office Confere nce with client

450 .00
112.50
67.50

02/11/2014

Office Conference with client
Preparatio n for trial, review of photos of Watkins subm itted in discovery
Research hea lth care inspection standards criteria, grease (FOG) trap maintenance
standards

180.00
225.00

Telephone Conference with Kelli Eiger from Eastern Idaho Health .Department
Preparation for trial , Watkins discovery organization and review
Research cooking hood maintenance standards, fire code requirements
Review , organization and preparation of photographs ; organization and outline of issues;
trial notebook; and Watkins discovery notebook
Office Conference with client and 6 witnesses

45.00
225.00
225.00

01/08/2014

02/12/2014

450.00

450.00
1,462.50

02/18/2014

Office Conference with Michael and Levi

112.50

02/21/2014

Office Conference with client

157.50

02/26/2014

Preparation of partia l exhibits and photographs list and organization of same

225.00

02/27/2014

Emai l to Judge's Clerk regard ing exhibit binder preference
Preparation of exhibit binder and tria l organization

45.00
675.00

02/28/2014

Office Conference with client
Preparation of emails to Judge's Clerk
Telephone Conference with Mr. Driscoll
Preparation of Motion and Order to Extend time to file exhibits
Preparation of Notice of Comp liance Exhibit List, Witness List and Pre-Trial Order
Office Conference with client

225.00
90.00
45.00
157.50
225.00
675.00

03/03/2014

Preparation of exhibit labels, exhibit list revisions , exhibit binders, exhibits
Preparation of Notice of Compliance: Exhibits, letter to Clerk
Office Conference with client
Office Conference with client

675.00
112.50
67.50
67.50
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Landlord/Tenant

45.00
22.50

03/10/2014

Preparation of email to Mr. Driscoll
Review email from Mr. Driscoll

03/11/2014

Preparation of email to client
Office Conference with cl ient

22.50
405.00

03/12/2014

Office Conference with client
Preparation for trial, review of exhibits, legal research elements, fact issues, photo
analysis plaintiff and defendant (3 hours spent billed 2 hours )
Review and respond to emails from Mr. Driscoll

787.50

03/13/2014

03/14/2014

03/15/2014

450.00
67.50

Preparation for trial, interview witnesses, Jeff Dexter and Katie Wil liams. Meeting with
client, preparation of subpoenas (11); legal research pleadings, judicial notice, resea rch
door parts, grease interceptors standards. (12 hours spent billed 9 as courtesy to client )

2,025.00

Preparation for trial, meeting with client, exhibit review and identification, testimony
outlines

2,025.00

Preparation for trial, meeting with Mr. Storms, meeting with Alison Noble, Ryan Getsinger
and Herb Rockhold

787.50

03/17/2014

Telephone Conference with Alan Flores
Preparation of letter to Mr. Flores and Mr. Englis
Preparation for trial and conference with cl ient

45.00
45.00
2,250 .00

03/18/2014

Office Conference with client, witnesses and attend trial (14 hours spent, billed 11)

2,475.00

03/19/2014

Office Conference with client, witnesses and attend trial (13 hours spent billed 11)

2,475.00

03/20/2014

Office Conference with client, witnesses and attend trial

2,250.00

03/21/2014

Office Conference with client, witnesses and attend trial

1,800.00

04/14/2014

Preparation of Stipulation to Continue 2nd day of trial and email to Mr. Driscoll
Review of decision denying motion for involuntary dismissal

90.00

04/15/2014

Preparation of Order Granting Continuance of Trial Date (no charge)

04/23/2014

Office Conference with client and preparation for trial

1,575.00

04/24/2014

Office Conference with client, witness and trial preparation (13 hours spent billed 9)

2,025.00

04/25/2014

Preparation for trial and conference with client
Court Appearance for trial

337.50
1,800.00

05/05/2014

Office Conference with cl ient

05/06/2014

Office Conference with client
Court Appearance - Trial Day 6

05/28/2014

Office Conference with client
Preparation for last day of trial

05/29/2014

Preparation for trial
Telephone Conference with Mr. Driscoll's office

675.00
180.00
1,687.50
292.50
225.00
90.00
22.50
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Telephone Conference with client
Research rebuttal testimony

45.00
11 2.50

06/02/2014

Office Conference with client

112.50

06/09/2014

Review and respond to email from Mr. Driscoll

45.00

06/12/2014

Telephone Conference with client

45.00

06/13/2014

Telephone Conference with Bingham County Clerk
Preparation of email to client

45.00
45.00

06/17/2014

Preparation of Available Dates

90.00

07/28/2014

Office Conference with client

07/29/2014

Preparation for trial
Court Appearance at last day of trial

08/07/2014

Review and respond to email from Mr. Driscoll

09/09/2014

Telephone Conference with Dan Williams, Court Reporter
Preparation of email to client
Telephone Conference with client
Partial preparation of proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

09/10/2014

Review and respond to email from client
Partial preparation of findings and conclusions

22.50
1,125.00

09/11/2014

Partial preparation of Finding of Fact (10 hours spent - 8 hours billed)
Preparation of Motion and Order for Extension of Time
Telephone Conference with Mr. Driscoll

1,800.00
167.50
45.00

09/12/2014

Partial preparation of findings of fact (12 hours spent - 8 hours billed as courtesy to client )

1,800.00

09/14/2014

Partial preparation of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

09/15/2014

Partial preparation of Findings, Conclusions and Argument

1,575.00

09/16/2014

Preparation of partial findings of fact

1,125.00

09/17/2014

Partial preparation of findings, conclusions, argument and legal research (10.5 hrs. spent billed 7.5 as courtesy to client)
Review file, research remedies, compile research document

1,687.50
1,501.50

Revisions, editing, and partial preparations conclusions of law and argument and research
of elements unjust enrichment, waste, breach of lease provision for repair and
maintenance (15 hours spent - 10 hours billed )
Review and edit FF/CL document

2,250.00
585.00

09/18/2014

112.50
112.50
1,125.00
45.00
45.00
22.50
67.50
450.00

675.00

09/19/2014

Preparation of final revisions, editing findings of fact, conclusions of law and argument

337.50

10/27/2014

Office Conference with client

157.50

11/19/2014

Telephone Conference with court clerk

45.00
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Landlord/Ten ant

Telephone Conference with client
11/20/2014

Review Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

45.00
225.00

FOR CURRENT SERVICES RENDERED

79,406.50

TOTAL CURRENT WORK

79,406.50
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B. J. Driscoll, Esq . - ISB #7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166

BY:- - - - - -

Attorneys for Pla intiff
IN TH E DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Case No. CV-10-5958
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES

V.

MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, KATHY
BURGGRAF, an individual, and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an Idaho
corpo ration ; collectively doing business as
BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT AND
BREWHOUSE,
Defendants.
COMES NOW the plaintiff, The Watkin s Company, LLC ("Watkins" ), by and
through its counse l of record, and pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(6)
and 54(e)(6 ) moves the court for an order disallowing all of the costs and attornei s fees
claimed by the defendants in the present case .
This motio n is made on the grounds and fo r the re aso ns that the defendants are
not the prevail ing parties in th is case, any award of costs and fees may be affected by
the court's ruling on Watkins' pending Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, and as a
matter of law the defenda nts cannot recover anything the costs and attorney's f ees
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES - Page 1
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206

they seek. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Proced ure 7(b)(3)(C), Watkins sha ll "file a brief
within fourteen (14) days with the court in su pport of the motion," and therein shall set
forth in detail its argument s and aut horities in support of this motion.
The motion is bas ed on th is Motion an d th e Notice of Hearin g filed co ncurrently
herewith, on the Brief in Support of Motion to Disa llow Costs and Attorney's Fees t o be
fil ed wit hin fo urteen (14) days, and on the court's records and fil es herein .
The plaintiff req uests oral argument.
DATED this

/7
I

i

day of December, 2014.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

'

~,

B. y l:') riscoll, Esq.
A orn eys for Plaint iff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/7

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of December, 2014, I caused a true and
correct copy of th e foregoing MOTtONfo D ISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES t o
be served, by placing th e sa m e in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States
Ma il, p ostage prepai d, or hand delivery, facs i mile transmission or ove rnight de livery,
addressed to the following:
Dean C. Bra n dstetter, Esq.
COX, OHMAN &
BRANDSTETIER, CHTD
P.O. Box 51600

[
[
[

] U.S. Mail
J Fax
] yvern ight Del ivery
[VJ Hand Delive ry

510 "D" Street
Idaho Fa lls, ID 83405
Honorab le Darren B. Simpson
District Judge
Bingham County Co urthouse
501 N. Ma ple, #310
Blackfoot, ID 83221

[~ S.Mail
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Del ivery
[ ] Han d Delivery

MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES- Page 3
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B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB #7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Ave .
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Id aho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-073 1
Facsimi le: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Plai ntiff

IN TH E DISTRI CT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUD ICIAL DISTR ICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TH E COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an Idaho limite d liabi lity company,
Case No. CV-10-5958
Plaintiff,

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATIORNEY'S
FEES

V.

MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, KATHY
BURGGRAF, an individual, and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an Idaho
corporation; collectively doing business as
BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT AND
BR EWH OUSE,
Defend ants.
I.

INTRODUCTION.
Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civi l Procedu re 54(d)(6), 54(e)(6), and 7(b)(3)(C), the

plaintiff/counterdefendant, The Watkins Compa ny, LLC ("Watki ns"), f iles this brief in
support of its motio n t o disa llow costs and attorney's fees requeste d by the
defen dants/counterclaimants, Mi cha el Storms ("Storms" ) and Brown stone Companies,
Inc. ("Brownstone") . As explained more fu lly below, the court should grant Watkins'
motion and disallow all of Storms an d Brownstone's costs and attorney's fees.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES - Page 1
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II.

THE COURT SHOULD DISALLOW ALL OF STORMS AND BROWNSTONE'S COSTS
AND ATIORNEY'S FEES BECAUSE THEIR TOTAL RECOVERY IS LIMITED TO THE
AMOUNT OF THE SECURITY BOND.
As Watkins has previous ly pointed out to the court, any recovery by Storms and

Brownstone is capped by the amount of the bond. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c)
provides in pertinent part as follows:
No restra ining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except
upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court
deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages including
reasonable attorney's fees to be fixed by the court, as may be in curred
or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjo ined
or restra in ed.
I.R.C.P. 65(c) (emphasis added). By the plain lan guage of Rule 65, the bo nd limitation
includes all costs and damages "including reasonable attorney's fees."
Idaho courts have addressed this issue and expressly accepted the majority view
that there can be no recovery in excess of the bond absent a showing of malicious
prosecution. The court in McAtee v. Faulkner Land & Livestock, Inc., 113 Idaho 393, 402
(Ct. App. 1987), explained, " In jurisdictions with rules or statutes similar to I.R.C.P. 65(c),

most courts have held that there can be no recovery in excess of the bond absent a
showing of malicious prosecution." (Emphasis added.) The court exp lai ned the
reasoning as follows:
Although attorney fees expended on pretrial restraint issues are
embraced by Rule 65(c), the rule does not mandate that every dollar of
such fees will be recovered. Rather, the rule strikes a balance,
articu lated by Ju stice Cardozo, between protecting wrongfully restrained

defendants and avoiding undue hardship for plaintiffs who present
facially meritorious claims in good faith.
Id. at 400 (emphasis added).

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATIORNEY'S FEES - Page 2
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In McAtee, several decreed water right owners appealed the limitation on their
recovery to the amount of the security bond in their favor, arguing that the final award
at tria l "was inadequate because it fa iled to cover all attorney fees." Id. The owners
also argued the limitation was unfair because the trial judge had commented that "he
did not be lieve a final recovery would be limited by the bond." Id. at 401. The appellate
court disagreed, applied the plain language of Rule 6S(c}, and limited the owners' total
recovery to the amount of the bond. Even though the appellate court acknowledged
that the party "took this statement [from the trial court] to be an assurance that the
bond amount wou ld not adverse ly affect them, " id., the court nonet heless limited the
party's recovery to the amount of the bond .
The owners in McAtee had provided some authority for the minority view that
"when a bond proves inadequate, the plaintiff ought to pay the excess because it was
his request for pretria l restraint which caused the defendant's loss." Id. The McAtee
court admitted that " [t]he minority view seems attract ive on its surface" because it
"provides compensation for the entire loss resulting from the wrongful restraint" and
"places the burden of compensation on the litigant who made the 'mistake,' albeit in
good faith, of seeking the pretrial restraint." Id. Nonetheless, the McAtee court
following the majority view that "there can be no recovery in excess of the bond absent
a showing of malicious prosecution, " fo llowing the reasoning of Justice Cardozo and the
"public policy of encouraging ready access to the courts." Id.
Importantly, restra ined parties like the defendants in McAtee are not without a
remedy. There, the court recognized that the trial court had "left the door open to

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATIORNEY'S FEES - Page 3
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further adjustment of the bond before trial," but that the party "sought no further
adjustment." Id. The water right owners could have sought to increase the bond
amount at some point in the proceeding, thus increasing their potential final recovery in
the case. However, the owners "let the $5,000 bond go unchallenged until a final
judgment on the merits had been entered." 113 Idaho at 402. As the owners had not
sought modification until after the trial court had entered final judgment, the court
could not consider awarding any more.
Here, Storms and Brownstone's recovery for al l costs, damages, and attorney's
fees is limited to the amount of the $10,000 bond, which amount the court has already
awarded in the judgment. 1 As a matter of law, Storms and Brownstone cannot recover
more. They may attempt to raise the same failed argument as the owners in McAtee
that the bond was "inadequate" because it did not cover all of their damages or
attorney's fees, but the law has not changed. And unlike in McAtee, Storms and
Brownstone cannot claim they relied on any statement from the trial court that "he did
not believe a fina l recovery would be limited by the bond," 113 Id aho at 401, because
this court made no such comment.
Moreover, if courts followed the minority rule and allowed a restrained party to
recover more than the bond amount, then the party seeking the injunction would face
unfair surprise at the end of the case. The main value of legal precedent is to allow
parties to make educated decisions about the relative st rength of their position and to
evaluate the risk of continuing litigation. Watkins has a right to rely on Rule 65{c) and

1

See p. 2 of the Judgment filed 11/19/20 14, already on fi l.e with the cou1t.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATIORNEY'S FEES - Page 4
F:\CLIENTS\BJD\831S - Watkins v. Sto rms .I I\P leadings\076 Brief.Motion .Disallo w .doc

212

McAtee that a restrained party cannot recover more than the bond amount to evaluate
its risk as the case progresses.
Whi le the minority view may offer some appeal, Idaho courts follow the majority
view that "there can be no recovery in excess of the bond absent a showing of malicious
prosecution ." Id. at 402. Storms and Brownstone had four years to seek an adjustment
of the bond amount before entry of final judgment, but they did not. Applying wellestablished and we ll -reasoned Idaho law, the court should grant Watkins' motion and
disal low Storms and Brownstone's request for costs and fees above the bond amount
the court has already awarded in the judgment.
111.

THE COURT SHOULD DISALLOW ALL OF STORMS AND BROWNSTONE' S COSTS
AND ATIORNEY'S FEES BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT THE PREVAILING PARTIES.
For any party to recover costs and attorney's fees, it must first estab lish that it is

the "prevailing party." In this regard, Idaho Ru le of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l) provides in
pertinent part as fol lows:
(A) Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when otherwise limited by
these rules, costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing
party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
(B) Prevai ling Party. In determining which party to an action is a
prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound
discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to
the relief sought by the respective parties. The tria l court in its sound
discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and
did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs
between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after
considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and the
resultant judgment or judgments obtained .
As the Supreme Court of Idaho exp lains, "An award of costs under I.R.C.P.
54(d){l), as the rule itself provides, is committed to the sound discretion of the district
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court." Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc. , 128 Idaho 851, 857 (1996) (citations
omitted) .
Where the trial court grants re lief to each party on some of their claims, the
court acts within its discretion to order that each side bear their own costs and attorney
fees. In a landlord--tenant dispute context, the most analogous case to the present is

Mountain Restaurant Corp. v. ParkCenter Mall Associates, 122 Idaho 261, where both
the landlord and the tenant prevai led in part and the court awarded no costs or fees to
either party. The tenant established a breach of contract, but the breach was not held
mat erial. For its part, the landlord recovered rent for the t ime period the tenant was in
the building, but the trial court denied any prospective rent damages because the
landlord had failed to mitigate its damages. Thus, with both the landlord and the tenant
prevailing in part, the trial court declined to award any attorney's fees. The appellate
court affirmed this decision. This court would likewise act well within its discretion by
refusing to award any costs or fees to Storms and Brownstone.
This case is also akin to Ace Realty, Inc. v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742, 750 (Ct . App.
1984), where the trial court explained, '"[e]ach [party] was about equally justified in
bringing suit. It appears to me that the liability for the incurring of costs and attorney
fees is about equal. In fact the suit was necessary to resolve the difficulties confronting
both sides. " ' On appeal, one of the parties cha ll enged the court's denial of the request
for costs and attorney's fee s. However, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
exercise of discretion, recogn izing that where both part ies had prevailed in part on their
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respective claims, the trial court acted well within its discretion to deny the party's
request for costs and attorney's fees. Id.
Here, like in Ace Realty, the court would act we ll within its discretion by denying
Storms and Brownstone's request for costs and attorneys because both sides prevailed
on some issues. This is especially true where Storms and Brownstone did not even
succeed in recovering the attorney's fees they claimed to have incurred from the initia l
proceedings on the motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.
Storms and Brownstone obtained a bond in the amount of $10,000. Their attorney's
fees incurred in the first seven weeks of this case amounted to $11,815. 2 They never
sought to amend the amount of the bond. As a result, Storms and Brownstone

continued to litigate for nearly four more years, but recovered nothing more. For its
part, Watkins' recovery was less than the amount sought, but the amount of recovery
should increase somewhat following the court's decision on the motion to alter or
amend the judgment. Viewing the case as a whole, Storms and Brownstone are not the
prevailing parties in this action, and the cou rt would act comfortably within its
discretion by denying Storms and Brownstone any costs or attorney's fees.
Th at Storms is not the preva ilin g party is especial ly true where he admitted at
tria l that he persona lly suffered no damages on his counte rcla im .3
Consider also Decker v. Homeguard Systems, a Div. of lntermountain Gas Co.,
105 Idaho 158, 161 (Ct. App. 1983), where the plaint iffs had 22 of their 28 cau ses of

2

See T rial Exhibit J and p. 99 of the Find ings of Fact and Conclusio ns of aw fi led 11/19/20 14, already on
file wi th the co urt.
3 See pp . 8-9 of the Brief in Su ppo rt ofMotion lo A lter or Amend the J udgment fi led 12/3/20 14, already on
fi le with the cou1.1.
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action dismissed, recovered only 3% of what it sought, and the defendant prevailed on a
counterclaim against one of the plaintiffs, but the court still held that the plaintiffs were
a prevailing party. Like Ace, t he Decker case is also analogous to this case, where the
court rejected most of Watkins' claims, but Watkins recovered about 2% of what it
sought (with the motion to amend the judgment still pending), and Storms and
Brownstone obtained a only a limited recovery on its counterclaim. But Decker is even
stronger authority to reject Storms and Brownstone's req uest for costs and fees
because if this case were like Decker, then Watkins would arguably be the prevailing
party, not Storms and Brownstone. This is even a greater reason to hold Storms and
Brownstone are not the prevailing parties and are not entitled to any award of costs or
fees.
Finally, the Supreme Court of Idaho's decision in Crump v. Bromley, 148 Idaho
172 (2009), provides further support for a ho lding that Storms and Brownstone are not
the prevailing parties. In Crump, the plaintiff received judgment against the defendant,
and the defendant received no judgment against the pla intiff, but the court determined
that the defendant who obtained no affirmative relief was the prevailing party in the
action and awarded costs and attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, even going
so far as to say, " [T]he fact that a party receives no affirmative relief does not prohibit it
from being deemed the prevailing party." Id. at 174. Here, the conclus ion that Storms
and Brownstone are not prevailing parties could be justified even if Watkins had
recovered no ju dgment against them, but denial of Storms and Brownstone's request is
especially appropriate where Watkins recovered judgment against them .
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IV.

THE COURT SHOULD REDUCE ANY AWARD TO STORMS AND BROWNSTONE
BASED ON TH E REQUIREMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS OF RULE 54.
As posited above, the court shou ld disallow all costs and attorney fees Storms

and Brownstone seek because the amount is already capped by the bond amou nt, and
because Storms and Brownstone are not the prevailing parties in this case . In the
alternative, any awa rd to t hem shou ld be reduced as follows.
Rule 54(d)(5) requires that Storms and Brownstone itemi ze all amounts they
seek. Their memorandum of costs seek attorney's fees of $80,126.S0,4 but the only
itemize $79,406,50.5 The court shou ld disal low the $720.00 that Storms and
Brownstone have fa iled to itemize.
Of all the factors the court cou ld consider in making an award, the most
significant factor in this case is the amount involved and the results obtained . I.R.C.P.
54(e)(3)(G) . While Storms and Brownstone assert that their efforts were " greatly
successful," 6 the record does not support that contention. Watkins obta ined a modest
judgment against them. 7 And while Storms and Brownstone did recover the ful l amount
of the $10,000 security bond, they had already incurred more than that amount in
attorney's fees ($11,815 by the court's determination) in the fi rst seven weeks of the
case and never sought to increase the amount of the bond . Thus, Storms and
Brownsto ne started out t he case as net losers, and then procee ded t o spend an other
four years and approximately $80,000 in attorney's fees with absolute ly no prospect of

See p. 3 of Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs fi led I2/3/20 14, already on file with the co urt.
See the last page of Ex. "A' to the Affidavit in Suppo1t of Attorney Fees and Costs filed 12/3/20 14,
al ready on fil e w ith the court.
6 See p. 3 of Affidav it in Support of Atto rney Fees and Costs fi led 12/3/2014, already o n file with the court.
7 This judgment is the subject of Watkins pending Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment filed
12/3/2014, already on file with the court.

4

5
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(

recovering anything more. Underthe totality of the circumstances and viewing the
outcome of the case as a whole, no one could say that spending over $90,000 in
attorney's fees to recover $10,000 on your best day would be a "greatly successful"
endeavor. Sound judicial policy weighs against the court awarding Storms and
Brownstone anything more. Otherwise, the court would be encouraging the parties to
waste the time and resources of the parties and the judicial system simply to increase
their chance at recovering attorney's fees at the end of the case.
Finally, while Watkins does not fault Mr. Brandstetter for offering courtesy
discounts to Storms and Brownstone, this court should reject Storms and Brownstone's
argument that Watkins "is not entitled to the benefit of [Mr. Brandstetter's] courtesy." 8
Under no circumstances should Watkins be required to pay for attorney's fees or costs
that Storms and Brownstone never actually incurred.
V.

CONCLUSION.
For all the foregoing reasons, the court should disallow Storms and Brownstone's

request for an award of costs and attorney's fees. Any award above the bond amount
already included in the Judgment would be reversible error.
DATED this

d S day of December, 2014.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

B.

8

==iff
riscoll, Esq.

See p. 3 of Affidavit in Support of Attorney Fees and Costs filed 12/3/20 14, already on file with the court.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES - Page 10
F:\CLIENTS\BJD\831S - Watkins v. Storms.l l\Plead ings\076 Brief.Motion.Disallow.doc

218

..

r
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2l_

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of December, 2014, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES to be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or
overnight delivery, addressed to the following:
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq.
COX, OHMAN &
BRANDSTETTER,CHTD
P.O. Box 51600
510 "D" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Honorable Darren B. Simpson
District Judge
Bingham County Courthouse
501 N. Maple, #310
Blackfoot, ID 83221

[ ])J. S. Mail

[vf

Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

[ ]~-- S. Mail
Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

[v1
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FrLED lN ctlAMBERS AT BLACKFOOT,
BINGHAM COUNTY, lDAHO

OYJ
C~f#.mht,.- /5, 01015
AT 4:3qf'Yll ~
I ;;.~
.
DARRNB.IMPSON
DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

TIIE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2010-5958

)
vs.

)
)

MICHAEL STORMS, an individual,
KATHY BURGGRAF, an individual, and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an
Idal10 Corporation; collectively doing
business as BROWNSTONE
RESTAURANT AND BREWHOUSE,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

ORDER SUBSTITUTING THE
ESTATE OF MICHAEL
STORMS AND GRANTING
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

_______________
I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff The Watkins Company, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company
(hereinafter "Watkins"), filed this breach of contract, breach of covenant to repair, unjust
enrichment, and waste action against Defendants Michael Storms, an individual
(hereinafter "Storms"); Kathy Burggraf, an individual (hereinafter "Burggraf ');
Brownstone Companies, Inc., an Idaho Corporation (hereinafter the "Brownstone"); and
Storms Burggraf, and Brownstone collectively doing business as the Brownstone
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Restaurant and Brewhouse (hereinafter the "Restaurant"). 1

Watkins also requested

injw1ctive relief, an accounting, eviction, and attorney's fees. 2 Storms and Brownstone
asserted affim1ative defenses and counterclaimed for storage rental, moving, utility, and
insurance expenses, together with attorney fees.
A Comt Trial was held on March 18-21 April 25, May 6, and July 29 of 2014. 4
Judgment was entered November 19, 201 4 whereby Watkins took nothing by its breach
of the ''New Lease" claims, its request for an accounting under the "New Lease," and its
unjust enrichment claim. 5 Watkins' requests for injunctive relief and for the defendants'
eviction were denied as moot. 6 Watkins recovered $699.64 from Storms and Brownstone
for repairs to the premises located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho alls Idaho (hereinafter
the "Premises") wherein the Restaurant was located. 7 Watkins took nothing by its unjust
enrichment claim against Storms and Brownstone. 8

1 Second Amended Complaint The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV20 l0-5958 (filed September 6, 20 l 3) (herei nafter the "Second Amended Complaint").
2 Second Amended Complaint, at pp. 6-8 .
3 Answer to Second Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, The Watkins Company, llC v. Storms,
Bonneville Co unty case no. CV-20 10-5958 (fi led October 23 , 2013 ) (hereinafter the "Answer and
Counterclaim").
4 Milrnte Entry [for March 18, 2014 Court Trial] , The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville
County case no. CV-20 10-5958 (filed March 2 1, 20 14); Minute Entry [for March 19, 2014 Court Trial] ,
The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-5958 (fi led March 21 20 14)·
Minute Entry [for March 20, 2014 Court Trial], The Wc1tkins Company, llC v. Storms, Bonneville County
case no. CV-20 10-5958 (fi led March 2 1, 2014); M inute Entry [for March 21 2014 Court Trial] , The
Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonnev ille County case no. CV-201 0-5958 (fi led May l , 20 l4); Minute
Entry [fo r April 24, 2014 Cou1t Trial ], The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonnevi lle County case no.
CY-2010-5958 (filed May 1, 2014). Th is Cou1i notes that the Bonneville County Cle rk has not prepared a
minute entry for the July 29, 2014 hearing as of this Order.
5 Judgment, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV -2010-5958 (fi led
ovember l 9, 2014) (hereinafter the "Judgment") , at pp. l-2.
6 ld.
7 Judgmem at p. 2.
8 Findings ofFact and Conclusions of law, at p. 88.
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Storms and Brownstone showed themselves entitled to receive $17,015.88 in
costs and fees attributable to Watkins' wrongful temporary restraining order. 9 Storms'
and Brownstone's recovery was limited by the amount of the bond, however, and
Watkins was adjudged liable to Storms and Brownstone in the amount of$1 0,000.00. 10
Storms and Brownstone have moved for an award of costs and attorney fees. 11
Watkins objected to Storms' and Brownstones' Motion for Fees and Costs. 12
Storm's and Brownstone' s Motion for Fees and Costs was heard on February 11 ,
2015 along with Watkins' request to alter or amend the Judgment. 13 This Court ruled
upon Watkins' Motion to Alter or Amend 14 but, due to an oversight, failed to rule on
Storms' and Brownstone's Motion for Fees and Costs.
Tragically, Storms has died. His estate moved for substitution into the lawsuit on
Storms' behalf.1 5

Watkins' objected to Storms' and Brownstone's Motion for

Substitution. 16

Find ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case
no. CV-20 10-5958 (filed November 19, 201 4) (hereinafter the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law"), at p. 102.
10 10 Id., Judgment, at p. 2.
11 Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no.
CV-2010-5958 (filed D ecember 3, 2014) (here inafter "Storms' and Brownstone's Motion for Fees and

9

Costs").
Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney's Fees, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville
County case no. CV-2010-5958 (filed December 17, 2014) (hereinafter "Watkins' Objection to Fees and
Costs"); Brief in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney's Fees, The Watkins Company, LLC v.
Storms, Bonnevi lle County case no. CV-2010-5958 (fi led December 23 , 201 4) (hereinafter "Watkins'
12

Brief re: Objection to Fees and Costs").
13 Minute Entry, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-20 10-5958 (filed
February 11 , 20 15).
14 Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms,
Bonneville County case no. CV-20 10-5958 (fil ed April 9, 2015).
15 Defendants' Motion for Substitution of Party, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County
case no. CV-20 10-595 8 (filed August 7, 2015) (hereinafter "Storms' and Brownstone's Motion for

Substitution").
16 Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Motion for Substitution of Party, Judgment, The Walkins Company,
LLCv. Storms, Bonnevi lle County case no. CV-2010-5958 (fi led August 19, 2015) (hereinafter "Watkins'
Objection to Substitution").
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A hearing was held on Sto1ms' and Brownstone's Motion for Substitution on
August 26, 2015. 17 At that hearing, this Court discovered its oversight with regard to
Storms ' and Brownstone's Motion for Fees and Costs.
Having reviewed the parties' arguments on both Storms' and Brownstone 's
Motion for Fees and Costs and Storms' and Brownstone's Motion for Substitution, the
record in this matter, and the relevant authorities, the Estate of Michael Storms
(hereinafter the "Estate") shall be substituted into this lawsuit as party defendant in place
of Michael Storms, and the Estate and Brownstone shall recover in part their requested
attorney fees and costs.
II.

ISSUES

Storms and Brownstone request substitution of the Estate as party defendant in
place of the deceased Storms. 18 Watkins objects and argues that the Estate has no "claim"
to attorney fees since attorney fees are merely ancillary to the claims Storms presented at
trial, and Storms' death extinguished any right of recovery of Storms' attorney fee
request. 19
Storms and Brownstone premise their attorney fe e request upon Idaho Code § 12120(3) and argue they successfully defended against Watkins' causes of action and
successfully prosecuted their counterclaim. 20

Watkins paiTies that Storms ' and

Brownstone's total recovery is limited to the bond Watkins put down to enjoin Stom1s

17 Minute Entry, Judgment, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no . CV-20105958 (filed August 26, 2015 ).
18 Storms' and Brownstone's Motion for Substitution, at p. 1.
19 Watkins' Objection to Substitution, at pp . 2-4.
20 Stonn s' and Brownstone's Motion for Fees and Costs, atp. 1.
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and Brownstone from removing items from the Premises. 2 1 Watkins also contends that
Storms and Brownstone were not the prevailing parties to the lawsuit. 22 Watkin furt her
posits that Storms' and Brownstone's fee request should be reduced based upon the
requirements ofldaho Rule of Civil Procedw-e 54 (hereinafter "Rule 54"). 23
Based upon the parties' arguments, the following issues must be determined:
I.

Is the Estate entitled to recover attorney fees if any, awarded on behalf of

Sto1ms?
2.

Are Storms and Brownstone entitled to recover attorney fees abov the

amount of the bond?
3.

Are Stonns and Brownstone prevailing parties to this lawsuit?

4.

What amount of money if any meets the standard for reasonable attorney

fees based upon the considerations outlined in Rule 54?
III.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

Watkins owns the Premises which consists of commercial real estate.24

2.

Stom1s was the president and registered agent for Brownstone. 25

3.

On July 31 , 1996, Storms and Burggraf, as individuals entered into a

thi1ty (30) year commercial lease agreement with Watkins (hereinafter refened to as the
"Lease") to lease the Premises for the operation of the Restaurant. 26
4.

After executing the Lease with Watkins, Storms and Burggraf gutted the

building and renovated it to accommodate the Restaurant. 27

21 Watkins'

Briefre: Objection to Fees and Costs, at pp. 2-5.
Watk ins ' Brief re : Objection to Fees and Costs, at pp. 5-8.
23 Watkins' Briefre: Objection to Fees and Costs, at pp. 9-10.
24 Findings ofFact and Conclusions o,f law, at p. 4,
l.
r Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 4, 12.
22
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5.

In 2005, Burggraf sold her interest in the Brownstone.28

6.

On April 21, 2010, Watkins received a judgment against Storms and

Brownstone terminating the Lease.29 Following the entry of the April 21 2010 judgment,
Storms and Brownstone retained possession of the Premises and paid rent on a month-tomonth basis.Jo Storms became a tenant-at-will, possessing the Premises with Watkins'
consent but without fixed lease terms. J1
7.

By letter dated September 15, 2010, counsel for Brownstone info rmed

Watkins of its intention to vacate the Premises on October 17, 2010. 32
8.

On September 29, 20 10, Watkins filed the above-numbered and styled

lawsuit against Storms, Brownstone, and Burggraf and alleged that they breached the
terms of the "New Lease" by failing to timely pay rent, failing to pay late fees, failing to
pay interest on their delinquent payment and impermissibly vacating the Premises.J 3
Watkins also sought to permanently eajoin Storms and Brownstone from removing an
fixtures from the Premises if such removal would cause damages. 34 Watkins requested an
accounting under the "New Lease" and the defendants ' eviction. 35
9.

Storms and Brownstone operated the Restaurant for the last time on

September 30, 20 10.36

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at p. 4 ,r 3.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law at p. 5, ,r 7.
28 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law at p. 6 ,r I 0.
29 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 9 ,r 21.
3 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p9. 9-l 0, ,r 2 1.
3 1 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. IO ,r 22.
32 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, at p. 12 ,r 30.
33 Com plaint, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-5958 ( fi led
September 29, 2010) (hereinafter the "Complaint").
34 Complaint at pp. 5-6.
r Complaint, at pp. 6-7.
26

27

°

36

ld.
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10.

On October 1, 2010 Watkins moved for a temporary restraining order

prohibiting Storms and Brownstone from removing any property located in or on the
Premises.37 A temporary restraining order was granted and the parties were directed not
to remove any property from the Premises until a decision issued on Watkins ' application
for a prejudgment writ of attachment. 38
11.

On October 5 2010 Watkins post d a $10,000.00 bond as required by the

temporary restraining order. 39
12.

On November 4, 2010, Watkins' Motion for Prejudgment Writ of

Attachment was denied, but his request for a preliminary injunction was partially
granted. 40 Stonns and Brownstone were enjoined from removing certain equipment and
stmctures from the Premises. 4 1
13.

On November 9, 2010, the partial preliminary injunction was set aside. 42

14.

On November 24, 2010, this Court again granted Watkins a partial

preliminary injunction applicable only to the outdoor poles in the vicinity of the
Premises. 43 Storms and Brownstone were not enjoined from removing other disputed
fixtures. 44
15.

A Court Trial took place in the spring and early summer of201 4.45

16.

Watkins demanded compensation, in the amount of $2 1,739.1 9, for

Storms' and Brownstone's alleged breach of the Lease's covenant to repair.46 Stom1s and

Findings
Id.
39 Finding
40 Finding
41 Finding
42 Finding.
43 Findings
44 Id.
37

of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 12 132.

3s

of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw at p. 92.
of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw, at p. 12, 133.
of Fact and Conclusions of Law at pp 12-3, 33.
of Fact and Conclusions of law at p. 13 34.
of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw, at p. 14, 36.
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Brownstone were ultimately ordered to compensate Watkins, in the amount of $699.64,
for certain items left in a state of disrepair. 47
17.

Watkins' claims against Storms and Brownstone for breach of contract (a

it related to the "New Lease"), an accounting, and breach of the cov nant to repair under
the "New Lease" were summarily adjudicated in Storms' and Brownstone's favor. 48

I 8.

Watkins' requests for injunctive relief and eviction were declared moot. 49

19.

Watkins ' request for rent in the amount of $5,600.00, under an unj ust

enriclunent theory, was denied. 50
20.

Storms and Brownstone counterclaimed damages in the amount of

$2 1,078.39 for Watkins' wrongful restraint of their efforts to vacate the Premises. 5 1
Storms and Brownstone were found entitled to recover $17 015.88 for costs and fees
attributable to Watkins ' wrongful temporary restraining order. 52

Stonns' and

Brownstone's recovery was limited to Watkins' $10,000.00 temporary restraining order
bond. 53
IV.
A.

APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF LAW

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54.

1.

nder Rule 54(d)( l ), costs a.re allowed as a matter of right to the

prevailing party or parties to a lawsuit, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

See: footnote 4.
Plaintiff's Closing Argument, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV20 l 0-5958 (fi Jed September J9, 2014), at p. 2.
47 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 104, 16.
48 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at pp. 16-7, 1,148, 50, an d 52.
49 Findings ofFact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 16 ~149 , 51.
5° Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, at pp. 86-89.
5 1 Stonns and Brownstone Proposed Findings, Conc lusions and Argument The Watkins Company, LLC v.
Storms, Bonnevi lle County case no . CV -2010-5958 (filed September 19 2014) at p. 53.
52 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at pp. 91-102.
45

46

O RDER SUIJSTITUTING THE ESTATE OF MI C HAEL STORMS A D GRMffU,G ATTORNEY FEES A O O TS

8

227

2.

At any time after a decision by the court, any party who claims costs may

file and serve on the adverse parties a memorandum of costs itemizing each claimed
expense. 54
3.

In any civil action, the comt may award reasonable attorney fees. 55 A

party's ability to recover attorney fees matures upon the filing of a judgment in the
lawsuit. 56
B.

Costs and Fees Incurred as a Result of a Wrongful Temporary Restraining
Order.
1.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) (hereinafter "Rule 65(c)") reads, in

pe1tinent part:
No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the
giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper,
for the payment of such costs and damages including reasonable attorney's
fees to be fixed by the court as may be incurred or suffered by any party
who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.
2.

Rule 65(c) allows the trial court to award costs and reasonable attorne

fees to any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.j 7
3.

If a paity requesting a temporary restraining order ultimately fails on the

merits of the basis for the restraining order then the "wrongfully enjoined or restrained
party" may recover its damages. 58

Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw, at p. 102.
Rule 54(d)(5).
55 Rule 54(e)( l).
56 See. e.g.: Western World, Inc. v. Prater, 121 Idaho 870,873 828 P.2d 899 902 (Ct. App. 1992).
51 Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 73785 P.2d 634, 637 ( 1990).
58 See: McAtee v. Faulkner Land & Livestock Inc. , 11 3 Idaho 393, 395-6, 744 P.2d 121 , 123-4 ( t. App.
1987).

53

54
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4.

The recoverable attorney fees under Rule 65(c) are those incurred in a

proceeding to dissolve a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction rather
than those earned through defending the merits of the action. 59
5.

Recovery of damages, costs and attorney fees occasioned by the

temporary restraining order is limited to the amount of the bond.60
C.

Standard on Award of Attorney Fees - Prevailing Party.
l.

In order to recover attorney fees under Idaho Code · 12-1 20(3) a party

must prevail in the civil lawsuit at issue. 61
2.

A detennination on prevailing parties is committed to the discretion of the

trial court. 62 Thus, this Court must: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion

(2) act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the consideration of an award, and (3) reach its decision by an
exercise of reason. 63
3.

The fact that a party receives no affirmative relief does not prohibit a party

from being deemed a prevailing party. 64 This Court may, in its discretion, conclude that a
party prevailed in part, and apportion the resulting costs and fees accordingly. 65 If neith r

Devine v. Cluff, 110 Idaho l , 3, 713 P.2d 437, 439 (Ct. pp. l 985)
McAtee v. Faulkner Land & Livestock, inc., 113 Idaho at 402, 744 P .2d at 130.
6 1 Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).
62 Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 7 16, 718, 117 P.3d 130. 132
(2005).
6" Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915 204 P.3d l 114, 11 26 (2009).
64 Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho 24, 27, 72 P.Jd 864, 867 (2003).
65 Burns v. Boundary County, 120 ldaho at 626, 818 P.2d at 330; Smith v. Mitton 140 Idaho 893 ,903, 104
P.3d 367, 377 (2004).
59
60
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party "predominantly prevailed" in relation to each other, the Court may decline to award
costs or fees. 66

D.

Standard of Review - Reasonableness of Attorney Fees and Costs.
I.

The factors to be considered in determining an award of attorney fee s as

set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(e)(3), include:
(a)

the tim and labor required·

(b)

the novelty and difficulty of the questions;

(c)

the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the

experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law;
(d)

the prevailing charges for like work;

(e)

whether the fee is fixed or contingent;

(f)

the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstance of

the case·
(g)

the amount involved and the results obtained;

(h)

the undesirability of the case;

(i)

the nature and length of the professional relationship with the

U)

awards in similar cases;

(k)

the reasonable cost of automated legal research. if the court finds it

client;

was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case; and

Smith v. Mitton, l40 Idaho at 903, 104 P. 3d at 377; Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho at 9 16, 204 P.3d at
1125.

66
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(1)

any oth r factor which the court deems appropriate in the part icular

case.67
2.

Although a court must consider the factors listed in Rule 54(e)(3) of the

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure when determining the amount to award in attorney fees,
the court need not demonstrate how it employed any of the factors in reaching an award
amount. 68 The court need not specifically addr ss each of the factors as long as the
record indicates that it considered them all .69
E.

Standard on Cost Award.
1.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l )(A) requires the award of costs as a

matter of right when one party prevails over another.
2.

When neither party prevails, a Court's determination as to a cost award is

discretionary. 70
3.

Discretionary costs may be allowed upon a showing that said costs were

necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice
be assessed against the adverse paity. 71

V.
A.

ANALYSIS

Substitution of the Estate as a Party Defendant.

Initi ally, Watkins objects to the substitution of the Estate and argues that since no
"claims" remain in this case, there is no basis to substitute the Estate into the lawsuit in

67

Idaho Ru le of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3).
In re Univers ity Place/Idaho Water Center Project 146 Idaho 527,544, 199 P.3d 102 l 19 (2008).
69 Id .
70 Idaho Rule of Civi l Procedure 54(d)( l )(B).
7 1 Idaho Rule of Civi l Procedure 54(d)( l)(D).
68
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the place of Storms. 72 Although attorney fees for prevailing over the opposing party in
certain civil lawsuits are not separate and distinct "claims," attorney fees are nonetheless
recoverable at the conclusion of the litigation by the prevailing party in a lawsuit based
upon a commercial transaction. 73
Storms, prior to his untimely death, argued that he and Brownstone prevailed over
Watkins in this lawsuit.

Should this Court agree with Storms' and Brownstone's

prevai ling pruty argument, then they will be entitled, at this Court's discretion, to recover
some or all of their attorney fees . Storms' and Brownstone's Motion for Fees and Costs
was timely filed. It was not timely ruled upon due to this Court's oversight.
Judgment has been rendered in this case.

If Storms and Brownsto ne are

considered the prevailing parties to this lawsuit, then their request for attorney fees has
now matured into a claim which is over-ripe for adjudication.74 Therefore, a claim on
behalf of Storms exists, to which the Estate may aspire.
Next, Watkins takes the position that Storms' death extinguished his now mature
claim for attorney fees. 75 The citation Watkins offers in support in fact runs counter to its
position. 76 The attorney fee claim now before the Court arises out of the contract dispute
between the parties. As such it survives the death of Storms and may be pursued by the
Estate.

Watkins' Objection to Substitution, at pp. 1-3 .
Ida ho Code§ 12-120(3).
74 See. e.!!..: We tern World, inc. v. Prater 121 ldahoh at 873 828 P.2d at 902 ("the right to costs. and an
a_ward for attorney tees, would mature anew when an amended judgment was enLered' ).
7 Watkins Objection to Substitution, at p. 3.
76 See id.
72

73
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For these reasons, Stonns' and Brownstone' s Motion for Substitution shall be
granted. The Estate shall be substituted into this lawsuit as a party defendant in place of
Michael Storms.
B.

Attorney Fees Over and Above the Amount of the Bond.

As this Court previously found, Rule 65( c) limits recovery of any damages or fees
incurred as the result of a wrongfully issued preliminary injunction bond. 77 Storms' and
Brownstone's attorney fees, incurred between October 1, 2010 and November 24, 2010,
were considered as damages suffered by Storms and Brownstone as a result of having
been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. 78 The fees requested by Storms and Brownstone
do not include any fees generated prior to December 1, 2010. 79
The vast majority of the pretrial and trial issues in this matter dealt with Watkins'
claims for breach of the covenant to repair in the Lease, unjust enrichment, and waste.
Those issues were not related to the temporary restraining order. Instead, the temporary
restraining order involved Watkins ' fears that Storms and Brownstone would remove
furnishings and fixtures from the Premises that should remain with the Premises.
A fractional portion of the parties' issues, after resolution of the temporary
restraining order, involved Storms' and Brownstone's counterclaims for damages caused
by Watkins' wrongful restraint of Storms' and Brownstone's efforts to vacate the
Premises. That portion of the litigation fell squarely under the auspices of the bond and
cannot be recovered.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw, at pp. 91Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 98.
79 Affidavit in Suppo1
1 of Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs, The Watkins Company, LLC v.
Storms, Bonneville County case no . CV-20 I 0-5958 (filed December 3, 20 14) (hereinafte r the
"Brandstetter Affidavit"), at attachment, p. 1.
77
78
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Although Storms and Brownstone did not clarify the precise amount of time
devoted to their counterclaim, this Cami is very fan1iliar with the pleadings filed and the
issues tried in this lawsuit. Not more than ten percent (1 0%) of the pleadings, arguments,
and trial evidence pertained to Storms' and Brownstone's counterclaim.

The vast

majority of the time, effort and evidence in this case centered upon Watkins' claims for
dan1age under the covenant to repair in the pa11ie ' Lease. Indeed, this Court's analyses
of Storms' and Brownstone's counterclaim accounts for approximately ten percent of the
105-page Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Therefore, Storms' and

Brownstone's fee request shall be reduced by ten percent in recognition of the time spent
on Stonns' and Brownstone's counterclaim, which time necessarily fell under the
auspices of the temporary restraining order bond.
C.

Storms and Brownstone Prevailed at Trial.

Watkins argues that since both sides prevailed on some issues this Court should
decline to award attorney fees to Storms and Brownstone.80 But Watkins recovered only
$699.64 (or 2.56%) of the $27 339.19 he demanded for breach of the covenant to repair
and for unj ust enrichment.
Storms and Brownstone were found entitled to recover $17,015 .88 (or 81% of
the $21 ,078 .39 they counterclaimed.

They ultimately recovered only $10,000.00 (or

47%) which was the amount of the bond. However, they prevailed on over ninety-seven
per-cent (97%) of Watkins claims against them.
Based upon this Court's knowledge of the parties' pleadings and arguments, and
its observation of the witnesses and evidence admitted at trial, and in light of its Findings

80

Watkins ' Briefre: Objection to Fees and Costs, at p. 7.
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of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this Court finds that Storms and Brownstone is the
prevailing party in this lawsuit.

D.

Storms' and Brownstone's Attorney Fee Request is Reasonable.
Watkins argues that Storms' and Brownstone's claimed attorney fees should b

reduced, based upon Rule 54, for a number of reasons.

First Watkins argues that

$720. 00 of Storms' and Brownstone's request was not itemized and therefore should be
denied. 81 This discrepancy is dealt with in the Brandstetter Affidavit, however. Fees and
costs incurred by Storms and Brownstone tlrrough November 20 2014 amounted to
$79,406.50. 82 Storms and Brownstone incurred the additional $720.00 in preparing their
Motion for Fees and Costs, which Motion was filed on December 3, 2014. 83
Next, Watkins argues that Storms and Brownstone were "net losers" because they
only recovered the amount of the bond on their counterclaim. 84 This position ignores the
fact that Storms and Brownstone defeated the vast majority of Watkins ' claims against
them.
Finally, Watkins argues that Storms and Brownstone should not recover the thirty
(30) hours of attorney time which Mr. Brandstetter did not charg

as a courtesy to his

clients. 85 Mr. Brandstetter did not include the courtesy discounts in the attorney fee he
requests from Watkins. 86

In other words, Watkins received the same "discount" in

St01ms' and Brownstone's fee request as did Storms and Brownstone.

Watkins' Briefre: Objection to Fees and Costs, at p. 9.
Brandstetter Affidavit, at attachment, p. 10.
83 Brandstette r Affidavit, at p. 4 '1f l S.
84 Watkins ' Briefre: Objection to Fees and Costs, at p. 9.
85 Watkins' Brief re: Objection to Fees and Costs, at p. 10.
86 Brandstetter Affidavit, at p. 3, '1f 3.
81

82
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A for the Rule 54(e)(3) factors , the time and labor Mr. Brandstetter required to
prepare for and defend this lawsuit which consumed over four years was commensurate
with the vast number of issues Watkins raised. While the questions at bar were not novel
they were complex and detailed.

The skill required to perform the legal s rvices

necessary was moderately high, as the volume of claims pursued by Watkins required
experienced organization and thorough investigatory skills. Mr. Brandstetter showed the
requisite ability and skill in his representation of torms and Brownstone.
Mr. Brandstetter's hourly fee of $225.00 falls within the range of highly
experienced litigators in southeast Idaho. His fixed fee for his work is typical for civil
defense in this area.
Although time limitations were not a factor in this case the time and labor
necessary to answer all of Watkins' issues necessarily consumed a vast amount ohime
investigation and skill. Mr. Brandstetter obtained very favorable results for his clients.
Mr. Brandstetter did not find the action undesireable.87 Mr. Brandstetter has represented
Storms and Brownstone since 20 10 in other proceedings and matters. 88
The attorney fee requested by Stonns and Brownstone is similar to other cases
involving multiple claims of damage to a building.
Mr. Brandstetter incurred $220.57 in electronic legal research fees .89 Given the

nature and complexity of this lawsuit, such fee is reasonable.
Based upon the foregoing analyses Stonns' and Brownstone's request for
attorney fees in the amount of $80,347.07 is reasonable under the circumstances

87
88

Brandstetter Affidavit, at p. 3, 1 12.
Brandstetter Affidavit, at p. 3 1 11 .
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presented in this lawsuit.

This amount shall be decreased by ten percent (10%), as

discussed above, for a total attorney fee recovery of $72,312.36.
E.

Costs.

Storms and Brownstone also request the $500.00 fee they paid to the mediator. 90
As the prevailing party, Stonns and Brownstone are entitled to recover their costs as a
matter of right under Rule 54(d)(l)(A). The mediator's fee is not enumerated as one of
the costs as a matter of right, however. 91 Thus, it falls within the ambit of a discretionary
cost. 92
Mediation is ordered in most civil lawsuits in Idaho. As such, the mediator's fee
is not an exceptional cost. Storms and Brownstone do not offer any reason why this cost
should be assessed against Watkins. Accordingly, this cost shall be denied.
VI.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

Based upon the foregoing findings and analyses, the following conclusions are
appropriate:
1.

The Estate is entitled to recover attorney fees, if any, awarded on behalf of

2.

Storms and Brownstone are entitled to recover attorney fees above the

Storms.

amount of the bond.
3.

Storms and Brownstone are the prevailing paiiies to this lawsuit.

89

Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County
case no. CV -2010-5958 (filed December 3, 20 14), at p. l.
90 Id.
9 1 See: Idaho Rule of Civi l Procedure 54(d)(l)(C).
92 See: Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(D).
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4.

The amount of $72,312.36 meets the standard for reasonable attorney fees

based upon the considerations outlined in Rule 54.
Vil.

ORDER

Accordingly, the Estate is hereby substituted into this lawsuit as a party defendant
in place of Michael Storms.
The Estate and Brownstone are entitled to recover attorney fees in the amount of
$72,312.36 from Watkins.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this \ ~ay of September 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true and correct copy of the foregoing Order
Substituting the Estate of Michael Storms and Granting Attorney Fees and Costs was
delivered to the parties listed below by first class mail with prepaid postage and/or hand
day of September 2015, to :
delivered and/or sent by facsimi le this ~

BJ. Driscoll, Esq.
SMITH, DRISCOLL &
AS SOCIATES, PLLC
4 14 Shoup Ave.
P .O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq.
COX, OHMAN &
BRANDSTETTER,CHARTERED
510 "D" Street
P.O. Box 51600
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600

~

Mail

D Courthouse Box

D Facsimi le

D Courthouse Box

DFacsimi le

RONALD LONGMORE, Clerk of the Court

~('{JJ1iWL1k2'.]~
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2010-5958
FIRST AMENDED
JUDGMENT

)
THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL STORMS, )
an individual, KATHY BURGGRAF, an )
individual, and BROWNSTONE
)
COMPANIES, INC., an Idaho Corporation; )
collectively doing business as
)
BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT AND
)
BREWHOUSE,
)
)
Defendants.
)
- -- -- -- - - - - -- -- .)

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Plaintiff The Watkins Company, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company
(hereinafter "Watkins") shall take nothing by its allegations against defendant Kathy
Burggraf, an individual.
Watkins shall take nothing by its breach of the ''New Lease" claims against the
defendants.

FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT
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Watkins' request for injunctive relief against the defendants is denied as moot.
Watkins' shall take nothing by its request for an accounting under the "New
Lease."
Watkins ' request for the defendants ' eviction is denied as moot.
Watkins shall recover $699.64 from defendant The Estate of Michael Storn1s, an
individual (hereinafter the "Estate"), and defendant Brownstone Companies, Inc., an
Idaho Corporation (hereinafter "Brownstone") for repairs to the premises located at 455
River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho (hereinafter the "Premises") necessitated by Michael
Storms' and Brownstone's breach of the expectations of their at-will tenancy with
Watkins or, in the alternative, for waste to the Premises.
Watkins shall take nothing by its claim of unjust enrichment against the Estate
and Brownstone.
The Estate and Brownstone shall recover the full amount of the $10,000.00 bond
given by Watkins for the Temporary Restraining Order on their counterclaim against
Watkins.
The Estate and Brownstone shall recover attorney fees m the amount of
$72,31 2.36 from Watkins.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this

. ·-n+
1S day of September 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

onUtptlmter /tg

I HEREBY CERTIFY that
c),D/?f served a true copy of the
foregoing First Amended Judgment on the pai1ies listed below by deposit into the U.S.
mail, by deposit into the attorney's courthouse mailbox, or by facsimile transmission.

B.J. Driscoll, Esq.
SMITH, DRISCOLL &
ASSOCJATES, PLLC
4 14 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 5073 1
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq.
COX, OHMAN &
~
BRANDSTETTER, CHARTERED
5 10 "D" Street
P.O. Box 51600
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600

FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT

~ D Courthouse Box

rv
ai l

3

D Courthouse Box

DFacsimile

DFacsimile
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B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB #7010
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SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone : (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166
Email: bjd@eidaholaw.com
Attorneys for Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liabil ity company,
Case No. CV-10-5958
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/ Appellant,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
V.

MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an Idaho
corporation; collectively doing business as
BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT AND BREWHOUSE,
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Respondents.
and
KATHY BURGGRAF, an individual,
Defendant.

TO:

THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL STORMS and BROWNSTON E COMPANIES, INC.,
Defendants/Counterclaima~ts/Respondents, and DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER,
ESQ., THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD; and TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVEENTITLED COURT;

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

Th e above-named plaintiff/counterdefe nd an t /appellant, THE WATKINS

COMPANY, LLC (" WATKINS" ), app eals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Seventh

NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 1
F:\CLI ENTS\BJD\8315 - Wat kins v. Sto rms. ll\Pleadings\082 Notice of Appeal.doc
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Judicial District Court's Judgment entered November 20, 2014; First Amended Judgment
entered September 15, 2015; and from the Order Substituting The Estate of Michael
Storms and Granting Attorney Fees and Costs entered September 15, 2015, in the
above-entitled action, the Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge, presiding.
2.

Watkins has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and

judgments and order described in paragraph one above are subject to appeal pursuant
to Idaho Appellate Rule ll(a).
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which Watkins intends to

assert on appeal are the following, provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not
prevent the appellant from asserting othe.r issues on appeal:
a.

Did the district court commit reversible error by apportioning and

awarding the respondents 90% of their attorney's fees where the memorandum
of costs and underlying attorney time entries did not isolate fees recoverable on
the contract defense from the fee s that were not recoverable on the
counterclaim?
4.

There has been no or-der entered sealing any portion of the record in this

5.

Watkins does not requ est a transcript;

6.

Watkins requests th e following documents be included in the clerk's

case;

record, which request is more limited than the st andard record under Idaho Appellate
Rule 28:
a.

Register of actions;

NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 2
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b.

The original an.d all amended complaints;

c.

The original and any amended answers to the complaints;

d.

The original and any amended counterclaim;

e.

The original and any amended answer to a counterclaim;

f.

The original fin.dings of fact and conclusions of law filed in

chambers on November 19, 2014, but listed as filed on November 20, 2014, on
the register of actions from the Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository for the
case;
g.

The original judgment fi led in chambers on November 19, 2014,

but listed as filed on November 20, 2014, on the register of actions from the
Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository for the case;
h.

The defendan!:s' motion for attorney fees and costs filed

December 3, 2014;
i.

The defendants' memorandum of attorney's fees and costs filed

December 3, 2014;
j.

The defendants' affidavit in support of memorandum of

attorney's fees and costs file_d Deo~mber 3, 2014;
k.

The plaintiff's motion to disa llow costs and attorney's fees f il ed

December 17, 2014;

I.

The pla intiff's brief. in support of motion to disallow costs and

attorney's fees filed Decemb'_er 17, 2014;
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m.

The order substituting the estate of Michael Storms and granting

attorney fees and costs filed September 15, 2015; and
n.
7.

The First Amended Judgment filed September 15, 2015.

Watkins does not req_uest any additional documents, charts, or exhibits

to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.
8.

I certify:
(a}

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each

reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the
address set out below: None.
(b)

That the clerk of the district court has not been paid the

estimated fee for preparatior ofthe reporter's transcript because none has been
requested.
(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has

been paid .
(d)

That the appeJlate filing fee has been paid; and

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 20.
DATED this

c:9,f

day of Sep':ember, 2015.
SM ITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

By: - ~- ~ ...............
~ -~ ........,...._...._
_ __
L J.Drisc~Attorneys for Appellant
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(

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this §?;!day of September, 2015, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served, by placing the same in a
sealed envelope and depositing in the Unit ed States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand
delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq.
COX, OHMAN &
BRANDSTETTER,CHTD
P.O. Box 51600
510 "D" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Fax
[ ] pvernight Delivery
[vf Hand Delivery

Honorable Darren B. Simpson
'
District Judge
Bingham County Courthouse
501 N. Maple, #310
Blackfoot, ID 83221

[~
S. Mail
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

Ronald Longmore
605 N. Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Fax
[ ] ,,Overnight Del ivery
[\;/J Hand Delivery
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC
an Idaho limited liability company,

)

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Appel !ant,
vs.

)
)

MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, lNC. ,an ldaho
corporation- collectively doing business as
BROWNSTO E RESTAURANT AND
BREWHOUSE,

)

Case No. CV-20 l 0-5958
Docket No.

43649

CLERK'S CERTIFICATION
OF EXHIBITS

)

)
)
)

Defendant/Counterclaimants/Respondents.

)

_ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ )
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
)
)

I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the foregoing Exh ibits were marki::<l for
identification and offered in evidence admitted, and used and considered by the Court in its
determination: please see attached sheets.

Plaintiffs Exhibit 1- Defendant Michael Storms and Brownstone Companies, Jnc. Answers to
Plaintiff's First Set of [nterrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, dated January 30, 2013.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 2- Defendant's Supplemental A nswers to Discovery, dated January 30, 2013 .
And 1 further certify that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of this record on
Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the sea l of the District Court

7

this J
day of December, 2015.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an fdaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Appellant,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-5958
Docket No.

43649

)
MICHAEL STORMS an individual, and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC.,an Idaho
corporation; collectively doing business as
BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT AND
BREWHOUSE,
Defendant/Counterclaimants/Respondents .

)
)
)
)
)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)

________ _ _________ )_
STATE OF IDAHO

)

)
County of Bonneville

)

I, Ronald Lo ngmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of
Idaho in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record in the
above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete
Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho
Appellate Rules.
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will be duly
lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript (ifreq uested) and
the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the ldaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand affixed the seal of the District Court this

/7

day of December, 2015.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liabi lity company,
P laintiff/Counterdefendant/ Appel !ant,

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-5958

)

vs.
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, and
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC.,an Idaho
corporation; collectively doing business as
BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT AND
BREWHOUSE,

)
)
)
)

Docket No.

43649

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE

)

)
)
)

Defendant/Counterclaimants/Respondents.
_ ___
_______________)
),

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

fl_ ~ day of December, 2015, l served a copy of the Reporter's

Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in the above entitled
cause upon the following attorneys:

BJ. Driscoll
PO Box 50731
Idaho Falls ID 83405

Dean C. Brandstetter
PO Box 51600
Idaho Falls ID 83405-1600

by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed
to said attorneys at the foregoing address, which is the last address of said attorneys known to me.
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